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INTRODUCTION 
In his essay entitled "The War of Gods and Demons," I after 
a plea for what he calls "psychological history" as opposed to 
purely economic and political history, G. K. Chesterton explairu 
the war to extinction between Rome and Carthage as a contest, 
not merely of commercial interests, but of two deep~y antago-
nistic cultures, world outlooks, religious atmospheres. He main-
tains that the Roman with his friendly, naturalistic gods, his 
ideal of "prisca virtus", his deep regard for the sanctity and 
inviolability of the home and family, was sustained in the face 
of death and defeat during the second, and most deoisive, por-
tion of the struggle, not by economic considerations, not by 
hope of world empire, but by a hatred of what he sensed in the 
Carthaginian culture,- a world outlook appalling to him in its 
basic despair, in its cruel commercialism, its utter disregard 
for objective moral standards, its inhuman cultus of blood-
thirsty Eastern gods. Thus Mr. Chesterton introduces a new 
aspect, suggests a more basic motive for the death struggle of 
these two great powers. 
The problem then arises: is this suggestion justified hist-
orically? What do we actually know of the civilization and 
culture, the spirit and moral atmosphere of Carthage as record-
ed by the ancients themselves? Do the historical sources just-
ify Mr. Chesterton's interpretation, or is it enough to explain 
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the Punic wars simply as a contest for political and economic 
supremacy between two states having essentially the same moral 
outlook and values? Obviously, the first step toward a solution 
must be an examination of the ancient authors with a view to 
determining the nature of Carthaginian civilization and culture l 
especially at the time of the Punic wars. That is what we pro-
pose to undertake in this investigation. 
Our attempt will be to discover not so much what Carthage 
~, but what she was. We shall not try, therefore, to trace 
the full history of the city, and historical details will be 
considered only in so far as they cast light on some significant 
trait of national character; rather we shall attempt to dis-
cover the reality beloind those details. R.B.Smith states the 
problem thus: 
If we try, as we cannot help trying, to picture to ourselves 
the daily life and personal characteristics of the people ••• and 
to ask, not what the Carthaginians did, for that we know, but 
what they were, we are confronted by the provoking blank in the 
national history ••• 
It is with the hope of filling in somewhat that "provoking 
blank in the national history" of Carthage that we shall 
examine the ancient sources, extracting all that casts light on 
the people themselves, their civilization and culture, inter-
preting this data to determine their national character. And, 
since the investigation draws much of its importance from its 
connection with the larger problem of the Punic wars, our 
interest will be centered on the civilization and culture of 
Carthage especially during the period of those wars. 
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In regard to sources, the ancient Latin and Greek authors, 
particularly the historians, will be used almost exclusively as 
the basis of conclusions. It is true that the details they offer 
conoerning the national oharacter of Carthage are limited and 
fragmentary. Yet, in one sense, this limitation is an advantage, 
sinoe it allows an exhaustive study of what data is provided. It 
will be objeoted, of course, that a study of Carthage through 
the acoounts of her enemies, the Greeks and Romans, will neoes-
sarily be prejudioed and lacking in objective value. We can 
reply, first, that if Greek and Roman writers of different peri-
ods present a single oonsistent pioture of the nation, and one 
that appears to be borne out by the actions of that nation, that 
is, by simple historical facts, then it is safe to say that 
their attitude must be justified by reality. Moreover, the Greek 
and Roman attitude itself is almost as important for our ulti-
mate purpose as the reality it reflects, sinoe it helps toward 
a basic explanation of their centuries of opposition to Cartha-
ginian expansion. Finally, we must be satisfied with Greek and 
Roman sources for the very good reason that no others exist. It 
would be highly desirable to learn the national charaoter of 
Carthage from Carthaginian historians, and to possess an acoount 
of the Punic Wars from the Carthaginian point of view. The faot 
is, however, that no suoh writings exist, and so we must make 
the best of what we have. 
Much has been written on Carthage in modern times, both in 
the course of general histories of the ancient world, like those 
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of Mommson, Rostovtzeff, and Duruy, or in the form of special 
studies, like those of R. B. Smith3 and A. J. Church. 4 The 
general histories, naturally, touch on the background of Cartha-
ge only in so far as it is necessary to an understanding of her 
political and economic history. Of the special studies, Smith 
is the most satisfactory; his style is interesting and his in-
terpretations moderate. His effort to achieve literary excel-
lence, hosever, is made at the cost of full citation and anno-
tation of prime sources. Moreover, he is not concerned exclusi-
vely with the nature of Carthage herself, but treats her history 
at greater length. Church, too, is concerned mainly with politi-
cal development and history; his account of Carthaginian civili-
zation and culture is rather cursory and superficial, inferior 
to that of some of the general histories of the ancient world. 
Neither had as his prime aim the precise object of this inves-
tigation. All the existing accounts are most useful, of course, 
as guides to prime sources and aids to interpretation. We shall 
be concerned with them only incidentally, however, attempting 
rather to examine carefully the prime sources themselves and to 
draw, as far as possible, our own conclusions. 
The data gathered from the ancient writers will be organized 
under the two main divisions of civilization and culture. The 
term "civilization" is here taken in its root meaning as signi-
fying all that has to do with law and its enforcement, so that 
we can say with E. R. Hull, S. J.:5 "Civilization, therefore, 
I define as a state of social organization which binds together 
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a race or people into a unity under a definite social code ••• 
In short, civilization is essentially the reign of social law." 
Thus, under the head of "civilization" we shall group all mate-
rial on the civil constitution and laws of Carthage and their 
enforcement. 
Again, we follow Hull in distinguishing between "civiliza-
tion" and"culture" as follows: 6 
Civilization ••• means essentially the reign of social law ••• 
Everything else which is found embodied in a given system of 
civilization must therefore for the sake of clearness be called 
by some other name; and that name, for want of a better, we may 
call "culture". Culture etymologically means the cultivation of 
something, and therefore the application of human faculties to 
some object. 
Thus, the faculties applied in the material sphere gives 
rise to material culture,- agriculture, commerce, resources, 
territorial dominion, etc. In the same way intellectual culture 
will include intellectual and aesthetic development,- art, lite-
rature, philosophy, and the amenities - while religion and na-
tional ideals will fall under moral culture. The division, no 
doubt, can be questioned; it is proposed, however, not as an ab-
solute, but rather as a convenient framework for the organiza-
tion of material. These two large aspects or approaches, the 
civil and cultural, while complementing and enlightening each 
other, will, we hope, join in focus upon the Carthaginians them-
selves, drawing out the salient features of their nature, en-
abling us to see with some accuracy "what they were", especially 
at the time of the Punic Wars. 
vi 
Notes to Introduction 
1 The Everlasting Man, New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1930, 
158. -
2 cartha~e and the Carthaginians, London, Longman's, Green, 
1879, 9. 
3 .2£. cit. 
4 Carthage (Story of Nations Series), New York, Putnam, 1893. 
5 Civilization and Culture, London, Sands and Co., 1916, 10. 




TBI CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF CARTHAGE 
I. General !lR! ~ Constitution 
Our mos\ complete and reliable authority on the cons\i\ution 
of Carthage is Aristotle, who sketches i\s broad outline in the 
politics, characterizing it, with that of Sparta and Crete, as 
-
"justly famous.· l He classifies the government of Carthage as an 
aristocracy, "the government of more tban one, yet only a few," 
so called "eitber because the best men rule or because \hey rule 
with a view \0 wbat is best for tbe state ana for its members. H2 
Yet it is not a pure aristocracy, governed by the "best in 
virtue absolutely," under wbicb -tbe same person is a good man 
and a good citizen absolutely,"- but a secondary type of aris-
tocracy, in wbicb tbe rulers are "good men in rela\ion to some 
arbitrary standard, ••• good relatively to tbeir own form of 
government.·3 -For even in tbe states tbat do not pay any public 
attention to virtue there are nevertheless 80me men that are 
held in high esteem and are thougbt wortby of respect. Where 
then the constitution takes in view wealtb and virtue as well as 
the common people, as, for instance, at Carthage, this is of the 
nature of an aristocracy.-4 
II. Chief Magistrates 
According to Aristotle, the constitution of Cartbage provided 
for cbief magistrates whom he calls kings, corresponding to the 
kings at Sparta,5probably in their twofold capacity as protector. 
OHAPTER I 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF OARTHAGE 
I. General Iln! ~ Oonstitution 
Our most complete and reliable authority on the constitution 
of Carthage is Aristotle, who sketches its broad outline in the 
Politics. characterizing it. with that of Sparta and Orete. as 
"justly famous.· l He classifies the government of Oarthage as an 
aristocracy, "the government of more tban one. yet only a few,· 
so called "eitber because the best men rule or because tbey rule 
with a view to what is best for the state ana for its members. H2 
Yet it is not a pure aristocracy, governed b.Y the Hbeat in 
virtue absolutely.· under which -the same person is a good man 
and a good citizen absolutely,"- but a secondary type of aris-
tocracy. in which the rulers are "good men in relation to some 
arbitrary standard •••• good relatively to their own form of 
government.-3 -For even in the states that do not pay any publio 
attention to virtue there are nevertheless aome men that are 
held in high esteem and are thought worthy of respect. Where 
then the constitution takes in view wealth and virtue as well as 
the common people, as. for instance, at Carthage, this is of the 
nature of an aristocracy.-4 
II. Chief Magistrates 
According to Aristotle, the constitution of Oarthage provided 
for chief magistrates whom he calls kings, corresponding to the 
kings at Sparta,5probably in their twofold capacity as protector 
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and rulers of t.he stat.e. They held office, however, not. by here~ 
ditary right as at Sparta, but. b.Y election on t.he double basis 
of wea1t.h and merit.. "It therefore e1ect.ion by wea1t.h is oligar-
chical and election by merit aristocrat.ic, this will be a t.hird 
system exhibit.ed in t.he organization of t.he const.it.ution of Car-
thage, for there elections are made with an eye to these two 
qualifications, and especially elections to t.he most import.ant 
offices, those of t.he kings and of t.he genera1s."S Aristotle re-
gards this as an advantage over the Spartan system, for in 
7 pointing out t.he resemb1ences of the two canstitutions, he says: 
"It. is another superior teature t.hat the Cart.haginian kings are 
not confined to the same taml1y, and that one ot no particular 
distinctlon." 
This much we know about the klngs trom Arlst.ot1e; later 
writers till in a tew details. Nepos tells us their number and 
term ot ottioe:8.&s ls true ot the consuls at Rome, so at Car-
thage two kings were elected annually tor a term of one year.· 
9 Livy calls t.hem b.Y thelr more common and proper title ·sutetes, 
10 qui su_us Poenis eat magistratus," and again, "sufetes (quod 
ve1ut consulare imperium apud nos erat),· ... a title which most 
modern historians and commentators trace to the Hebrew word 
shotetim,p commonly rendered in Biblical English as judse, though 
the otticials bearing this title at Carthage held exeoutive as 
well as judioia1 authority. 
What were the funotions ot the sutetes? Up to Aristotle's 
time they must have held, in oonjunotion with a group ot Elders 
3 
who probably formed their cabinet or privy council, the supreme 
legislative and executive authority. "The reference of some 
matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the 
kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unani-
mously, but failing that these matters also lie with the people; 
11 
and ••• the kings introduce business in the assembly ••••• 
In later times, during the Punic wars, though the sufetes 
must have lost much of their power and authority through the 
limitations imposed on them bf the excessive power of the order 
of JUdges,12sti11 they retained the prerogative of calling the 
senate or assembly together~3and probably of introducing busi-
ness and acting as spokesmen for the body, as we find in Poly-
bius' account of the Roman embassy to Carthage at the beginning 
of the Second Punic war:14 
The oldest member of the embassy, pointing to the bosom of 
his toga, told the senate that it held both peace and war for 
them. Therefore he would let fall from it and leave with them 
whichever of the two they bade him. The Carthaginian sufete bade 
him let fall whichever the Romans chose, and when the envoy said 
he would let fall war, many of the senators cried out at onee, 
'We accept it.'· 
Finally, the sufetes must have acted as Judges in popular 
law suits, holding court daily in a busy quarter of the city, 
for Livy tells us that after the Second Punic war Arlsto, the 
Tyrian agent of the exiled Hannibal, hung his written message to 
the senate ot Carthage ·celeberrimo loco, supra sedem quotidi-
anam magistratuum prima vespera," and that it was discovered 
15 
"postero die, cum sufetes ad jus dicendum consedissent.· 
III. The Council ot Elders 
- -
According to Aristotle's account, there was a council ot 
Elders ( YEpouaCa) corresponding to the Elders at Sparta, 
though the exact nature ot this group, its tunction, number, 
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and mode of selection is not clear from the sources, and later 
commentators are hopelessly at odds upon the difficUlty.16Aria-
totle tells us that ·the kings and the council of alders corre-
spond to the kings and Elders at Sparta,.17and we know that the 
council at Sparta, like that at Crete also,18consisted of twenty 
eight members and acted as a single agency ln conjunction with 
the kings.19 The Gerousia at Carthage may very well have been 
the same in number, tormlng, together wlth the kings, that coun-
cil ot which Livy speaks as negotiating tor peace at the end ot 
the Second Punic war: 20 
Carthaginienses oratores ad pacem petendaa mittunt triginta 
seniorum principes. Id erat sanctius apud lllos cone ilium 
maximlque ad lpsum senatum regendum vls. 
It is quite clear trom this and other sources that there ex-
isted along with the council ot twenty eight another larger 
body, the senate, ot which this group tormed but a part, and 
trom which lt probably drew its members. 2l In the passage just 
quoted Livy points out that this ·consilium· comprised the 
·principes seniorum," whlle in another place22he explaines: 
·seniores, ita senatum vocabant.· The councll, then, were the 
·prlncipes senlorum,· the senate. ·seniores." This distinction 
between the council and the larger senate is evident from Pol,. 
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bius' account ot the terms ottered ~ the Romans betore the 
Third Punic war, which included the surrender ot three hundred 
hostages, the sons ot senators (~wv lx ~~~ O~XA~~OU ) and ot 
( 1... ') 23 members of the council ~x ~~~ yePOucrLa~ , while atter the 
capture of New Carthage, according to the same author, Scipio 
"set apart Mago and the Carthaginians who were with him, two ot 
them being members ot the council ot Elders (yepoucr{a) and tit-
teen members ot the senate (cr~YXA~~O~ ),24 
The council ot Elders must have been made up ot the senators 
most distinguished tor ability, family, and wealth, since these 
were the standards ot excellence at Carthage, according to Aris-
25 totle. In his time, the legislative power ot t he council was 
apparently absolute when its members agreed with the two kings: 
The reference of some matters and not ot others to the popu-
lar assembly rests with the kings in conSUltation with the 
Elders in case they agree unanimo~gly, but tailing that, these 
matters also lie with the people. 
There is question here, ot course, as to whether Aristotle, 
in speaking ot the Elders (ylpov~€~ ) means the councilor the 
entire senate. It is likely that he speaks ot the council; this 
would be more in accord with the praq~ice at Sparta, and much 
more practical. The entire senate woula be too unwieldy a group 
to act thus in harmony with the kings in the multiple attairs ot 
government; its membership must have ~een tairly large, since 
Justinus relates that, at a perios of more than titty years 
betore the writing of the Politics, ·centum ex numero senatorum 
judices deliguntur.-27 
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The function of this council of Elders at the time of Aris-
totle, then, was not merely to advise the kings, but actually to 
share their power of government. Later, however, they must have 
lost this prerogative with the decline in the monarchy and the 
rise of oligarchical rule. While Livy speaks of them even in the 
time of the Punic wars as ·vis ad ipsum senatum regendum," they 
probably exercised this influence more through personal author-
ity as Mprincipes seniorumM than in virtue of any authority in-
vested in the council itself. The occasions upon which the coun-
cil of Thirty appears in Livy's account,28_ the only times he 
distinguishes between this group and the rest of the senate- is 
when they are sent as a delegation to ask tor peace, which indi-
cates that at least the conventional form of the council was re-
tained as a convenient committee tor carrying out diplomatic and 
civic formalities under the authority of the senate. This is 
borne out by Polybius, who speaks of -the thirty of the Gerousia 
who were sent to reconcile Hanno and Hamilcar toward the end of 
the Mercenary war. 29 
IV • .IS! .-S.-en=a.-t ... e
Little is said of the senate at the early peri04; in fact it 
is not mentioned by Aristotle. However, we know that it existed 
in his time from the fact that a board of 104 Judges, whom he 
does mention, was chosen from among its members, according to 
Justinus. 30 This fact indicates also that it must have been a 
rather large body. The silence of Aristotle may be accounted for 
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b.Y assuming that the senate was ot little importance at his 
time, the power of state being in t he hands of the kings and the 
Gerousia. The senate, like the council of Elders and the Judges 
drawn from it, would have been composed of representatives of 
families distinguished tor wealth and influence. 
In the time of the Punic wars, however, w.e know that the Sen-
ate was of great importance. There are several incidents in 
polybius which show that the senators had the prerogative ot 
deciding tor war or peace. For example, when Regulus was threat-
ening Carthage, it was the senate that d.'ermined not to submit, 
but to hold out against him to the end.3l Again, the senate de-
cided to accept war from the Roman ambassado.s who came to re-
monstrate about the aggression of Hannibal. 32 Finally, when 
Scipio proposed terms at the end of tohe Second Punic war, at the 
instigation and under the influence of Hannibal, the senate 
·voted to make the treaty on the above conditions and ••• at once 
dispatched envoys with orders to agree with them. w33 
V. l!!! .;;oH~:un=d_r_e_d 
How can we account for this change, the shift in power from 
the hands of the kings and Elders to the senatorial class? It 
was due, probably, to the influence of a new institution, intro-
duced into the Carthaginian system at a comparatively late hour 
to restore the balance of power between the nobility and the 
senatorial order. 34 For the family of Mago, through superior 
ability, wealth, and influence had come to dominate the state to 
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such an extent that they threatened to become absolute. Justinus 
atter telling of the death ot Hamilcar in the Sicilian war (479 
a.c.), says:35 
Deinde cum fami11a tanta imperatoram gravis liberae civitati 
esset, omniaque ipsi agerent simul et judicarent, centum ex num-
eto senatorum judices deliguntur, qu1 reversis a bello ducibus, 
rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu ita in bello im-
peria eogitarent ut dom1 judicia legesque respicerent. 
This new commission was instituted, then, as a check upon the 
power ot the kings and generals, to exact an account ot their 
administration and to punish them when necessary. 
Aristotle, writing about fitty years atter the death of Ham-
ilcar, speaks of this "magistracy of 104" as one of the chiet 
institutions of carthag~~ "corresponding to the Ephors at Spart~M 
the Carthaginian institution is superior to that of Sparta, bow-
ever, in tbis, that nthe Epbors are drawn trom any class, but the 
Carthaginians elect this magistracy ~ merit." He refers once 
more to the commission.37tbis time as "the supreme magistracy of 
the Hundred," explaining that its members were elected by the 
Boards of Five, ot wbich we will speak later. Thus it appears 
that even in the time ot Aristotle, the Hundred (as the commis-
sion is generally referred to, although conSisting ot 104 actual 
members, as mentioned above) had become more tban simply a board 
of judges to whom returning generals were accountable; they are 
already the ·supreme magistracy". probably exercising a strong 
influence over the sutetes, generals, and senators through their 
supremacy as arbiters ot otticial conduct at home and in the 
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field. We shall see later that this power eventually gave them 
the actual control of the city. 
VI. The Boards ot Five 
- --
Another feature of the political organization of Carthage, 
and one rather closely connected with the Judges in spirit and 
function, were the commissions of Five, or Pentarchies, describ-
ed ~ Aristotle as an oligarchic element in the Carthaginian 
constitution:38 
The appointment ~ co-optation of the Boards of Five which 
control many important matters, and the election by these 
boards of the supreme magistracy of the Hundred, and also their 
longer tenure of authority than that of any other officers (for 
they are in power after they have ~one out of office and before 
they have 8ctually entered upon it) are oligarchical features; 
their receiving no pay and not being chosen by lot and other 
similar regulations must be set down as aristocratic, and so 
must the fact that the members of the Boards are the judges in 
all law suits; instead of different suits being tried by differ-
ent courts, as at Sparta. 
This is all we know of the inst'itution from ancient sources t 
and the account is none too clear. It is probable that as Car-
thage grew into an empire under the policy of expansion and 
foreign conquest which she undertook to offset the inroads of 
39 the Greeks about the fifth century B.C. the business of gover-
nment became too complex to be handled efficiently by the kings 
and council. The Boards of Five would have been instituted as 
permanent commissions in charge of ftimportant matters"- milita 
and naval affairs, commerce and revenues, colonial administra-
tion, and domestic discipline. The commissioners' tenure of of-
fice stretched over a long period of time, and this, with the 
c their own members b was doubt-
10 
lesS intended to insure stability and singleness of purpose in 
the vital departments of the state. Yet it is this very perman-
ence that Aristotle criticizes as oligarchic, leaving the door 
open to abuse. The Boards of Five, ha~ing the privilege of 
electing the members of the ·supreme magistracy ot the Hundred", 
could place men ot their own class and point of view in this 
powerful institution also. The fact that the commissioners re-
ceived no pay, and that they were not chosen by lot, but probab-
lyon the basis of wealth and merit, Aristotle concedea to be 
an aristocratic feature, but points out later40that such regu-
lations in practice tend to oligarchy. Finally, he tells us 
that the members of these boards were judges in all law suits,-
a prerogative that could also easily be misused to strengthen 
the grip of oligarchy. It has been mentioned that the sutetes 
acted as judges in law SUits;41It this is to be reconciled with 
Aristotle's statement we must conclude that the sutetes were 
ex officio members of the Boards, perhaps the permanent chair-
men, much as the vice-presIdent is chairman of the Senate of the 
United States. 
VII. lB! Assembly 
Unusual as it may be in a commonwealth of Eastern or Semetic 
origin, there was a popular assembly at Carthage,- a bij~oG -
with even greater power than the assembly at Sparta. 
The reference of some matters and not of others to the popu-
lar assembly rests with the kings in consultation with the 
Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, these 
matters also lie with the people; and when the kings introduce 
11 
business in the assembly, they do not merely let the people sit 
and listen to the decisions that have been taken by their ruler~ 
but the people have the sovereign decision, and anybody who 
wishes may speak against the proposals introduced, a right that 
does not exist under the other constitutions.42 
This passage proves that in Aristotle's time at least, the 
kings could call the assembly and propose measures for consider-
ation. Under these circumstances the people had the right of 
debate and their decision was final. 
Among the later authors, Polybius relates an incident which 
took place toward the end of the Second Punic war, and which 
clearly shows that the assembly was still of importance at that 
time. After the Carthaginians, by seizing the Roman supply ship~ 
had broken the treaty which was supposed to have ended the war, 
Scipio sent ambassadors to demand an explanation. Polybius say~~ 
On arriVing at Carthage they first of all addressed the 
senate, and afterwards being brought before the popular assembly 
spoke with great freedom about the situation. 
After an account of their complaint, he continues: 
There were few among the Carthaginians who approved of adher-
ing to the treaty. The majority both of their leading politi-
cians and of those who took part in the deliberation objected 
to its harsh conditions, and with difficulty tolerated the bold 
language of ~e ambassadors •••• The popular assembly decided sim-
ply to dismiss the ambassadors without a reply •••• 
Thus it is evident that even at this time, matters of the 
greatest importance were put in the hands of~e assembly for 
deliberation and decision. 
But the greatest proof ot the power ot the assembly is the 
reform which Hannibal effected through it after the end of the 
Second Punic war. Hannibal, being elected sutete, broke the 
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power ot the Judges, who had dominated the Carthaginian state up 
to that time. A pretext was given him in the insubordination ot 
a quaestor. Livy records the event thus: 44 
Hannibal, thinking this conduct highly improper, sent a mes-
senger to arrest the quaestor and haling him betore the assembly 
(in contionem), assailed him and not less the order ot Judges. 
in comparison with whose pride ot place and power the laws were 
as nought. and the magistrates as well. When he saw that his 
speech was well received and that their haughty spirits menaced 
the liberty ot the lowest classes also, he immediately proposed 
and enacted a law that Judges should be elected tor one year 
each, and that no one should be a judge tor two consecutive 
terms. But whatever influence he gained in this way with the 
commons, to the same extent he roused the animOSity ot a large 
party among the nobles. 
Thus the popular assembly was strong enough under the direct-
ion ot Hannibal to overcome the ruling clique by P4ssing a law 
directly contrary to their interests,- limiting thier term of 
office. In order to appreciate the difficulty, the power invol-
ved, it must be remembered that the Judges had made themselves 
supreme, torming a narrow oligarchy and strengthening their pos-
ition through years ot domination. 
It is not clear trom the sources whether the assembly was 
composed ot all common citizens without discrimination, or 
whether some qualitication was necessary. It is likely that in 
a city where wealth was an important basis ot distinction, some 
property qualification was required tor participation in public 
affairs, even in the assembly.45 
VIII. ~enerals ~ Minor Qtticials 
The last oftice mentioned by Aristotle is that ot general. He 
refers to it only incidentally, saying that at Carthage Melect-
13 
ions are made with an eye to these two qualifications ,wealth 
and merit) and especially elections to the most important, those 
of the kings and of the genera1s.·46 All we can gather from this 
is that the generalship was an office distinct from that of suf-
ete, unlike the system at Rome, where the consuls were also gen-
erals; that the generals were elected; and that they had to be 
distinguished for wealth as well as merit. 
Among the later writers, Nepos remarks that: 47 ·0n his return 
Hannibal was made king after he had been general for twenty-one 
years." It is evident from this that the generalship had no fix-
ed term, but continued for the length of the war, or at least 
until the general was recalled for mismanagement, or simply 
defeat, as many of them were. The Carthaginian generals held 
this advantage over the Roman, in that they were not limited by 
a fixed term of office, and so eou1d maintain a consistent and 
unchanging policy, profiting by experience. The Romans, in 
changing generals every two years, were deprived of these advan-
tages. 
As we have mentioned (supra V). the generals were responsible 
for their conduct, and in fact, for the outcome of their exped-
itions, to the Board of 100 Judges, and some paid for ill suc-
cess with their lives. In the field they were supreme; it ap-
pears however that they were sometimes accompanied by members of 
the senate, who must have had some influence upon their conduct, 
probably attending them as advisers. There were fifteen senators 
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with Mago when Scipio. defeated him and took New Carthage, accor-
48 d1ng to Pa1ybius. 
There were at least two generals in charge ot the armies ot 
Carthage. Thus, while Hannibal led one army in Italy, another, 
under Hasdrubal, detended Carthage against Scipio. During the 
Mercenary War which toll owed the First Punic war Hamilcar and 
Hanno both held command. Polybius mentions three generals as 
holding command at the same time atter the battle ot Ecnomos in 
the First Punic war,- Ham11ear, Bostarus, and Hasdrubal, the son 
ot Hanno. 49 
There were minar otficials at Carthage mentioned occasionally 
by historians, though little is known of their tunctions outside 
of what is indicated by their titles. We have mentioned the 
Wquaestor w whom Hannibal summoned for insubordination, according 
to Livy.50 The quaestors were, probably, on the analogy of the 
Roman system, treasury officers and paymasters. Nepos speaks ot 
a "praetectus Morum w51who reproved the great Hamilcar,- an otfic 
ial who must have fultilled many ot the functions of the Roman 
censor, with powers to supervise public and private conduct in 
all citizens, regardless of rank or position. 
IX. Conclusion 
Such was the 88Beral organization ot the Carthaginian govern-
ment,. kings,council ot Elders, senate, the Hundred Judges, the 
assembly, the Pentarchies, the generals, minor ofticials. the 
bare external structure of be constitution, the letter of the 
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law, as~r as we can determine from the ancient sources. It is 
this sea¥ral form that Aristotle admires: 52 
Carthage also appears to have a good constitution. (And 
!urthur:) Many regulations at Carthage are good; and a proof 
of a well-regulated constitution is that the populace willing-
ly remain faithful to the constitutional system, and that 
neither civil strife bas arisen in any degree worth mention-
ing, not yet a tyran;. 
53 It is this form which draws from Polybius the comment: 
The constitution of Carthage seems to me to have been 
originally well contrived as regards its most distinctive 
features. For there were kings, andthe house of Elders was 
an aristocratical force, and the people were supreme in 
matters proper to them, the entire frame of the state much 
resembling that of Rome and Sparta. 
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CHAPTER II 
ADHEREN CE TO THE LAW 
I. The Problem 
It is evident, then, from the testimony ot Aristotle, whom 
Smith calls "the greatest political philosopher of antiquity,·l 
and of Polybius, whom Duruy terms .the wisest historian of anti-
quity,.2 that the external structure ot the Carthaginian govern-
ment as originally planned, was excellent; what we want to 
determine next is: How did this constitution work out in prac-
tice? What was the spirit animating the corpus of laws? What do 
the ancients tell us ot the actual operation ot t be Carthaginian 
government under the system proposed by the lawmakers? In other 
words, we have seen the Carthaginian system in~e abstract; we 
must try now to discover hew it was entorced in fact. 
II. Detects Mentioned ~ Aristotle 
It is important to notice that whereas Aristotle praises the 
general structure ot the government ot Carthage, he does not 
hesitate to criticize certain elements which he regards as de-
tects, departures trom~e aristocratic torm, and sources ot dan-
ger to the state. "The features open to critic1.sm as judged by 
the principle ot an aristocracy or republic are s~me of them 
departures in~e direction of democracy and others in the direc-
3 tion ot oligarchy." 
The democratic teature criticized is the import~ce allowed 
to the popular assembly in making it supreme when the kings and 
~~ 
Elders fail to agree, giving it the right of debate and decision 
as explained above (Chapter I, section VII). 
The oligarchical features oar more numerous: (1) the Pentar-
chies, (2) venality or plutocracy, (3) official pluralism, and 
(4) the reduction of the populace by colonization. 
(1) The Pentarchies, or Boards of Five, are dangerous because 
while controlling important matters, they elect their own members 
by co-optation, enjoying an unusually long term of office, and 
~he privilege of selecting the members of the powerful Board of 
4 Judges. 
(2) In regard to the"venal or plutocratic tendency, Aristotle 
5 says: 
But the Carthaginian system diverges from aristocracy in the 
direction of oligarchy most signally in respect of a certain idea 
that is shared b.Y the mass of mankind; they think that the rulers 
should be chosen not only for their merit, but also for their 
wealth, as it is not possible for a poor man to govern well or to 
have leisure for his duties •••• But it must be held that this 
divergence from aristocracy is an error on ~e part of the law-
giverj for one of the most important points to keep in view from 
the outset is that the best citizens may be able to haTe leisure, 
and may not have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only 
when in office bpt also when living in private life. And if it 
is necessary to look to the question of means for the sake of 
leisure, it is a bad thing that the greatest offices of the stat~ 
the kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this 
law makes wealth more honored than worth, and renders the whole 
state avaricious; and whatever the holders of supreme power deem 
honorable, the opinion of the other citizens also is certain to 
follow them, and a state in which virtue is not held in the high-
est honor cannot be securely governed by an aristocracy. And it 
is probable that those who purchase offioe will learn by degrees 
to amke a profit out of it when they hold office for money spent. 
(3) The feature most characteristically oligarchical, however, 
is the union of a number of distinct offices and powers in one 
6 person,- official pluralism: 
And it might also be though a bad thing for the same person 
to hold several offices, which is considered a distinction at 
carthage. One man one 30b is the best rule for efficiency, and 
the lawgiver ought to see- that this may be secured and not 
appoint the same men to play the flute and make shoes. 
(4) Finally, the rulers at Carthage were accustomed to rid 
themselves of truublesome surplus population among the lower 
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classes by an expedient which Aristotle regards as dangerous: 
But the constitution being oligarchical they best escape the 
dangers by being wealthy, as they constantly send out a portion 
of the common people to appointments in theicities (colonies); 
by this means they heal the social sore and make the constitutio 
stable. However, this is the achievement of fortune, whereas 
freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by the lawgiver; 
but as it is, suppose some misfortune occurs and the multitude 
at subject class revolts, there is no remedy provided by the 
laws to restore tranquillity. 
These five defects, then, were already evident in Aristotle's 
time. It is clear that they are not simply theoretical object-
ions, based on an analysis ot the constitution in the abstract. 
At least venality, pluralism, and the colonizing device are not 
regarded as merely possible dangers, but because they are !!!a 
12 exist the constitution is criticized for not providing against 
them. Theretore the detects mentioned by Aristotle must have bee 
actual dangerous tendencies in the operation of the Carthaginian 
government under the oonstitution. 
III. During.!!!.! First Punic War 
A period of more than fifty years elapsed between Aristotle's 
death and t he First Punic war, during which we have no record of 
the political developement of Carthage. A few indications can be 
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gathered, however, from Polybius' account. He speaks only once 0 
the conai tion of the state, and that is to say only that: tiThe 
two states (Rome and Carthage) were also at this period still un-
corrupted in principle, moderate in fortune, and equal in 
strength. t1B All further evidence must be gathered by inference. 
In relating the opening incident, the Roman occupation of 
Messene, Polybius says:9 
The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dis-
lodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established 
in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the 
city in his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their general, 
thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgment and of courage in 
abandoning the citadel •. 
Another commander, Hannibal (not the Great), later suffered 
the same fate: "Not long afterwards he was blockaded in one of 
the harbors of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of 
his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians 
and crucified. H10 
This was, as is evident, the customary way of dealing with 
unsuccessful generals at Carthage. Since they were responsible 
to the Board of 100 Judges, the punishment, no doubt, was meted 
out by this group. They were traditionally cruel, though probablJ 
not so blindly severe as Valerius Maximus pictures them. After 
speaking of the rigor of Roman discipline, he says:ll 
Lenlter hoc, patres conscripti, si Carthaginiensium senatu8 
in militiae negotlis procurand1s v1olent1am intueri velimus; a 
quo duces bella pravo consilio gerentes, etiamsi prospera for-
tuna subsequuta esset, cruci tamen sufflgebantur; quod bene 
gesserant deorum immortalium adjutorio, quod male commiserant, 
lpsorum culpae imputantes. 
In general, the practice shows the power of the order of 
Judges, their interest in resulta above all else, and their 
oruelty. 
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It is likely, too, that they used this cruel power to gain 
their own ends within the state. There is an instance of this 
related by Justinus12 as taking place even in the time of Aris-
totle (circa 328 Be), while the government of Carthage was still 
relatively pure and uncorrupted. A certain Hamilear Rhodanus, 
"vir solertia faeundiaque praeter eaeteros ins ignis ," was sent 
as a spy to the court of Alexander the Great. He fulfilled his 
mission with extraordinary success, yet, according to Justinus, 
"Carthaginienses post mortem regis (Alexander) reversum in pat-
rlam, quasi urbem regi venditass.t, non ingrato tantum, verum 
etiam invido et crudeli animo, necaverunt." No doubt his success 
and abilities were a threat to the ambition of ~he wealthy class, 
embodied in the Board of Judges. It must have been through the 
exercise of their power in this manner that they eventually be-
came the real directing power of the state, usurping the rights 
of the senate and controlling the magistrates through fear, as 
Livy relates. l3 
There is another characteristic evident in the operation of 
the Carthaginian government during the first Punic war whicb was 
much more important in effect ing tbe final resul t--their short-
Sighted commercial attitude. The Carthaginians w.ere clearly led 
by the blindness of aVarice into mistakes wbich not only cost 
them the but kindled th 
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v ~ ~ volt--the acrnovvov nO~E~ov--which followed it. These mistake. 
were 1) the oppression of subject states, 2) the neglect of 
their fleet, and 3) the treatment of their mercenary army after 
the war. 
The Romans gained their first real footing in Sicily not 
simply because they took Messene, but because their forces were 
joined and supported by the people of the island. Polybius 
says: "On their arrival in Sicily, most of the cities revolted 
14 from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans." 
Again, when the Romans landed for the first time in Africa 
the native Numidians seized the opportunity to revolt and join-
ed them against the Carthaginians: "In addition to the misfor-
tunes I have mentioned, the Numidians attacking them at the same 
time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more dam_ge on 
the country than the latter.-15 
Why should the states and peoples subject to Carthage be so 
ready to revolt, to join the invader against her, if not for the 
same reason that the Libyans rushed to support the mercenariea 
in the bloody insurrection that followed the war? Polybius tells 
us that the Carthaginians -had chiefly themselves to thank for 
all these grievous mischances," and explains as follows: 16 
During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh. 
They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of 
their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen with-
out allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement 
to the poor. They had applauded and honored not those governors 
who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those 
who procured for Oarthage the largest amount of supplies and 
stores and used the country people most harshly •••• The conse-
quence waS that the male population requi red no incitement to 
revolt,--a mere mel.age Was sufticient--wh.ile the women, who 
28 
bad constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and 
fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by 
oatb in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and strip 
ping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to 
tbe war fund. 
Thus, the revolts amons subject nations may well be .ttribu-
ted to a barsh. colonial policy, dictated by the avaricious de-
sire of the Carthaginian government to throw the financial bur-
den of the war on them rather than carrying it herself as Rome 
did. 
Secondly, this same blind commercial outlook betraTed Car-
thage into the error that actually lost the war for her in the 
naval battle near the island of Aegusa, off Lilybaeum. The Ro-
mans had been driven from the sea twioe already, their fleet 
shattered. "It was yield1ng to the blowa of Fortune that they 
bad retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time 
it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, but now they made th~ 
tbird attempt, and through it, by gaining a viotory and outting 
off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army a~ Eryx, 
they put an end to the whole war.·17 
Why was Carthage defeated at sea in this deoisive ba·ttle? (1) 
She failed to estimate correctly the spirit of her opponent and 
(2) she neglected her own fleet. Polybius explains thus:18 
Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable oondi-
tion for battle, while the crews were quite untrained, and had 
been put on board for the emergenoy and their marines were re-
e ent levies, whose first experience of the least hardship and 
danger tb.is waa. The fact is that, owing to their never having 
expeoted the Romans to d1spute the sea w.ith them, they had, in 
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contempt for them, neglected their own navy. 
Those who governed Carthage judged the Roman spirit by their 
0.0 materialist standards; it was only ·sound business sense" 
to economize by cutting down on naval expenditures after the 
second Roman failure. Their economy cost them the war. 
Finally, this same attitude brought on t he mercenary revolt. 
After peace was made, the mercenary troops were shipped by their 
generals in contingents to Carthage for payment and quiet demo-
bilization. The government of Carthage, however, allowed them 
to gather in~e city, hoping that when all were assembled they 
might be persuaded to forego some of the wages due them, as 
Polybius points out:19 "The Carthaginians partly because, owing 
to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money, 
and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries, 
would let them off part of t heir arrears of pay, once they got 
them all collect.ed in Carthage, detained them there on their 
arrival in t.his hope, confining them t.o~e city.-
Among such a veteran soldiery, many of them half barbarian, 
all of them confident in~eir prowess after years of campaigning 
few of them having any personal attachment to Cart.hage, the 
proposed reduction of wages for services already rendered could 
not but fan the spark of discontent into the roaring conflag";' 
ration of revolt. The devastating war that followed could have 
been prevented had the Carthaginian government been willing to 
pay her soldiers the wages she had promised. It was not that 
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Carthage lacked the wealth, though she was hard pressed and 
would have had to make sacrifices. The wealth must have been 
there, since later, when threatened with revolt, the government 
agreed to pay even more than the soldiers originally demanded, 
and actually sent their general Gesco with money to discharge 
the arrears; but the affair had gone too far; Gesco and the 
money were seized and the mutiny became civil war. 20 
These three gre~t disasters,- the revolt of the subject 
states, the decisive naval defeat off Aegusa, and the outbreak 
of the "war without truce"- are all traceable to the myopic pol-
icy of an avaricious commercialism, a characteristic of the gov-
ernment of Carthage which indicates clearly that at this time 
she must have been dominated by the wealthy class,. an inevitabl 
consequence of the oligarchic tendencies descr1bed by Aristotle. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that along with its short-
comings tha Carthaginian senate was also capable of genuine 
courage in the face of destruction. Defeated and almost in the 
. 
hands of the Roman general Regulus, they sent ambassadors to ask 
for terms. Regulus dealt w1th them in a high handed manner, pro-
21 posing conditions of extreme severity. In the words of Polybius: 
"The attitude of the Carthaginian senate on hearing the Roman 
general's proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all 
hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than 
submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were 
Willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every 
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extremity." 
From Polybius' acoount of the First Punic war, then, we can 
conclude that the operation of the Carthaginian government was 
marked at times by oruelty, by oppression and neglect springing 
from the blindness of avarice, wbiob cost Carthage not only the 
war, but the mercenary rebellion that followed. It must not be 
supposed that the Carthaginians were incapable of acting other-
wise, as the incident of their opposition to Regulus olearly 
shows; nor were their counsels always rash ana their plans im-
portunate, 'or t hey would never have been a match for Rome; fur-
ther, they could produce a great leader like Hasarubal, utterly 
selfless in devotion to his country, surpassing any Roman in his 
skill as a general; yet the fact is that Carthage did fail, and 
her failure may be attributed to~e defects mentioned, since 
they undermined the structure of her government, kindling the 
hatred of her allies, arousing the hopes, and the contempt,of 
Rome. 
IV. During the Second Punic ~ 
For the period of the Second Punic war, there is no need to 
determine the characteristic operation of the Carthaginian gov-
ernment by inference, since both Polybius and Livy have left 
enlightening generalizations on ~e matter. First of all, both 
agree that the government of Carthage underwent a ohange, that 
t.he old oonstitution no .. longer operated in its purity, that 
abuses had broken down the balance between the various depart-
.ents of the original aristocracy. Polybius specifically men-
tions this change, its nature and causes. After praising the 
original constitution, he says:22 
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But at the time when they entered on be Hannibalic war, the 
Carthaginian constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was 
better. For as every body or state or action has its natural 
periods first of growth, then of prime, and finally of decay, 
and as every thing in them is at its best when they are in their 
prime, it was for this reason that the difference between the 
two state. manifested itself at this time. For by as much as the 
power and prosperity of Carthage had been earlier than that of 
Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun to decline; while 
Rome was exactly at her prime, as far, at least, as her system 
of government was concerned. ConsequentlY the multitude at Car-
thage bad already acquired the cbief voice in deliberations; 
while at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as in 
one case the masses deliberated and in the other tbe most emi-
nent men, the Roman decisions on public affairs were superior, 
so that although they met with complete disaster, they were 
tinally, by the wisdom of their counsels, victorious over the 
Carthaginians in war. 
There is no doubt of t he fact of the change; as to t he nature, 
Polybius held that it was in t he direction of democ racy, that 
the old aristocracy had given way in the time of the Hannibalic 
war to something like mob rule. Livy, on~e other hand, does not 
mention the fact of~e change specifically; rather it is implied 
in his summary of the situation immediately after t he Sec ond 
Punic war, when he describes the reforms instituted by Hannibar~ 
The order of Judges at that time was in control in Carthage, 
principally because the same men were judges for life. The prop-
erty, reputation, and life of every citizen were in t heir hands. 
A man who offended one of the Judges made enemies of them all, 
nor was there any lack of persons to bring accusations before 
hostile Judges. Under their adminstration, marked by such vio-
lence,- for they did not use their excessive wealth in the spiri 
of a free state- Hannibal had been elected praetor. 
The reforms instituted by Hannibal cast light on the conditio 
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of the government during this period. These reforms were aimed 
at what Hannibal, unquestionably sincere in his desire for the 
good of his native city, evidently regarded as the greatest 
detects in her administration. The first reform was an attempt 
to restore the balance of power: 24HWhen he saw ••• that their (the 
Judges') baughty spirits menaced the liberty of the lowest 
classes also, he immediately proposed and enacted a law, that 
Judges should be elected for one year each, and that no one 
should be a Judge for two consecutive terms.-
These two passages clearly indicate Livy's opinion as to the 
oligarchic nature of the change. From both Livy and Polybius 
then this much at least is clear,- (1) that a change trom the 
original constitution had taken place in the Carthaginian govern-
ment, and (2) that the change was tor the worse, though the 
sources apparently disagree concerning its nature. 
It is possible, despite the apparent contradiction of the two 
accounts, that both may be right, the difference lying in the 
point of view. Livy says that the Judges held supreme power; 
Polybius claims that the people prevailed. We have seen that the 
dangerous tendencies noted by Aristotle were both democratic and 
oligarchic. 25 It is probable that in a time of stress like the 
period of the Punic wars, these elements would grow, upsetting 
the balance of the original constitutional torm, each striving 
for domination. Both Livy and Polybius agree on the fact of the 
change trom the old form. They differ on the direction it took. 
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Polybius, speaking of the principles of political evolution 
in the sixth book, says: 26ftAristocracy by its very nature degen-
erates into oligarchy; and when the commons, inflamed by anger 
take vengeance on this government for its unjust rule, democracy 
comes into being." This may well have been the case at Carthage. 
The original aristocracy would have changed to oligarchy through 
the tendencies noted by Aristotle. Through the Pentarchies, offi-
cial pluralism, venality, and power to crush opposition by the 
abUse of their cruel prerogative, the Judges would have gathered 
everything into their own hands. 
On the other hand, because of the expense involved and the 
insecurity of war times, the otficial colonizing expeditions,-
the "safety valve" device mentioned by Aristotle tor ridding 
the city of troublesome excess population- were probably discon-
tinued, so that the lower classes ,swelled by natural increase 
and joined by numbers of rural workers who tlocked to the city 
for protection t must have offered an increasing threat to the 
oligarchy, eventually becoming its rival for power. 
The struggle between these two would explain Livy's account 
of the tyrannical measures employed by the oligarchs against 
individuals. They would have been drtten to such measures to 
maintain their position. This opposition also explains Polybius t 
remark about the increased importance of the multitude in the 
affairs of state, for the oligarchs, fearing a general uprising, 
Would have been forced to allow the people to decide in matters 
that concerned them intimately, as in the case of the renewal 
of the Second Punic war after the treaty with Scipio had been 
27 broken. 
The final victory of the assembly under Hannibal, as Livy 
relates, would end the struggle by breaking the power of the 
Judges, and Polyblus' principle would be fulfilled: • ••• and 
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when the commons, enflamed by anger. take vengeance on this gov-
ernment tor its unjust rule, democracy comes into being." Thus 
Livy and Polybius, apparently contradicting each other, would 
both be right. 
In regard to a second great weakness in the operation of the 
government at this time, it will help to recall that Aristotle, 
noting dangerous tendencies in his own time, criticizes the law 
which made wealth as well as merit, a basis of preferment: 28ftFor 
this law makes wealth more honored than worth, and renders the 
whole state avaricious •••• And it is probable that those who 
purchase office will learn by degrees to make a profit out of it 
when they hold office for money spent." 
That Aristotle's sage prediction was borne out in fact in the 
subsequent history of Carthage is proved by the testimony of 
both Livy and Polybius. In tracing the causes of Rome's final 
Victory in the Second Punic war, Polybius says:29 
Again, the laws and customs relating to the acquisition at 
wealth are better in Rome than at Carthage. At Carthage nothing 
which results in profit is regarded as disgraceful; at Rome, 
nothing is considered more so than to accept bribes and seek 
gain from improper channels •••• A proof at this is that at Car-
thage candidates tor oftice practice open bribery, whereas at 
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Rome death is the penalty for it. 
Livyfs account of the second great reform of Hannibal is 
proof that at Carthage those who had "purchased office had learn 
ad by degrees to make a profit out of it":30 
Moreover, by another act he served the public interest, but 
aroused personal enmities against himself. The public revenues 
were being partly wasted through carelessness, partly appropri-
ated as their booty and spoils of office by some of the promi-
nent men and magistrates, and money to pay the tribute to the 
Romans each successive year was laoking, and a heavy assessment 
seemed to threaten the oitizens. 
When Hannibal had investigated the revenues, how much was 
colleoted as taxes on land and as duty at the ports, for what 
purpose it Was spent, how much the ordinary expenses of the 
state required, and how much embezzlement took form the treasury 
he asserted in the assembly that the state would be rich enough, 
1f it collected the revenues not otherwise used and omitted the 
assessment on individual oitizens, to pay its debt to the Romans 
and this assertion he was able to make good. 
But now the men whom embezzlement from the treasury had main-
tained for many years, as if they were being robbed of their 
property instead of being made to give up the profits of their 
thefts, in passion and anger tried to bring upon Hannibal the 
wrath of the Romans. 
The abuse was evidently of long standing if there were "'men 
whom embezzlement from the treasury had maintained for many 
years." Some estimate of "how much embezzJ.ement took from the 
treas~y" may be gathered from the fact that in 191 B.C. the 
Carthaginians offered to pay up in a lump sum the remainder of 
the ten thousand talent indemnity imposed upon them by the Ro-
mans as one of the conditions of peace in 202 B.C •• This means 
that by stopping the embezzlement of public funds through the 
Hannibalic reform the government was able to save ten thousand 
talents in about ten years, one-fifth of the time allowed them 
by the treaty.31 
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That the government of Carthage, then, had degenerated from 
the original well-balanced aristocratic form and that it was 
undermined by venality,- bribery and embezzlement- both Polybius 
and Livy agree. Polybius mentions several more weaknesses in the 
carthaginian system, as further reasons for Rome's final vic-
tory. Among them is the utter dependence of Carthage on mercen-
ary troops,- a practice consistent with the commeroial character 
of the city. After speaking of the Carthaginian superiority at 
sea, Polybius continues:32 
But as regards military service on land the Romans are much 
more efficient, They indeed devote their whole energies to this 
matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infant-
ry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry. 
The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign 
and meroenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the 
soil and oitizens. So that in this respeot also we must pro-
nounce the politioal system of Rome to be superior to that of 
Carthage, the Carthaginians oontinuing to depend for the main-
tenance of their freedom on the courage of a meroenary foroe, 
but the Romans on their own valor and on the aid of their allies 
Though the employment of mercenaries may not be a defect in 
government as such, still it indicates the materialistic char-
acter of the Carthaginian state, whioh sought to win its wars 
through wealth rather than through the moral vigor, the courage 
and patriotism, of its citizens. It is this lack of moral vigor, 
arising from the failure of the Carthaginians to foster public 
spirit and the manly virtues, that Polybius mentions as another 
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of the causes of their final defeat. Fiaally, he attributes 
Rome's success in great part to her marked superiority in mat-
ters of religion:34 "But the quality in which the Roman common-
wealth is most distinctly superior is in my opinion the nature 
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of their religious convictions." However, the discussion of 
theSe last two important points,- national ideals and religion-
pertains rather to the moral culture of Carthage and will be 
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oonsidered later. 
These passages, then, from the most reliable historians of 
the Second Punic war, give sufficient testimony to the fact tha 
at this period the operation of the government at Carthage had 
fallen away from the provisions of the original constitution; 
that it was corrupted by wholesale bribery on the part of candi 
dates, who reimbUBsed themselves from the public funds after 
their appointment to office; that it Was characterized by the 
mercenary spirit and its corresponding weakness in moral fibre. 
v. During the Third Punic War 
As sources of our knowledge of the Third Punic war, Livy and 
Polybius are found to be of less value than the late Roman his-
torian Appian, who, in the portion of his history of Rome dedi-
cated to the Punic wars, has left us the only detailed account 
of the final struggle which ended with the destruction of Car-
thage. 36 Polybius' account is sketchy and fragmentary; Livy's 
has survived only through the epitome. Appian, though late (951 
165 A,D.), had the best sources at his disposal add is as de-
pendable as any of the historians of his time. His account, how 
ever, affords only occasional glimpses of the working of the 
Carthaginian government during this period, and we shall have 
to rely upon inference, as in the case of the First Punic war, 
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rather than direot testimony. 
Aooording to this method, form the aooounts of Appian, Livy, 
and Polybius, two main oonolusions oan be drawn oonoerning the 
government of Carthage at this period. The first is that the 
original oonstitutional form still existed, and seoond, that 
the operation of the government was rendered unstable by fao-
tional strife, partioularily by the interferenoe of the multi-
tudes. Finally, in the last oritioal moments, a<tyranny was 
established and under it the oity was destroyed. 
How do we know that the old oonstitutional form was maintain-
ed? The evidenoe is not oomplete; there is, for example, no men-
tion in the souroes of the sufetes or of the judges as suoh. 
still, there is evidenoe to show that the senate, the Gerousia, 
and the assembly were still distinguished, and that the prin-
ciple business of the state was still carried on through their 
ageno¥ up until the establishment of the tyranny. 
It was the ~arthaginian senate, for example, that deoided to 
make terms after Rome had deolared war. Polybius testifies to 
37 this: "After a long seoret disoussion in the [> senate they 
appointed plenipotentiaries and sent them to Roma with instruo-
tions to do whatever they thought was in the interest of their 
oountry under the present ciroumstanoes." And the epitome of 
Livy fills in a significant detail:38 "Deleotique sunt ex pri-
moribue triginta, quibuslibet oonditionibus paoem impetraturi." 
From these two passages it is evident that the senate and the 
Gerousia were still funotioning, the senate as a real agency of 
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government, the Gerousia (delecti triginta)39at least as a dip-
lomatic unit. This is further supported by the distinction in-
corporated in the Roman demand for "three hundred hostages, sons 
of senators or of members of the uerousia. n40 
Then, even after the popular tumult that followed the announ 
cement of Rome's determination to raze the city, the senate sti 
retained and exercised the prerogatives of government:4l 
The same day the Carthaginian senate declared war and pro-
claimed freedom to the slaves. They also chose generals and se-
lected Hasdrubal for the outside works, whom they had condemned 
to death, and who had already collected 30,000 men •••• Within 
the walls they chose for general another Hasdrubal, the son of 
a daughter of Masinissa. They also sent to the consuls asking 
a truce of thirty days in order to send an embassy to Rome. 
Despite the survival of the ancient constitutional form and 
the recognized authority of the senate, there could have been 
little internal tranquillity or stability of policy in Carthage 
at this time, for the city was racked with factional strife. 
During the fifty years of comparative peace preceding the Third 
Punic war, th8ee groups formed in the city:42 
Very soon (as frequently happens in periods of prosperity) 
factions arose. There was a Roman party, a democratic party, 
and a party Which favored Masinissa. Each had leaders of emi-
nent reputation and bravery. Hanno the Great was the leader of 
the Romanizing faction; Hannibal, surnamed the starling, was 
the chief of those who favored Masinissa; and Hamilcar, sur-
named the Samnite, and Carthalo, of the democrats. 
It was the rash action of the democratic faction which act-
ually precipitated the Third Punic war. First they stirred up 
trouble with Rome's Numidian ally, Masinissa:43 "The latter 
party, watching their opportunity ••• persuaded Carthalo ••• to 
attack the subjects of Masinissa, who were encamped on disputed 
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territory." The incident made Rome determine to take up arms 
once more against Carthage. A second incident which took place 
a feW years later brought on war with Masinissa, and gave Rome 
the eXCuse she needed to interfere. Again, factional distur-
bances in the city were at the basis of the trouble, and this 
time, too, the democratic group was responsible:44 
The democratic faction in Carthage drove out the leaders of 
the party favoring Masinissa, to the number of about forty, and 
alsO cartied a vote of banishment and made the people swear that 
they should never be taken back, and that the question of taking 
them back should never be discussed. The banished men took re-
fuge with Masinissa and urged him to declare war. 
The Numidian king sent his sons to intercede; the sons were 
shut out of the city by Carthalo, the democratic leader; one or 
them was attacked on the return journey; and Masinissa opened 
the war by seizing a town allied to Carthage. Thus the action 
of the democratic group began the war Which resulted in the de-
struction of the city. 
There are evidences of popular violence all through the ao-
oount of this period. The multitudes in the city must have been 
a force to reckon with; they apparently not only interfered in 
the government, but took it into their own hands when aroused. 
We have but to consider their treatment of the state officials 
after the announcement of Rome's determination to raze the oity 
to realize how unoontrollable the people were, and consequently 
how great their influence through fear must have been upon those 
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who conducted the government after that time: 
Some fell upon those senators who had advised giving the hos-
tages and tore them in pieces, considering them the ones who had 
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them into the trap. Others treated in a similar way those 
l.d had favored giving up the arms. Some stoned the ambassadors ~~~ bringing the bad news, and others dragged them through the 
city-
As might be expeoted, this same spirit of violenoe broke out 
later in the assembly itself; it is surprising, however, and in-
dicative of their oharaoter, to find it appearing at a time when 
the Carthaginians were elated by suooess and confident of vic-
tory, rather than reduced to desperation as on the occasion just 
mentioned:46 
Being now armed, their designs grew unbounded, and they gain-
.d in confidenoe, oourage, and resouroes from day to day. Has-
drubal, who oommanded in the oountry and had twioe got the bet-
ter of Manilius, was also in high spirits. Aspiring to the oom-
mand in the city, whioh was held by another Hasdrubal, a nephew 
of Galussa, he aocused the latter of an intention to betray Car-
thage to Galussa. This acousation being brought forth in the 
assembly, and the acoused being at a loss to answer the unex-
pected oharge, they fell upon him and beat him to death with the 
benches. 
It appears, then, from these passages that the government of 
Carthage at this time was oharacterized by factional strife and 
violent outbreaks among the populaoe. This does not mean, how-
ever, that throughout the period the multitudes held uninter-
rupted supremacy. The demooratio faction had involved the oity 
in war with Masinissa, as has been shown. But after the Cartha-
ginian foroes had been defeated and Rome intervened, the pro-
Roman faotion, probably the nobles and rioh merchants who de-
sired peaoe, must have gained the upper hand, for (1) the demo-
oratio leaders were oondemned to death,47and (2) great efforts 
were made to conoiliate Rome, involving the surrender of three 
hundred hostages and all the oity's vast store of armaments. 48 
43 
go«ever, af~er Rome's final demand for the destruction of the 
oity, and the wild demonstration that followed, the pro-Roman 
faotion fell, Hasdrubal was reinstated, and the people, infur-
iated against Rome, resolved to resist. The government at that 
time must have passed largely into their hands, though the tra-
ditional form was retained. 
In the ninth book of the Republic Plato traces the natural 
developement of governments through a series of stages,- aris-
tooracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. The 
theory appears to be borne out by the history of Carthage. Con-
sidering the time of the Thir~ Punic war as the change to the 
democratic phase, during which the government of Carthage was 
influenced more than ever before by the multitudes, as has been 
shown, we find the theory fulfilled, the wheel turned full cycle 
with the establishment of the tyranny of Hasdruba1 shortly befor 
the final seige and destruction. His rise to power can be traced 
through the passages already quoted from Appian. He led the Car-
thaginian forces in the democratic-instigated war against Masi-
49 
nissa, and after being defeated, was condemned to death; he 
escaped, gathered an army, and after Carthage declared war, was 
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reinstated as general outside the city; after defeating the 
Romans twice, in a moment of popular favor he brought false char 
ges against his namesake and colleague within the City, stirred 
up the people to kill him, and thus established his own supre-
macy.51 He openly assumed the role of tyrant after the capture 
of Megara by Scipio:52 
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When daylight came, Hasdrubal, enraged at the attack on Meg-
ara, took the Roman prisoners whom he held, brought them upon 
the walls in full sight of their comrades, and tore out their 
eyes, •••• He intended to make reconciliation between the Cartha-
lnians and Romans impossible, and sought to fire them with the ~onviction that their only sagety was in fighting; but the re-
sult was contrary to his intention. For the Carthaginians, con-
science-stricken by these nefarious deeds, became timid instead 
of courageous, and hated Hasdrubal for depriving them even of 
all hope of pardon. Their senate especially denounced him for 
committing these savage and outrageous cruelties in the midst 
of such great domestic calamities. But he actually arrested 
some of the oomplaining senators and put them to death. Making 
himself feared in every way, he came to be more like a tyrant 
than a general, for he considered himself secure only if he 
were an object of terror to them, and for this reason difficult 
to attack. 
Hasdrubal had all the characteristics of the Platonic tyrant, 
and in their last days the Carthaginians, hemmed in on all sides 
by the Romans, were reduced to utter misery by his ruthless dom-
5 ination. Polybius describes the tyrant and his brief reign thus: 
"Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian general, was an empty-headed brag-
gart and very far from being a competent statesman or general. a 
This is followed by an aocount of Hasdrubal's stupid attempt to 
obtain the city's freedom by negotiating with Scipio, even after 
his horrible cruelty to the Roman prisoners, and when Carthage 
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was already doomed. Polybius continues: 
When we look at his utteranoew we admire the man and his 
high-souled words, but when we turn to his actual begavior, we 
are amazed by his ignobility and cowardice. For, to begin with, 
when the rest of the citiZens were utterly perishing from fam-
ine, he gave drinking parties and offered his guests sumptuous 
second courses and by his own good cheer exposed the general 
distress. For the number of deaths was incredibly large and so 
Was the number of daily desertions due to famine. And next by 
making mock of some and inflicting outrage and death on others 
he terrorized the populace and maintained his authority in his 
sorely striken country by means to which a tyrant in a prosper-
ous city would scarcely resort. 
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Such was the state of the government of Carthage at her de-
.truction, the old constitution suspended. all power gathered 
into the hand of the tyrant. Faotional strife had led to popu-
lar interference and mob violence; the multitudes had raised 
.p and encouraged their champion; wi th their help he had clear-
.d away his rivals; and finally, taking over the government him 
•• If, became the oppressor of those who had brought him to }:-: 
power. 
VI. Conclusion 
Our purpose is to determine as .est we can from the original 
sources the charaoter of the Carthaginians,- their oivilization 
and culture- at the time of the Punic W&rs. How has the dis-
oussion just oonoluded furthered this purpose' What light does 
the material presented oast upon the Carthaginain charaoter? 
w. have shown Carthage in her oivil aspeot.- her basic syst .. 
of government and the operation of that government during the 
Punic wars. What conclusions can we draw now in regard to the 
civil character of Carthage' 
The first is that the ancients agree in praiSing the orig-
inal oonstitution of Carthage as being· well contrived, showing 
extraordinary politioal w!sdom. as evidenced by the statements 
of Aristotle and Polybius. The best proof of its exoellenoe is 
that this constitution was never overthrown, but remained, at 
least nominally, in force until the fall of the oity. 
Then. what of the operation of the Carthaginian government 
under this oonsti tution? We have seen that even in the::.time of 
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Aristotle certain defects began to appear; that these are con-
firmed by the inferences drawn from Polybius' account of the 
First Punic war; that both Livy and Polybius bear witness to 
the growth of these defects, and of others, during the second 
war; and that Appian widens the breach between the law and its 
proper operation by giving evidence of factional strife and 
popular interference in government, ending in tyranny and a sus-
pension of the law at the end of the Third Punic war. Thus, 
while the law itself was excellent, its effective operation was 
inhibited by defects and abuses springing from the national 
character. Carthage was like a man dominated and torn by unruly 
passions, knowing the right course of action, yet too weak mOD-
ally to carry it out. 
What were these defects and abuses? They may be roughly clas-
sified as: (1) Venality, springing from the commercial character 
of her civilization, making wtealth the object of national de-
sire, undermining the government by bribery and embezzlement, 
transforming the original well balanced constitution into oli-
garchy, dictating short-sighted and avaricious policies, such 
as the false economy on naval upkeep, and the attempt to deprive 
the army of its promised wages at the end of the First Punic war 
(2) A certain heartlessness and cruelty accompanied the spirit 
of venality at Carthage, as manifested in the treatment of her 
generals, her subject states, her public servants. (3) Factious-
ness in intermal affairs may also be related to the venal char-
acter of Carthaginian civilization, for with wealth exalted by 
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toe constitution itself, virtue and honor lost their supremacy 
and the nation was deprived of the strongest moral bond. Jeal-
ousy and strife arose between classes and disturbed the oper-
ation of government, apparently growing in intensity until the 
final tyranny suppressed all freedom. Justinus bears evidence 
56 to this trait when he characterizes Carthage thus: "Condita est 
urbs haec LXXXII annis antequam Roma; cUius virtus slcut bello 
clara fuit, ita domi status variis discordiarum casibus agitatus 
est." (4) Finally, expediency, rather than principle, was the 
Carthaginian standard of policy in their external relations with 
other peoples. Illustrations are frequent,- the violation of the 
first treaty with Scipio toward the end of the first war, their 
treatment of allies during the second, and of their troops at 
its end, and the initial action against Massinissa leading up 
to the third. It was this lack of principle that gained Carthage 
her reputation for faithlessness, so that ·Punica fides" became 
a synonym for treachery. 
These were, in genBral, the defects which appeared in the 
operation of the government at Carthage; they were weaknesses 
that undermined her own civilization and kindled the hatred of 
Rome. But it would be foolish to suppose that Carthage did not 
have extraordinary talents as well; otherwise she could never 
have established harself as mistress of the seas, nor have re-
sisted Rome as she did. The Romans themselves were not the last 
to recognize this; Appian tells of the wild rejoicings of the 
people of Rome at the fall of Carthage, for "they knew no other 
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war whioh had so terrified them at their own gates as the Punio 
wars, which ever brought peril to them by reason of the persev-
eranoe, high spirit, and courage, as well as the bad faith, of 
those enemies. n57 And Cicero, in a fragment from the De Repub-
lioa , says:58"Nor could Carthage have prospered so greatly for 
~
about six hundred years without good counsel and strict training 
(Sine consiliis et disoiplina)." 
The strong qualities of the national character of Carthage, 
so far as we have seen, are mainly: 
(1) A remarkable cleverness, shrewdness, the kind of wisdom 
that brings preeminenoe in oommeroe, but 1s distinguished from 
wisdom in the fullest sense by a lack of comprehensiveness and 
absolute standards. The lim1tations have been shown in several 
Instances,- the negleot of the fleet and the treatment of allies 
and mercenaries, for example. The wisdom of Carthage was that of 
a man of affairs, the wisdoa of expediency, of olever devioes 
and practical measures; yet it was capable of producing the con-
stitution so admired by Aristotle; it succeeded in establishing 
a commeroial empire never before equalled; it kept the state 
intaot through oenturies, in spite of turbulent elements within 
and the assaults of powerful enemies from without. 
(2) Courage was the second strong element in the Carthaginian 
character, a courage whioh, fDom the ancient sources, seems born 
of recklessness or desperation, rather than high resolve and 
noble principle. It is the unpredictable courage that provoked 
the raids on Masinissa, then, as rapidly as it had risen, gave 
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way to the point of surrendering arms and hostages, and as sud-
denly flaring up again when all seemed lost, shut the gates in 
the face of the conqueror, resisting with a frenzy and a power 
that left the Romans stunned and incredulous even after they had 
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triumphed: 
They were so excited over this victory that they could hardly 
believe it, and they asked each other over and over again whe-
ther it was really true that Carthage was destroyed. And so they 
conversed the whole night, telling how the arms of the Carthag-
inians had been taken away from them, and how at onoe, contrary 
to expeotation, they supplied themselves with others; how they 
lost their ships and built a great fleet out of old material; 
boW the mouth of their harbor was closed, yet they managed to 
open another in a few days. 
Brilliant oourage it was, but fickle, and ultimately ineffeo-
tive against the solid, dogged determination of Rome. 
Nations, like men, are rarely preeminently good or utterly 
depraved, and character must be judged on broad lines by oon-
sidering the combination of good and bad which constitute it. 
To attempt to formulate in a sentence the character of a nation 
is difficult and dangerous at the least. Yet, from such testi-
mony as we have seen, we may hazard the conolusion that the 
civil character of Carthage was shrewd and powerful, but defect-
ive in the higher qualities associated with the best civiliza-
tion,- magnanimity, humaneness, unity of spirit and integrity 
of principle. 
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Civilization, as we have described it in the opening chap-
ter, concerns the "reign of social law,"- the government of Car-
tnage, its form and operation; all the other elements which went 
to make Carthage what she was may be grouped under the general 
II 
term "culture", divided into material, intellectual, and moral 
.... 
culture. In the state as it exists there is, of course, a mutual 
dependence between civilization and culture. A people must pos-
sesS a certain minimum of material, intellectual, and moral cul-
ture before they can establish the "reign of social law," before 
they can form a civilization at all. But granted that the state 
be actually established, its subsequent history will be shaped 
by the mutual interplay of civil and cultural influences, one 
affecting the other. Thus cultural changes will show themselves 
in the government, and likewise the vicissitudes of government 
will react in the sphere of material, intellectual, and moral 
culture. Whatever we know ot one, therefore, must cast light 
upon the other, helping us to trace the development and charac-
ter of the social organism of which they are the elements. 
In the first part we have attempted to reconstruct the pic-
ture of Carthaginian civilization,- the law and its operation-
at the time of the Punic wars particularily. It remains to cloth 
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these dry bones with the flesh of culture by describing, as well 
as weaan from the limited information of the ancient sources, 
the material, intellectual, and moral development of Carthage 
.1th special reference to this period. In the process it is to 
be hoped that light may be cast upon doubtful periods of civil 
development by the study of the cultural aspect, that inferences 
and conclusions in one sphere may be tested by knowledge which 
the other supplies, that the civil and oultural aspects may com-
bine to form an integrated view of the nature of Carthage at the 
time of the Punio wars. 
II. Description £f ~ City 
Carthage was the richest oity of the ancient world. Yet, when 
we try to picture how she must have appeared in the days of her 
prosperity our sources leave muoh to be desired. They are far 
too meager to permit our traoing the external growth of the dit~ 
and at best afford but a rough sketoh in broad outlines. Yet in 
this sketch, rough though it is, we oatch a glimpse of power and 
splendor which recalls that she was onoe queen of the Mediter-
ranean and head of a vast commeroial empire. 
Perhaps our most familiar impression of the struoture of Car-
thage, and only one purporting to represent the oity as it ap-
peared in the earliest period, is Virgil's imaginative conoep-
tion in the first book of the Aeneid: l 
Aeneas marvels at the massive buildings, mere huts onoe; mar-
vels at the gates, the din, and paved high roads. Eagerly the 
Tyrians press on, some to build walls, to rear the oitadel, and 
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roll up stones by hand; some to choose the site for a dwelling 
and enolose it with a furrow. Here some are digging harbors, 
bare others lay the deep foundations of their theatre and hew 
out of the cliff vast columns, lofty adornments for the stage ••• 
Amid the city was a grove luxuriant in shade •••• Here Sidon-
ian Dido was founding to Juno a mighty temple, rioh in gifts and 
the presenoe of the goddess. Brazen was its threshold, uprising 
on steps; bronze plates were its lintel beams, on doors of 
bronze oreaked the hinges •••• While beneath the mighty temple ••• 
he soans each object, while he marvels at the city's fortune, 
the handicraft of the several artists and the work of their toil 
he sees in due order the battles of Ilium, the warfare now known 
by fame throughout the world. 
Granted the poetic nature of Virgil's desoription, though we 
may not aooept the details as historioally accurate, still the 
general impression of massive structure and vast material re-
sources is borne out by Strabo and Appian in their more prosaio 
acoounts of the oity at a later time. Strabo is brief, ske~ching 
only the predominant features of the city:2 
Carthage is situated on a kind of peninsula, whioh oomprises 
a circuit of three hundred and sixty stadia, and this circuit 
has a wall; and sixty stadia of the length of this cirouit 
ocoupy the neok itself, extending from sea to sea •••• Near the 
middle of the city was the acropolis, Which they called Byrsa; 
it was a fairly steep height and inhabited on all sides, and at 
the top it had a temple of Asolepius •••• Below the aoropolis lie 
the harbors, as also Cothon, a circular isle surrounded by a 
strait, which latter has ship houses all round on either side. 
Appian's description of the oity is very much longer, filling 
in some detail~ of these general features mentioned by Strabo, 
though the two fail to agree in matters of direction and dis-
tanoe. The combined acoount~, however, afford a picture of Car-
thage suffioient at least for our purpose, i.e. to indicate a 
~ighll developed material culture, manifested in the ingenuity 
of her harbors and fortifications, the power of her resources, 
and their effioient organization for military purposes, the 
e~istence of well oonstructed temples and an agora, of multi-
storied dwellings, and monumental public works like the giant 
stairway ascending the height of Byrsa. Appian's longest de-
soriptive passage is as follows: 3 
62 
The city lay in a recess of a great gulf and was in the form 
of a peninsula. It was separated from the mainland by an is-
thmUS about three miles in width. From this isthmus a narrow 
and longish tongue of land, about 300 feet wide, extended to-
wards the west between a lake and the sea. (On the sea side) 
where the oity faced a precipice, it was protected by a single 
wall. Towards the south and the mainland, and where the city 
of Byrsa stood on the isthmus, there was a triple wall. The 
height of eaoh wall was forty five feet, not taking acoount of 
the parapets and the towers, which were placed all round at in-
tervals of 200 feet, each having four stories, while their depth 
was thirjy feet. Each wall was divided into two stories. In the 
lower space there were stables for 300 elephants, and along side 
were receptacles for their food. Above were stables for 4000 
horses and places for their fodder and grain. There were bar-
racks also for soldiers, 20,000 foot and 4000 horse. Such prep-
aration for War Was arranged and provided for in their walls 
alone. The angle whioh ran around from this wall to the harbor 
along the tmngue of land mentioned above was the only weak and 
low spot in the fortifications, having been negleoted from the 
beginning. 
The harbors had oommunication with each other, and a common 
entrance from the sea seventy feet wide, which could be closed 
with iron chains. The first port was for merchant vessels, and 
here were collected all kinds of ships tackle. Within the se-
oond port was an island, and great quays were set at intervals 
round both the harbor and the island. These embankments were 
full of shipyards which had capacity for 220 vessels. In addi-
tionto them were magazines for their tackle and furniture. Two 
Ionic columns stood in front of each dock, giving the appear-
ance of a continuous portico to both the harbor and the island. 
On the island was built the admiral's house, from whioh the 
trumpeter gave signals, the herald delivered orders, and the 
admiral himself overlooked everything. The island lay near the 
entrance to the harbor and rose to a considerable height, so 
that the admiral oould observe what waB going on at sea, while 
those who were approaching by water could not get any clear 
View of what took plaoe within. Not even inooming merohants' 
oould see the docks at once, for a double wall enclosed them, 
and there were gat es by which merchant ships could pass from 
the first port to the city without traversing the dockyards. 
Such was the appearance of Carthage at that time. 
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Later in his account, Appian mentions the first harbor, open 
to merchant vessels, as "thag part of Cothon which is in the 
form of a quadrangle," and the seoond, containing the military 
dookyards, as "the other part of Cothon which was in the form 
of a circle.,,4 This regularity of shape leaves little doubt 
that these harbors were dredged out by the Carthaginians them-
selves,- a public work worthy of their Phoenician ancestors-
and lends historical support to at least one of Virgil's de-
5 tails, viz. "here some are digging harbors." 
The harbor district lay in the north west portion of the 
city. From Appian's aocount of Scipio's attack upon this dis-
trict we learn that the forum was located near by:6 "The wall 
around Cothon being taken, Scipio seized the neighboring forum 
and ••• passed the night there under arms." 
Either facing the forum, or close by, was the temple of 
Apollo, which must have been of extraordinary splendor if it 
corresponded to the statue housed within:? "At daylight he 
brought in 4000 fresh troops. They entered the temple of Apollo, 
whose statue was there, covered with gold, in a shrine of beate 
gold, weighing 1000 talents." 
Not far from the forum and the temple of Apollo, and like 
them on the north, the sea side, of Carthage, arose the acro-
polis already mentioned by Strabo, the focal point of the oity, 
the stronghold known as Byrsa, surmounted by the temple of As-
clepius. The distriot surrounding the height was thickly popu-
a lated, for: "There were three streets asoending from the forum 
to this fortress, along which, on either side, were houses 
built closely together and six stories high." 
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The temple itself was "much the richest and most renowned 
of all in the -citadel," and "in time of peace was reached by 
an ascent of sixty steps."9 The first statement implies that 
there were other temples in the citadel, less renowned than 
that of Asclepius. It is not certain to whom they were dedi-
cated; perhaps to the goddess Tanit, whose worship superceded 
that of Asclepius on the geight of Byrsa when Carthage was re-
10 
stored under the Romans. 
It is likely that the senate chamber so often mentioned in 
connection with the government was located here as well. There 
were public baths too, which must have been situated near Byrsa 
in the heart of the city,- one for the privileged classes and 
another for the commons, as Valerius Maximus tells us in cas-
11 tigating the Carthaginian and Campanian senators for snobbery: 
IIInsolentiae vero inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum senatum 
quasi aemulatio fuit; ille enim separato a plebe balneo lava-
batur; hic diverso foro utebatur." 
In these scattered accounts, them, the bulk of Carthage 
looms up before the mind's eye, its main features just distin-
gUishable, as though seen through a mist,- the massive battle-
ments rising on three sides from the sea and tripling to face 
invaders from the mainland; the efficient land-locked harbors, 
cut with geometrical precision; the forum and the temple of 
Apollo, whence three roads lead through close packed dwellings 
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to ascend the mount of Byrsaj and finally the height itself, 
consecrated to government and the cult of Carthage's gods, and 
crowned with the collonades of temples. 
There is little direct mention of esthetic detail in the 
ancient descriptions of Carthage. However, the public buildings 
of the wealthiest city of her tiJe.s must have been splendidly 
adorned with the richest materials, materials which the sur-
rounding country produced in such abundance that they became 
traditionally connected with its name. There was the famed Nu-
midian marble, mentioned by Horace12as "columnas ultima recisas 
13 Africa," and by Juvenal as trlongis Numidarum fulta columnis",-
the symbol of extravagent and elegant construction. We have 
seen how gold was lavished upon the shrine of Apollo in the 
temple near the forum; how much ~ore common would silver have 
been in a city that had for centuries exploited the rich mines 
of Spain? Pliny remarks that the precious citron wood was found 
on Mt. Atlas, west of Carthage,14and that ivory, so prized at 
Rome, was abundant enough in Africa to be used by the natives 
for door frames and even fence posts. 1S All these precious ma-
terials must have added splendor to Carthaginian construction. 
Vague and speculative as these conclusions may be, there is 
one detail of which we are certain in regard to the ornamen-
tation of Carthage. We know that the city was adorned with the 
finewt artistic productions of the Greek colonies in Sicily,-
Silenus, Himera, Agrigentum, Gela. The only period we can de-
r finitely determine as marking a step forward in the artistic 
l----------------------------------~ 
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development of Carthage is the last ten years of the fifth cen-
tury, during which first Hannibal, then Hamilcar, sacked these 
Greek cities and sent their art treasures across the sea to 
adorn the city. After Hannibal had taken Silenus and Himera in 
the expedition of 410 B.C. he returned home in triumph, burden-
ed with spoils, as Diodorus Siculus relates:16nWhen he sailed 
back to Carthage, laden with a vast quantity of booty, the en-
tire population turned out to receive him with honor." 
But the second expedition fo that period, landing in Sicily 
about 406 B.C., acquired for Carthage her greatest treasures. 
Diodorus estimates the richness of the spoils taken from Agri-
gentum as follows: 17 
Hamilcar, by systematically stripping both shrines and pri-
vate dwellings, amassed spoils of such value as the city could 
be expected to possess, numbering as it did 20,000 inhabitants, 
having never yet been plundered from the time of its foundation 
being the richest of almost all the Greek cities of that period 
and one whose citizens spared no expense in indulging their 
fondness for the beautiful in every type of art and construc-
tion. Paintings exeouted with oonsummate skill were found in 
great numbers, and innumerable examples of every type of sculp-
ture, products of the finest workmanship. He sent the most pre-
cious of these to Carthage, among them the famous "Bull of Pha-
laris." 
18 And again he writes: 
The Carthaginians, after taking the city, shipped votive 
offerings from the temples, statues, eVBrything of great value, 
back to Carthage. 
Finally, after the fall of Gela, Hamilcar followed the same 
19 procedure: "From the temples, that is, from as many as he did 
not think fit to destroy by fire, he stripped the carvings and 
Whatever was of superior workmanship." 
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During this period, then, the finest productions of the Si-
cilian Greek artists were brought to Carthage and set up to 
adorn the city,- statues, paintings, carvings, decorative work 
of all kinds. The golden statue of Apollo mentioned above was 
probably acquired at this time; we know definitely that another 
of giant proportions add cast in bronze, was seized when Gela 
20 fell and sent to Tyre: "The people of Gela had a statue of 
Apollo outside the city, made of bronze and exceptionally large 
seizing this the Carthaginians sent it to Tyre." 
The Carthaginians seem to have kept many of these treasures 
intact through all the vioissitudes of their history, since 
Plutarch testifies that SCipio, entering Carthage after the 
final struggle, "found the city full of Greek statues and vo-
tive offerings, which had oome from SiOi1y.,,21 Thereupon, as 
22 Appian reoounts, SOipio "sent word to Sioily that whatever 
temple gifts they could identify as taken from them by the Car-
thaginians in former wars they oould come and take away." 
Thus, through the last oenturies of their history at least, 
the Carthaginians could boast of artistio exoellence in the 
adornment of their city, though as far as we can determine from 
the sources, it seems to have been borrowed, due to Greek, 
rather than Punio, genius. 
III. Resources of ~ City 
The resouroes of Carthage corresponded to the grandeur of 
her external struoture. Appian's desoription already oonveys 
some oonce tion of the militar 
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not a sword, nor a sufficient number of fighting men at home, 
ba~ing lost 50,000 a short time ago." Yet under the stress of 
seige , and with the courage of despair, the Carthaginians manu-
factured arms and ships at the rate indicated by Strabo, and 
bald out against overwhelming odds for three years. 
Where did they procure the materials? Some of it, as Strabo 
says above, had been stored away in readiness for just such an 
26 
occasion. Zonaras suggests other sources: "They melted down 
the statues for the sake of the bronze in them and took the 
woodwork of buildings, private and public alike; for the tri-
remes and the engines." During the final seige Carthage was 
practically cut off from all outside supply, so that it was 
mainly upon the resources of just the city itself that she had 
to rely; it is evident, then, why her protracted resistance was 
a source of wonder and admiration to the ancients. 
These details from the sources, finally, though sketchy and 
none too well connected, still afford a glimpse of the general 
lay-out, the magnitude and richness of construotion, the power-
ful material resources of Carthage,- enough at least to indi-
cate that this aspect of her culture was highly developed. 
IV. The Environs 
The countryside about Carthage must have been exceedingly 
fertile, well stocked, and well cultivated, from the glimpses 
we catch in a few of the anoient authorities. In fact, were it 
not, Carthage could neither have supported her population and 
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~er armies, nor supplied grain to other parts of the ancient 
.orld through trade. Even a large portion o£ the territory en-
closed within the walls o£ Carthage was under cultivation. This 
waS the suburb known as Megara, which stretched out £rom the 
Syrsa on the side opposite the harbors to the wall that cut 
aOross the neck o£ the peninsula. Appian mentions it a s the 
district o£ homes and gardens where Scipio gained his £irst £oot 
hold within ~he walls:2? 
That part o£ Carthage called Megara ••• was a very large suburb 
adjacent to the city wall •••• Megara was planted with gardens 
and was £ull o£f.ruit bearing trees divided o££ by low walls and 
hedges o£ brambles and thorns, besides deep ditches £ull o£ 
water running in every direction. 
This description, such as it is, is the only one we have o£ 
Megara; it is enough, however, to indicate that the Carthagin-
lana were experts in cultivation and irrigation. 
A picture o£ the countryside beyond the walls, much more de-
tailed and impressive, has been preserved by Diodorus, who tells 
how Agathocles raised the spirits o£ his men with the sight o£ 
its opulence, promising that they should share it when Carthage 
tell: 28 
The intervening countryside through which they had to travel 
was cultivated as gardens and every type o£ plantation, the 
Whole intersected by a well developed system o£ irrigation 
through which it was plentifully watered. Landed estates border-
ed one another in succession, adornedw ith mansions of splendid 
architecture,- an indication of the wealth of the owners. The 
estates were £itted out with every possible £acility for enjoy-
ment, collected by the inhabitants as the fruit of a long peace. 
The plains were partly covered with the vine, partly with the 
olive, and planted with all the other trees that bear fruit. In 
another part herds of cattle and flocks of sheep were graZing, 
and in the meighboring fens great numbers of war horses. In brie 
all possible prosperity was manifest on those plains where the 
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_ost eminent citizens of Carthage owned property and used their 
.ealth for the pleasure of indulging their elegant taste. Con-
sequently the Sicilians were much impressed with the beauty and 
prosperity of the countryside. 
It is not probable, of course, that the Carthaginian country-
side presented so prosperous ani appearance throughout the entire 
history of the city. Agathocles, as the text indicates, entered 
it after the period of prolonged peace from 337 to 310 B.C., dur 
ing which the fortune of the merchant city would have risen to 
uncommon heights. Still, this condition of wealth and fruitful-
ness must have prevailed at the time of the First Punic war at 
least, since that too came at the end of a long term of peace. 
After the Mercenary war, however, which followed the first con-
flict with Rome, and after the depredations of Massinissa follow 
ing the second, it is not likely that the same happy condition 
continued. The merchant princes of Cartl~ge would have been wil-
ling to expose neither their lives nor their wealth on country 
estates situated at some distance from the city walls. Moreover, 
the loss of power and prestige, with the corresponding loss of 
personal income, suffered by the wealthy class through the rise 
of the democratic elements during the last period of Carthagin-
" ian history would have discouraged the continued maintalnance of 
expensive establishments such as Diodorus describes. However, 
though the land may have changed ownership in later times, it 
need not be supposed that it thereby became less fruitful or 
less valuable to Carthage as har source of supply. 
We have seen how the wealthy built themselves magnificent 
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_anaiona on their great landed estates; but what of the dwel-
lings of the common folk, the rural workers and small farmers? 
For though the estates of the nobles were undoubtedly worked by 
sla~e labor, there were apparently many independent rural com-
munities, froups of free farmers, in the vicinity of Carthage. 
Diodorus mentions that Agathocles, in subduing the territory 
about Carthage, I'brought more than 200 towns in all under his 
,,29 dominion. These towns were probably not much more than clus-
ters of the rude structures known as "mapalia" or "megalia" 
which Virgil speaks of as originally occupying the site of Car-
30 thage: "Miratur molem Aeneas, megalia quondam." Sallust de-
scribes them thus:3l "It is an interesting fact that even to the 
present day the dwellings of the rustic Numidians, which they 
call rmapalia r, are oblong and have roofs with curved sides, 
like the hulls of ships." 
A group of these poor dwellings formed into a small village 
would offer the advantages of comparionship and mutual protec-
tion to the families of rural workers who went out from them 
each day to the neighboring fields, and whose lot would thus be 
in sharp contrast to that of the gentlemen-farmers of Carthage 
with their luxurious estates,- a circumstance Which helps to 
explain why foreign invaders found them willing allies against 
the Carthaginians. 
In these few brief passages from the sources, then, we catch 
Sight of the richness of the cultivated land in and about Car-
thage,- well stocked with fruit trees of all descriptions, the 
73 
~ine, and the olive; fenced, hedged, and intersected by irriga-
tion canals; the fields beyond the walls alive with grazing 
flocks and herds; the sumptuous mansions of the wealthy adorning 
lUXurious estates and giving way to scattered hamlets of rustic 
huts as the distance from the city increased. It is enough to 
indicate that the cUltivation of rural resources corresponded to 
the highly developed material culture within the city. 
v. !!!! People 
Who were the people that composed this center of civilization 
and inhabited the country around it? Diodorus divides them rough 
32 11 into four classes: 
Africa at that time was divided among four peoples: the Phoe-
nicians, who dwelt in Carthage; the Liby-Phoenicians who occu-
pied many coastal towns and intermarried with the Carthaginians, 
being so named because of this relationship to them; the greater 
part of the common people, the original inhabitants, known as 
Libyans, who burned with a heaaty hatred for the Carthaginians 
because of the harshness of their rule; and finally the Numid-
ians, who occupied a large portion of Libya, extending to the 
edges of the desert. 
From the fact that so sharp a distinction was possible betwee 
the racial groups dwelling in and about Carthage we may infer 
that the Carthaginians, unlike the Romans, for example, maintain 
ad a policy of exclusiveness in regard to the native subject pop 
ulation, treating them as inferiors to be exploited, rather than 
insuring their loyalty by incorporating them into the state or 
entering into compact with them as respectable allies. The hos-
tile attitude of the Libyans supports this conclusion; we shall 
lee more of it later in regard to the attitude of the Carthagin. 
74 
ian subjeot nations to the mother oity. 
We might ask then: What did the Carthaginians look l~.ke? Thei 
appearanoe is important for two reasons. First. and obviously. 
national charaoterist1os are indioated by dress, and seoond. the 
representation of the average Carthaginian in the imagination of 
other peoples, like the Greeks and Romans, is significant in hel 
ping to explain their attitude toward Carthage. Imagination shap 
IS attitudes and gives impulse to action. Though desoriptions' 
gathered from Latin and Greek sources may not be entirely acou-
rate in regard to the first reason, they are nevertheless impor-
tant in regard to the seoond. 
To the stern Roman the dres. of the Carthaginians must have 
suggested ostentation and luxurio~sness, since they seem to have 
made ample use of the rich materials supplied through world trad 
to adorn their persons in lavish Eastern fashion. First. the rio 
purple dye of the murex, so prized by the ancient world, was de-
veloped by the Tyrians and beoame oonneoted with their name. so 
that Horaoe oould speak ot nmurioibus Tyriis iteratae veller& 
lanae. n33 Tyre would have been an easy souroe of the preoious 
stuff for Carthage, but she had another even oloser at hand in 
the island ot Meninx and a portion of the African Coast, as Plin 
points out:34 "In Asia the best purple is that of Tyre, in Atrio 
that of Meninx and the parts of Gaetulia that border on the 
ooean." And Horace mentions "te bis Afro murice tinotae. n35 With 
suoh ready sources of supply, then. the purple must have been a 
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common article of Carthaginian trade, and even more common in 
their own vesture. Thus Polybius presents Haadrubal,- the tyrant 
of Carthage in her last days - as coming forth to parry with 
Golosses, king of the Numidiana, "in a oomplete suit of armour, 
over whioh was fastened a cloak of sea purple."36 And again, on 
a second meeting, he refers to the display oontemptuously:37 
'The Carthaginian again advanoed slowly to meet him in great 
state, wearing his full armour and purple robe, leaving the ty-
rants of tragedy muoh to seek." 
Appian describes a clown who appeared inthe triumphal pro-
oession of the elder Soipio, evidently dressed to represent a 
Carthaginian, "wearing a purple oloak reaohing to the feet and 
golden bracelets and neoklaoe."38 
Jewelry of this type was another item which must have formed 
a part of the Carthaginian oostume, at least that of the wealth-
ier classes. Gold, silver, and ivory, as we have seen, were com-
mon enough. Moreover, the Carthaginians would have been well sup 
plied with glass beads and trinkets by their Phoenician kinsmen, 
who, acoording to Pliny,39 had disoovered the process for making 
glass, for which, as Strabo mentions, Tyre furnished the sand 
and Sidon the workmanshiP:40 "Between Ace and Tyre is a sandy 
beach which produces the sand used in making glass. Now the sand 
it is said, is not fused here, but is oarried to Sidon and there 
melted and cast." 
Not only glass beads, however, but genuine precious stones, 
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.ust have been plentiful in this center of world trader one type 
of ruby, or carbuncle, for example, was called "Carthaginian" 
41 because of its abundance there, as Pliny says: "Horum (carbun .. 
oulorumJ genera, Indici et Garamantici, quos et Charcedonios vo-
oant, propter opulentiam Cart?aginis Magnae." 
That the men of Carthage were accustomed to deck themselves 
with jewelry may be gathered from the fact that at one time the 
government encouraged military service by offering the oitizens 
a decoration of this sort as a publio distinotion, as Aristotle 
42 points out: "Indeed, among some peoples there are even certain 
laws stimulating military valour; for instance at Carthage, we 
are told, warriors receive the deooration of armuleta of the 
same number as the oampaigns on which they have served." 
The ordinary form of dress worn in time of peace was a loose 
tunic, without a belt or girdle, probably highly colored. Gel-
lius remarks:43 "Quintus Ennius also seems to have spoken not 
nthout soorn of the 'tunic-clad men' of the Carthaginians." And 
Plautus, in the Poenulus, oapitalizes on this Roman scorn with 
references to the dress of Hanno, a rioh old Carthaginian:44 
But what bird is that arriving here in the tunios? Was 
his cloak nabbed at the baths, I wonder? (975-6) 
Hey, you without a belt, ••• (1008) 
WhOIS the ohap with the long tunics like a tavern boy? 
(1298) 
-Though the details are scattered and meagre, still they are 
suffioient to conjure up the image of a bearded Semet10 in a 
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long, loose robe of richly dyed material, glittering with gems, 
glass beads or trinkets, with the deeper glint of gold or silver 
at his throat and wrists and on his ivory sword hilt, scented, 
perhaps, with the perrumes of the East, his whole dress suggest-
ing to the Roman ostentatious wealth and luxury, - such is the 
impression of the wealthy Carthaginian merchant or noble. 
What of the dress of the lower classes? The historians, of 
course, are not much concerned with it, and leave us without a 
clue. It was probably as much like that of the merchants and 
nobles as their means would allow. One characteristic may be 
noted. The fondness for jewelry seems to have been universal. 
Plautus introduoes Carthaginian slaves with rings in their earj~ 
"Well, here they are with ring-arrayed ears." And it may be re-
membered that the Mercenary War was partially financed by the 
peasant women of nearby Libyan villages who "stripping themsel-
ves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war 
tund. n46 In general, it is probable that the dress of the North 
African peasant has not changed radically in the course of the 
centuries, so that he must have appeared in the days of Cartha-
ginian glory much as he does today. 
VI. The Armies of Carthage 
Carthage, true to her commercial character, preferred to pay 
others to do most of her fighting, though she provided the gene-
rals and at least a nucleus of native Carthaginian soldiery. Up 
to the time of the Third Punic War she depended almost entirely 
78 
upon foreign troops for conquest and protection, recruiting them 
not only a~ong the African coast, but from every oountry ahd is-
land on the European side of the Meditarranean. 
As early as 480 B.C. the Carthaginians sent a host against 
Galon of Syraouse oonsisting, acoording to Herodotus, of "Phoe-
nioians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Elisyci, Sardinians, and 
cyrnians, led by Hamilcar, son of Hanno, the king of the Cartha-
ginians."47 The Ligyes were Ligurians, the Cyrnians Corsicans, 
and the Elisyci an Iberian people. 
In the next Sicilian expedition of 410, sent to relieve Eges-
ta, aooording to Diodorus,48 "the Carthaginians dispatched to 
the Egestians 5000 Libyans and 800 Campanians," while Hannibal, 
their general, "throughout that summer and the following winter 
oolleoted large mercenary forces from Spain, and enlisted a conM 
siderable number of citizens; then travelling through Libya, se-
lected the best men from each village." The army thus oollected 
numbered at the lowest estimate 10QOOO, as Diodorus recounts:49 
"The whole of Hannibal's army, as Ephorus reoords, numbered 
200,000 foot and 40,000 horse; but Timaeus claims there were no 
more than 100,000. 0 
When the Carthaginians decided on a seoond expedition four 
years later an even more extensive enlistment was made; thus 
Dlodorus says:50 
They lthe generals] sent out certain eminent Carthaginians 
with vast sums of money to Spain and to the Balearic Islands, 
with orders to enlist as many meroenaries as possible, while 
they themselves went through Libya, enrolling Libyan and Phoe-
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ician troops, including the best of their fellow citizens. They 
°ummoned Moors and Numidians from the kings and tribes allied to ~~em, and even some from the territory around Cyrene. Then they 
hired Campanians, whom they transported from Italy to Africa. 
It was this army that took Agrigentum and brought the trea-
sures of Sicily to Carthage. 
Later in their history, however, the Carthaginians did more 
of the fighting themselves. Thus in 383 B.C. they raised a body 
of troops from their own number. Carthaginians enrolled in for-
mer campaigns were for the most part officers; now they were 
called upon to serve in the ranks. "Prudently foreseeing a pro-
longed struggle, they enlisted as soldiers those citizens who 
were suitable."51 Yet these citizen troops were only a part of 
the army, since they hired great numbers in addition: 52 "And 
gathering a great sum of money, they hired large forces of mer-
cenaries." 
In the war with Timoleon some forty years later, an estimated 
10,000 native Carthaginians appeared in an army of 70,000, as 
Plutarch records:53 
••• the enemy were seen crossing, in the van their four-horse 
chariots formidably arrayed for battle, and behind these ten 
thousand men-at-arms with white shields. These the Corinthians 
conjectured to be Carthaginians from the splendor of their armor 
and the slowness and good order of their march. 
Thus the citizen troops impressed the Greeks as being well 
armed and disciplined; they represented, moreover, the aristo-
cracy of Carthage. Yet the action that followed ended in the 
sorest defeat the city had ever suffered:54 
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It is said that among 10,000 dead bodies, 3000 were those of 
carthaginians,- a great affliction for the city. For no others 
were superior to these in birth or wealth or reputation, nor is 
it recorded that so many native Carthaginians ever perished in 
a single battle before, but they used Libyans for the most part 
and Iberians and Numidians for their battles, and thus sustain-
ed defeats at the cost of other nations. 
About twenty years later, when Agathocles suddenly appeared 
before the walls of Carthage, the citizens were forced to turn 
out in numbers, since there was no time for a levy of mercena-
ries from Spain or the islands, or even the African coast. Dio-
dorus speaks of the event:55 
The Carthaginian generals, seeing that there was no time for 
delay, refused to wait for troops from the surrounding country 
and from allied cities, but called out the citizens themselves, 
not less than 40,000, including a thousand horse and two thou-
sand chariots. Hanno was in charge of the right wing, supported 
by the Sacred Cohort. 
This Sacred Cohort probably represented the wealth and nobi-
lity of Carthage, and acquitted itself honorably, fighting on 
despite the loss of its leader and the flight of the Libyans. 
These latter, as has been mentioned, formed the bulk of the com-
mon people and probably of the army in this instance. Justinus 
puts the total strength of this army at 30,000, a more likely 
figure than the one above:56 "Obvius eis fuit cum XXX milibus 
Poenorum Hanno." This was as close to a purely citizen army as 
Carthage had ever mobilized. It was defeated, however, by Aga-
thocles, and with severe losses. 
By the time of the First Punic war the Carthaginians had ap-
parently reverted to their practice of depending almost entire-
ly upon mercenaries. Diodorus presents an impOSing list of those 
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whO took part in thi s w ar and in t he mercenary rebellion that 
followed:57 "Those who had been enlisted to fight with the Car-
thaginians were Spaniards, Gauls, Balearians, Libyans, Phoeni-
cians, Ligurians, and Greek slaves of various cities; and these 
rebelled." Polybius adds58 that "the largest portion consisted 
of Libyans" and that the entire force was "more than 20,000 in 
number." 
There has been much discussion among scholars about Hanni-
bal's army in the Second Punic war; it will be sufficient here, 
59 however, to cite the statement of Polybius on the army of Italy: 
••• his regiments were not only of different nationalities 
but of different races. For he had with him Africans, Spaniards, 
Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks, peoples 
who neither in their laws, customs, or language, nor in any 
other respect had anything naturally in common. 
As to the army in Africa, the Carthaginian array before the 
battle of Zama is typical: 60 
Hannibal placed in front of his whole force his elephants, 
of which he had over eighty, and behind them the mercenaries 
numbering about twelve thousand. They were composed of Ligu-
rians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors. Behind these he 
placed the native Libyans and C rthaginians, and last of all 
the troops he had brought over ~rom Italy • ••• He secured his 
wings by cavalry, placing the Numidian allies on the left and 
the Carthaginian horse on the right. 
Finally, in a passage which compares the relative strength of 
Rome and Carthage with particular reference to the Second Punic 
w~, Polybius writes: 61 
. As regards military service on land the Romans are much more 
efficient. They indeed devote their whole energies to this mat-
ter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, 
though they do pay some sllght attention to their cavalry. The 
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reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and 
mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil 
and citizens. 
After the Second Punic war Carthage's mercenary armies dis-
appear. Conquest was forbidden herj any attempt to enlist troops 
would have brought sanctions from Rome. The Third Punic war was 
fought by the Carthaginians themselves, with help from the sur-
rounding countryside. Their plight at the beginning of the war 
has been described by Appian, who mentions among other details~2 
"Nor had they mercenaries, nor friends, nor allies, nor time to 
procure any." Their chief support at first must have been the 
army of 30,000 which the exiled Hasdrubal had collected, pro-
bably from his followers in the city and natives of the surroun-
ding territory. The ranks of the army within the walls were 
swelled by freeing the slaves:63 "The same day the Carthaginian 
senate declared war and proclaimed freedom to the slaves. They 
also chose generals and selected Hasdrubal for the outside work, 
whom they had condemned to death, and who had already collected 
30,000 men." This army included a considerable force of cavalry, 
for we know that when the chief cavalry officer, Phameas, deser-
ted to Scipio, he brought a large number with him:64 "Some of 
the officers went over to the enemy with their forces, to the 
number of about 2,200 horse. n Even during the final phase of the 
war, after the capture of Megara, Hasdrubal still had an army of 
30,000 within the city, for Appian tells us that "the supplies 
brought by the ships Hasdrubal distributed to his 30,000 sol-
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diers whom he had chosen to fight, neglecting the multitude."65 
There was, moreover, in the country beyond, a large supporting 
force of Africans under Diogenes, whose duty was to keep the 
supply lines open and the natives loyal. SCipio routed this 
force at Nepheris and, as Appian says,66 "Galussa pursued them 
with his Numidian cavalry and elephants and made a great slaugh 
ter, as many as 70,000, including non-combatants, being killed, 
10,000 captured, and about 4000 escaped." All this gives some 
comcept of the armed force Carthage could raise from just her 
own citizens and the natives of the surrounding countryside. 
In conclusion, then, it is evident that Carthage depended 
almost entirely upon mercenary armies throughout the greater 
part of her known history, though during the fourth century the 
Carthaginians themselves took anactive part in bearing arms. 
The Third Punic war, however, was fought without the aid of mer-
cenaries, proving that C~rthage could raise a formidable army 
of her own, and manifesting her amazing native powers when dri-
ven to desperation. The contrast, then, between the C~rthagin­
ian and the Roman attitude at this time becomes clear. The Car-
thaginians depended mainly upon mercenary troops, supplementing 
them with citizen forces when necessary; the Romans depended on 
their main body of citizen-soldiers, supplementing it with for-
eign allies. The Romans preferred to do their own fighting; the 
Carthaginians paid others to do it for them. 
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VII. The Navies 
The ancients are of one accord in regard to the naval stren-
•• gth of c~rthage. They agree that in her prime she was complete 
mistress of the Western Mediterranean. Dionysius of Halicarna-
SUS echoes them all when he speaks of "the Carthaginians, whose 
maritime strength was superior to that of all others."6? Poly-
bius adds some reasons for this supremacy while comparing Rome 
and carthage:68 "The Carthaginians naturally are superior at 
sea both in efficiency and equipment, because seamanship has 
long been their national craft, and they busy themselves with 
the sea more than any other people." The first may be attributed 
to their Phoenician background, the second to their character 
as a merchant city. 
The Carthaginians were, moreover, proverbially jealous of 
their control of the sea and took drastic measures to preserve 
it, as Strabo remarks: 69 "According to Eratosthenes, the expul-
sion of foreigners is a custom common to all barbarians ••• and 
the Carthaginians likewise, he adds, used to drown in the sea 
any foreigners who sailed past their country to Sardo (sardinia) 
or to the Pillars." There seems to have been an ancient boast, 
too, that no man could wash his hands in the sea without the 
consent of Carthage. 
A few instances lnay be cited to indicate the magnitude of the 
naval forces by which Carthage maintained her hegemony. In the 
early period of her history, when Hannibal had gathered his 
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forces for the expedition of 410 B.C. against Sicily, Diodorus 
88.ys:70 "He manned 60 ships of war and fitted out about 1500 
transports, in which he conveyed his troops, siege machinery, 
.eapons, and all other equipment." Fleets of the same propor-
tions passed back and forth from Carthage to Sicily several 
times during the period of wars with Dionysius which followed, 
from 406 to 368 B.C., and the tyrant was finally defeated 
through the efficiency of the Carthaginian navy. Having reopened 
hostilities in 368 by taking Selinus, Entellus, and Eryx, Dio-
nys1us was besieging Lilybaeum when he heard that the docks at 
carthage had burnt. Thinking, therefore, that he would not need 
his fleet, he sent much of it back to Syracuse, keeping 130 
ships at Eryx. "But,1t says Diodorus,7l lithe Carthaginians, con-
trary to all expectation, manned 200 ships and bore down upon 
the enemy lying at anchor in the harbor of Eryx. 1t Dionysius lost 
over half his squadron, called a truce, and, dying shortly af-
terwards, left victory to the Carthaginians. About thirty years 
later Carthage sent another armada to Sicily against Timoleon, 
as Plutarch records:72 "Meanwhile the Carthaginians put in at 
Lilybaeum with an army of 70,000 men, 200 triremes, and 1000 
transports carrying engines of war, four-horse chariots, grain 
in abundance, and other requisite equipment. 
Through naval armaments of this magnitude Carthage maintaine 
uninterrupted sway over the Mediterranean, so that at the begin-
ning of the First ~Anic war Polybius could refer to them as lithe 
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carthaginians, who had held for generations undisputed command 
of the sea. tl73 It was in this war that her maritime supremacy 
was questioned for the first time, and that by the Romans who 
had never taken seriously to the sea before. still, in the firs 
engagement at Mylae (260 B.C.) a fleet of 130 Carthaginian ship 
was defeated and put to flight by not more than 100 clumsy Roma 
vessels, through the success of a device which the Romans used 
to pin the Carthaginian ships close to theirs, enabling their 
marines to carry the action. Made more w~y by this defeat, the 
Carthaginians employed the next four years in strengthening 
their fleet for a decisive engagement. The Romans made good use 
of the time and did the same. In 256 B.C. the two fleets met at 
Eonomos in one of the greatest naval battles of all times. Poly 
bius carefully reoords the forces involved:74 
The Romans ••• set to sea with a fleet of 330 deoked ships 
of war ••• the Carthaginians setting sail with 350 deoked ves-
sels ••• The Roman foroes embarked on the ships numbered abou 
140,000, each ship holding 300 rowers and 120 soldiers. The 
Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparation 
to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reokon by the number 
of ships, aotually above 150,000. 
After describing the engagement, Polybius concludes:75 
The final result of the whole battle was in favor of the 
Romans. The latter lost twenty four sail sunk, and the Cartha-
ginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew 
fell into the enemy's hands, but sixty four Carthaginian ships 
were so captured. 
The Victory was again determined by the Roman device mention-
ed above, rather than by superior seamanship; nevertheless, Car-
thage at her best had been defeated. She was kept on the defen-
sive until the third Roman fleet was destroyed by storm, when 
she was left once more supreme. But instead of strengthening 
their position, the Carthaginians "economized" by neglecting 
their fleet. Consequently the launching of a fourth fleet by 
the Romans caught them unprepared. Though the Carthaginians at 
once sent out their fleet to meet the new challange, they were 
miserably defeated, for, as Polybius records,?6 "their ships, 
being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, 
while the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board 
for the .emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose 
first experience of the least hardship and danger this was." 
Consequently they "were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and 
seventy captured with their crews." The result was that Rome 
thenceforward commanded the sea, and Carthage had to ask for 
terms. Her long maritime supremacy was broken. Her greatest 
strength had lain in this domination of the Mediterranean; she 
had lost it through a fatal attempt to economize. 
That the Carthaginian supremacy on the sea was not subsequen-
tly restored may be inferred from two considerations. First, 
Hannibal chose to march his army across the Alps into Italy, in-
stead of transporting them by sea from Spain. Second, Scipio had 
a small and newly constructed fleet, consisting originally, as 
Livy says,?? of "thirty ships, twenty quinqueremes and ten quad-
riremes which, upon the insistence of Scipio himself, were so 
rapidly constructed that precisely forty five days after their 
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timbers had been cut in the forest they were launched l ~llly ar 
mad and fully equipped." This was increased after his sojourn 
in SicilYI so that putting out from Lilybaeuml "he sent his arm 
across in transports numbering al!nost four hundred l escorted by 
forty ships of war."78 Yet this fleetl still comparatively 
smal11 made the crossing unmolested by the Carthaginians. "I 
take it on the authority of many Greek and Latin writers that 
the crossing was made successfully without threat or distur-
bance l " says Livy.79 
After the fall of Tunis the Romans were almost taken unaware 
by a fleet from Carthage l and might have been annihilated had 
the Carthaginians not lost their spiritl as Livy remarks:80 
If the Carthaginians had hastened to the attaok they might 
have overwhelmed all in oonfusion and fear at the first on-
slaught; but so oppressed were they by their defeats on land 
that they lost heart even at seal where they had been most 
powerful I and so after passing the day in aimless maneuvers at 
sundown they put in with their fleet at the port which the Afri-
cans call Ruscinona. 
The following daYI after an attaok on the Romans l they suo-
ceeded only in capturing six transports. "Sex ferme onerariae 
puppibus abstraotae Carthaginem sunt. lt8l 
Thus l during the Second Punic war the Carthaginian fleet was 
certainly not the force to reckon with that it was in the First. 
Carthage oould evidently no longer boast of being mistress of 
the Mediterraneanl at least. And the treaty which ended the war 
ended all future pretensions to naval power for the Carthagi-
nians with the demand that "they surrender their ships of war l 
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.i tb the exception of ten triremes."82 
VIII. The Empire - Sources of Wealth 
In the course of her history Carthage had grown from a simple 
Phoenician colony to the powerful capital of a vast empire, as 
APpian points out:83 
Later on, using this tthe original site) as a base and get-
ting the upper hand of their neighbors in war, and engaging in 
traffic by sea, like all Phoenicians, they built the outer city 
round Byrsa. Gradually acquiring strength they mastered Africa 
and a great part of the Mediterranean, carried war abroad into 
Sicily and Sardinia and the other islands of the sea, and also 
into Spain, while they sent out numerous colonies. They became 
a match for the Greeks in power, and next to the Persians in 
wealth. 
This empire must have been established by the end of the 
fifth century, for Dionysius, contemplating hostillties against 
Carthage about 397 B.C., prepared huge armaments, as Diodorus 
relates,84 "because he realized that he was about to struggle 
with the most powerful people of Europe." 
Fear of this ever-growing empire of Carthage and not mere 
lust for power was behind Rome's support of the Mamertines,- the 
85 
episode which began the First Punic war - according to Polybius: 
They saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya 
to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they 
were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and 
Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, 
if they also became ma.sters of Sicily, they would be most 
troublesome and dangerous neighbors, hemming them in on all 
sides and threatening every part of Italy. 
Vfuat were the motives behind this constant expansion? Three 
suggest themselves at once. (1) Carthage probably decided defi-
nitely on an imperial policy when the Greeks began to establish 
oolonies in the western Mediterranean, threatening her trade 
supremaoy in that part of Europe. (2) She found oolonizing a 
painless and profitable means of thinning out her population, 
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as Aristotle remarks:86 "They oonstantly send out a partion of 
the common people to appointments in the cities [0010nies1 ; by 
this means they heal the sooial sore and make the constitution 
stable." And again:87 "By following some suoh policy as this 
the Carthaginians have won the friendship of the common people; 
for they oonstantly send out some of the people to the surround-
ing territories and so make them well off." {3} It is evident, 
however, that the rulers of Carthage were anxious to counteract 
Greek expansion, and her people were willing to be transported 
to foreign soil, for a motive whioh was characteristio of the 
natlon,- the hope of gain. Carthage was established as a Phoe-
nician trading station; she grew into a nation of rioh mer-
chants; her empire was maintained as a source of wealth. 
We have already mentioned some of the wealth supplied to Car-
thage by her African subjeots,- grain, fruit, live stock, ivory, 
citron wood, precious stones, dyes. These riohes, and more, Car-
thage could gather, first, through trade with her subjects. 
These she restrained from commerce with other nations that she 
might exploit them herself. At first, it is true, her polioy 
Was more liberal, as is shown by a treaty conoluded with Rome, 
at the end of the sixth century, which agrees, as Polybius in-
terprets it,88 that "to Carthage herself and all parts of Libya 
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on this side of the Fair Promontory, to Sardinia and the Cartha-
ginian province of Sicily, the Romans may come for trading pur-
poses, and the Carthaginian state engages to secure payment of 
their just debts." But from a later treaty with Rome, supposed 
to have been made about 306 B.C., it is evident how narrow her 
policy became. Polybius records the treaty:89 
The Romans shall not maraud or trade or found a city on the 
farther side of the Fair Promontory, Mostia, and Tarseum • ••• 
No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia and Libya nor 
remain in a Sardinian or Libyan port longer than is required 
for taking in provisions or repairing his ship. If he be driven 
there by stress of weather, he shall depart within five days. 
In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and at Carthage he may 
do and sell anything that is permitted to a citizen. 
It is significant that this agreement was made less than a 
half century before the outbre~k of the First Punio war. 
The exclusive trade with their African subjects, however, did 
not satisfy the Carthaginians. For, in addition, they sailed 
along the western coast of Africa beyond the Pillars, carrying 
on a "dumb tr~dett with the natives" probebly very primitive 
people, as Herodotus tells: 90 
There is a place, they say, where men dwell beyond the Pil-
lars of Heracles; to this they come and unload their cargo; then 
having laid it orderly by the waterline they go aboard their 
ships and light a smoking fire. The people of the country see 
the smoke, and coming to the sea, they lay down go!d to pay for 
the cargo and withdraw away from the wares. Then the Carthagi-
nians disembark and examine the gold; if it seems to them a fair 
price for their cargo, they take it and go their ways; but if 
not, they go aboard again and wait and the people come back and 
add more gold till the shipmen are satisfied. Herein neither 
party (it is said) defrauds the other; the Carthaginians do not 
lay hands on the gold till it matches the value of their cargo, 
nor do the people touch the cargo till the shipmen have taken 
the gold. 
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In sharp contrast to this primitive kind of trade with the 
African aborigines in the Westl the Carthaginians entered into 
corr.plex cormnercial relations with the highly civilized Egyptians 
to the East. They must have supplied Egypt with the products of 
western Europe l and sometimes with grain.9l We know that they 
were on very friendly terms wi th the Egyptians at the time of 
the First Punic war l and that their credit was good enough to 
lead them to hope for a large loan from the Egyptian treasury I 
as Appian records:92 "Both Romans and Carthaginians were desti-
tute of money ••. the Carthaginians sent an embassy to PtolemYI 
the son of PtolemYI the son of Lagusl king of Egyptl seeking to 
borrow 2000 talents. lie was on terms of friendship with both 
Romans and Carthaginians." The loan was refused l however l out of 
deference to Rome. But the attempt at least is an indication of 
the relations existing between Carthage and Egypt. 
While individuals were enriched by t hi s trade I moreover I the 
public treasury was filled by taxes levied upon African colonies 
and ~ll.bject peoples. There are several IncUcations that the re-
venues demanded byt he mother city were excessive. As has been 
mentioned l the grinding taxation led the Libyans to support the 
Mercenary Revolt l according to Polybius:93 
They had exa.cted from the peasantrYI without exceptionl half 
of their cropsl and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen 
without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abate-
ment to the poor. They had applauded and honored not those gov-
ernors who treated the people with gentleness and humanitYI but 
those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies 
and stores and used the country people harshlYI- Hanno l for ex-
ample. The consequence was that the male population required no 
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incitement to revolt, •• " 
Again, the tax paid bY one of the Afrio an cities is recorded 
by Livy:94 "They call tpis district Emporia; it is the coast of 
tbe Lesser Syrtis and a fertile spot; one of its cities is Lep-
tis, and this paid to tpe Carthaginians a tribute of one talent 
per day." This is almost unbelievable when we realize that after 
the Second Punic war Carthage herself was only required to pay 
Rome an indemnity of 200 talents per annwn for fifty years, 
which was considered a peavy penalty. 
These two examples of land tax or tribute certainly indicate 
that Carthage demanded ~n excessive rate; the same is probably 
true also of the other Wlown form of taxation, the tariff, men-
tioned by Livy in regard to the reforms of Hannibal :95 "When 
Hannibal had investigated the revenues, hOw much was collected 
as taxes on land and as duty at the ports, ••• " Altogether, then, 
the Carthaginians reaped abundant profit from their African hol-
dings, privately througP trade, publicly through tribute and 
tariff revenues. 
Spain was perhaps the oldest, and at least the richest, posw 
session of Carthage in BUrope. The Phoenicians had come there 
first in .the earliest times, as Strabo rernarks:96 liThe Phoeni-
Cians 
• • • 
occupied the best of Iberia and Libya before the age 
of Homer, and continued to be masters of those regions until the 
Romans broke up their eJIlpire." strabo here evidently includes 
the Carthaginians under the term "Phoenicians". It is not clear 
94 
just when the Carthaginians as such came into the country; they 
may have taken over after Tyre was destroyed by Alexander. We 
dO knOW definitely that Spain was invaded by a Carthaginian arm 
under Hamilcar Barca after the Pirst Punic war (238 B.C.), but 
this expedition served to consolidate and strengthen the power 
of carthage, not to establish it there for the first time, as 
APpian indicates:97 "I think also that from an early time the 
Phoenicians frequented Spain for purposes of trade, and occupied 
certain places there." And further :98 "This favored land, aboun-
ding in all good things the Carthaginians began to exploit be-
fore the Romans. A part of it they already occupied and another 
part they plundered, until the Romans expelled them from the 
part they held ••• tt 
The Phoenicians settled in what was known as Turdetania, on 
the western side of the Pillars above Gades, a region of extra-
ordinary riches, as we shall see. Speaking of the Iberians, 
Strabo says:99 "Indeed the people became so utterly subject to 
the Phoenicians that the greater number of the cities in Turde-
tania and of the neighboring places are now inhabited by the 
Phoenicians." They also founded the city of Gades on the island 
of that name, the modern Cadiz, as Strabo, among others, re-
cords :100 
••• about the founding of Gades, the Gaditanians recall a 
certain oracle, which was actually given, they say, to the Tyr-
ians, ordering them to send a colony to the Pillars of Hera-
cles ••• the men who arrived on the third expedition founded 
Gades, and placed the temple in the eastern part of the island 
but the city in the western. 
It was probably these possessions, Gades and Turdetania, 
wb.ich the Carthaginians took over from Tyre, and which "they 
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b.ad already occupied" when Hamilcar arrived to" pl under another 
parttf of Spain in 238 B.C., for it is here that Hamilcar landed 
from Carthage, using this territory as a base for further con-
quest, as Appian says:10l "At the end of the war ••• Hamilcar 
was left in sole command of the army. He associated his son-in-
law Hasdrubal with him, crossed the straits to Gades, and thence 
crossing into Spain, plundered the territory of the Spaniands 
without provocation. II 
Why should the Carthaginians'be so interested in this portion 
of Spain beyond the Straits? First of all, the district had muc 
to attract the attention of the merchant princes. Strabo descri-
bes it in glowing terms as it was at his time:102 tlTurdetania 
itself is marvellously blessed by nature; and while it produces 
all things, and likewise great quantities of them, these bles-
sings are doubled by the facilities for exportation." And after 
discussing the waterways which afford these facilities, he con-
tinues :103 
There are exported from Turdetania large quantities of grain 
and wine, and also olive oil, not only in large quantities, but 
of the best quality. And further, wax, honey, and pitch are ex-
ported from there, and large quantities of kermes and ruddle 
tdye stuffs] which is not inferior to the Sinopean earth. And 
they build their ships there out of native timber; and they 
have salt quarries ••• and not unimportant, either, is the fish-
salting industry that is carried on ••• Formerly much cloth 
came from Turdetania, but now wool, rather of the raven-black 
sort ••• Surpassing too are the delicate fabrics which are wo-
ven by the people of Salacia. Turdetania also has a great abun-
dance of cattle of all kinds, and of game. 
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The value of trade resources like these is evident; but the 
country possessed far greater riches of another kind. It was 
perhaps the most prolific source of wealth in the Carthaginian 
empire because, as Strabo says:l04 
Although the aforesaid country had been endowed with so many 
good things, still one might welcome and admire, not least of 
all but even most of all, its natural richness in metals •••• 
Up to the present moment, in fact, neither gold, nor silver, 
nor yet copper, nor iron, has been found anywhere in the world, 
1n a natural state, either in such quantities or of such good 
quality. 
Gold there was in abundance, which, as Strabo explains,105 
"is not only mined, but washed down ••• and the so-called 'gold-
washeries' are now more numerous than the gold mines •••• And 
1n the gold dust, they say, nuggets weighing as much as half a 
pound are sometimes found." But Spain produced, above all else, 
silver, as Diodorus remarks :106 "For this land possesses, we may 
venture to say, the most abundant and most excellent known sour-
ces of silver, and to the workers of this silver it returns 
great revenues."' While Strabo testifies :107 "The wealth of Ibe-
ria is further evidenced by t he following facts; the Carthagi-
nians who, along with Barcas, made a campaign against Iberia, 
found the people in Turdetania, as the historians tell us, using 
sil ver feeding troughs and wine jars. tt 
If the Carthaginians had enjoyed the wealth of Turdetania be-
fore, even this was augmented by the expedition of 238 B.C., for 
Hasdrubal established their power on the south-eastern coast of 
Spain by founding the city of New Carthage, and opening up rich 
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1eins of silver, newly discovered in the vicinity. The value of 
tnese mines may be estimated from what they yielded to the Roman 
treasury at a later time, as Strabo reports: l08 
Polybius, in mentioning the silver mines of New Carthage, 
says that they are very large; that they are distant from the 
city about twenty stadia l and embrace an area four hundred sta-
dia in circuit; and that 40,000 work men stay there, who, (in 
hiS time) bring into the Roman exchequer a daily revenue of 
25,000 drachmae. 
Finally, what this constant supply of silver meant to Car-
thage throughout her history may be g~thered from the remarks 
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with which Diodorus closes his description of the Spanish mines: 
Not one of the mines has a recent beginning, but all of them 
were opened by the covetousness of the Carthaginians at the time 
when Iberia was among their possessions. It was from these mines 
, .• that they drew their continued growth, hiring the ablest 
mercenaries to be found and winning with their aid wars many and 
great. For it is in general true that in their wars the Cartha-
ginians never rested their confidence in soldiers from among 
their own citizens or gathered from their allies, but that when 
they subjected the Romans and the Sicilians and the inhabitants 
of Libya to the greatest perils it was by money, thanks to the 
abundance of it which they derived from their mines, that they 
conquered them in every instance. 
The city of New Carthage was, for the short period the Car-
thaginians occupied it after its foundation, their stronghold 
and the center of their activities in Spain. Scipio recognized 
this when he made it the first objective in his conquest of that 
country. Upon inquiring, according to Polybius,110 
••• he learnt ••• that it stood almost alone among Spanish ci-
ties in possessing harbors fit for a fleet and for naval forces, 
and that it was at the same time very favorably situated for the 
Carthaginians to make the direct sea crossing to Africa. Next he 
heard that the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and 
their war material in this city, as well as their hostages from 
the whole of Spain, and ••• that the trained soldiers who garri-
soned the citadel were only about a thousand in number, ••• whil 
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tne remaining population was exceedingly large but composed of 
artisans, tradesmen, and sailors. 
The wealth of this, the last and most famous of the colonies 
of carthage, is seen in the spoils taken by Scipio after the 
fall of the city in 210 B.C., as Appian records:lll 
In the captured city he obtained great stores of goods, use-
ful in peace and war, many arms, darts, engines, dockyards con-
taining thirty three war ships, corn and provisions of various 
kinds, ivory, gold, and silver, some in the form of plate, some 
coined and some uncoined, also Spanish hostages, and everything 
that had been captured from the Romans themselves. 
The capture of New Carthage broke the Carthaginian power in 
Spain and lost for Carthage the richest province of her empire, 
stemmed the constant stream of silverwhich had flowed thence 
into her treasury, broke up the trade monopoly which she must 
have imposed, according to her custom, upon her own rich posses-
sions, and drove her out of Europe forever. 
In addition to part of Africa and Spain, the Carthaginians 
laid claim to most of the islands in the western Mediterranean. 
We have already seen some of their operations in Sicily, and the 
treaty quoted from Polybius showed that they regarded Sardinia 
as their own. This latter island would have been of use to Car-
thage, first, for its agricultural products, for, as Strabo 
says,l12 "the greater part of Sardo is rugged ••• though much 
of it has also soil that is blessed with all products,- especial 
ly with grain." Then, the Sardinians were useful as soldiers, of 
Whom Strabo says further: ll3 "Later on the Phoenicians of Car-
thage got the mastery over them, and along with them carried on 
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war against the Romans." They were, however, never really fully 
conquered, as Diodorus points out:114 "The Carthaginians, thoug 
their power extended far and they subdued the island, were not 
able to enslave its former possessors." And again:115 "Although 
the Carthaginians made war upon them many times with consider-
able armies, yet because of the rugged nature of the country 
and the difficulties of dealing with their dug-out dwellings, 
the people remained unenslaved." Carthage was forced to cede 
this island to the Romans after the First Punic war by a treaty 
which Polybius records:116 "The Carthaginians are to evacuate 
Sardinia and pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents." In 
the words of the same author in another place:117 "Thus was Sar 
dinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, 
most thickly populated and most fertile." 
Corsica probably never belonged to Carthage; at least there 
is no mention of Carthaginian occupation in Strabo or Diodorus. 
But about 536 B.C. Carthage did ally herself with the Tyrhen-
nians to drive out a colony of Phocaeans who settled there and 
interfered with Carthaginian trade, as Herodotus recalls:118 
"But they {the Phocaeans1 harried and plundered all their 
neighbors; wherefore the Tyrhennians and Carthaginians made 
common cause against them, and sailed to attack them with sixty 
ships." Thus, though Carthage did not own Corsica, she policed 
it, exercising indirect control in this way. 
Next, to the West, was the Balearic group, which belonged to 
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carthage and helped to maintain the empire by supplying the f~­
~ous light armed troops known as Balearic slingers, who figured 
SO prominently in the Carthaginian armies. In describing the 
tWO islands, Diodorus mentions that "in the hurling of large 
" stones with slings the natives are the most skillful of all men, 
and that "in early times they served in the campaigns of the 
carthaginians."119 Further, of the islands themselves, hesayst20 
The smaller (Minorcal lies more to the east and maintains 
great droves and flocks of every kind of animal, especially 
mules, which stand very high and are exceptionally strong. Both 
islands have good land which produces fruits, and a multitude 
of inhabitants numbering more than 30,000. 
Here again were agricultural products and man power for Car-
thage. 
Further westward, within the Pillars, were the Pityusian Is-
les, described by Diodorus thus:12l 
The island is only moderately fertile, possessing little land 
that is suitable for the vine; but it has olive trees which are 
engrafted upon the wild olive. And of all the products of the 
island, they say the softness of its wool stands first in excel-
lence. The island is broken up at intervals by notable plains 
and highlands and has a city named Eresus, a colony of the Car-
thaginians. And it also possesses excellent harbors, huge wallS, 
and a multitude of well constructed houses. The inhabitants con-
sist of barbarians of every nationality, but Phoenicians prepon-
derate. 
This not only supplied produce and a market for trade, but 
afforded a convenient stopover between New Carthage and the mo-
ther city. 
Finally, Carthage possessed the three key islands between Si-
cily and the African coast, a great advantage for her shipping, 
as Diodorus points out:122 
Off the south of Sicily three islands lie out in the sea, 
and each of them possesses a city and harbors which can offer 
safety to ships which are in stress of weather. The first one 
is that called Melite ••• and it possesses many harbors which 
offer exceptional advantages, and its inhabitants are blessed 
in their possessions ••• This island is a colony planted by the 
Phoenicians, who, as they extended their trade to the western 
ocean, found in it a place of safe retreat, since it was well 
supplied with harbors, and layout in the open sea. 
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This was the island of Malta, a valuable base in the Carthag-
inian empire, as it has been to the British. Just above it lies 
the island now called Gazo, the second in the chain from Car-
thage to Sicily. Diodorus describes it:12311After this island 
[Mal tal there is a second which bears the name of Gaulas, lying 
out in the open sea and adorned with well-situated harbors, a 
Phoenici an c 01 ony. II 
Last of all, there was the island of Cercina, now Kerkenna, 
lying along the African coast below the Carthaginian peninsula. 
"Next comes Cercina, facing Libya, which has a modest city and 
most serviceable harbors which have accommodations not only for 
merchant vessels, but even for ships of war.,,124 
Thus, a ship coming from the eastern Mediterranean would have 
to pass through this chain of Carthaginian possessions, a pass-
age which, unless Carthage allowed it by treaty, involved evi-
dent danger from the nation who, as Strabo mentions on the 
authority of Eratosthenes,125"used to drown in the sea any for-
eigners who sailed past their country to Sardinia or to the 
Pillars." 
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Last of all, in regard to the island of Sicily, of which 
much has been said already, we must be content with the general 
appraisal of Diodorus, who calls it "the richest of the is-
lands",126and of Strabo, who asks:127l1As for the fertility of 
the country, why should I speak of it, since it is on the lips 
of all men, who declare that it is no whit inferior to Italy? 
And in the matter of grain, honey, saffron, and certain other 
products, one might call it even superior." 
Because of its proximity, and because it threatened to har-
bor a rival Greek trade center, the Carthaginians were inter-
ested in Sicily at an early date; in fact their first recorded 
overseas expedition was sent there about 550 B.C. under the 
general Malchus, as Justinus recalls; he was defeated, however, 
when he attempted to carry the war into Sardinia:128 "Propter 
quod ducem suum Malchum, cuius auspiciis et Siciliae partem c' 
domueran t ••• exsulare jus serunt. It The hi st ory of Carthage from 
that time to the Punic wars is the history of her struggle with 
the Sicilian Greeks under Gelon, Dionysius, Timoleon, and Aga-
thocles. Through it all she managed to maintain at least a foot-
hold in the western part, and at times almost succeeded in sub-
jugating the island completely. It was her growing power in 
Sicily, finally, that threatened the Romans and brought on the 
First Punic war. 
Sicily was one of the most valuable of the Carthaginian 
possessions. Her cities and colonies in the west enabled Car-
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thage to command the sea; the produce of Sicily supplied her 
with support for her armies; the skill of Sicilian Greek work-
lnen gave her articles of trade and a coinage to carryon that 
trade; finally, the subject peoples of Sicily paid her tribute, 
as is seen in the terms after the successful campm gn of 405 
B.C., quoted by Diodorus:129 
Peace was concluded on these terms: The Carthaginians were 
to hold subject, besides their ancient colonies, the Siconi, 
the Silenuntii, the peoples of Agrigentum and Himera. In addi-
tion, the citizens of Gela and Camarina could remain in their 
cities after tearing down the walls, but must pay tribute to 
the Carthaginians. 
These advantages made Sicily well worth fighting for; when 
the island vvas lost, a wedge was driven into the heart of the 
Carthaginian empire. 
The empire of Carthage, then, can be divided into three 
groups of territory: (1) The African coast of the Mediterranean 
from the subject city of Leptis on the east to the Pillars and 
beyond, including Carthage herself and the vicinity immediately 
under her dominion. (2) Sp~n, particularily Gades and New Car-
thage. (3) The islands of the Mediterranean from Malta to the 
Pillars. We have tried to indicate the advantages that Carthage 
reaped from these vast holdings in trade and tribute, in pre-
cious metals, from Spain and Africa, in man power for her armies 
in agricultural produce for her support. It is not surprising 
that at the head of such an empire, Carthage should be the 
wealthiest city of antiquity. 
But if the Carthaginians built up this empire entirely for 
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their own selfish interests, what held it together? A number of 
influences may be mentioned: 
(1) Many of the dependencies of Carthage were her own colon-
ies, the nucleus of the settlement being Carthaginians, or at 
least Liby-Phoenicians, sent out originally from Carthage in the 
colonizing expeditions mentioned by Aristotle to relieve Car-
thage of superfluous population and to enrich the colonists. 
They were attached to Carthage therefore by ties of blood, and 
probably maintained an ascendancy in the surrounding country by 
their connection with the powerful mother city. 
(2) Carthaginian arms forced submiSSion, as, for example, in 
Sicily, where a garrison was maintained in the Carthaginian 
settlements to s~ppress revolts, to enforce treaty stipulations, 
or to push the interests of Carthage. The garrison at Motya 
which resisted Dionysius' first revolt may be cited, or that 
already mentioned as forming part of the population of New Car-
thage. 
(3) The fact that Carthage was complete mistress of the west-
ern Mediterranean and jealous of all foreign trade would enforce 
the loyalty of the merchant classes throughout the empire, since 
they could not hope to find secure markets or transportation 
without her approval. 
(4) There was a common coinage to form another commercial bon 
between Carthage and her dependents. In fact a sort of bank note 
made of leather, corresponding to modern paper money, was issued 
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to facilitate trade. 130 
(5) Finally, religion formed a common bond, the religion 
which the Carthaginians had taken from their Phoenician ances-
tors and which they passed on to their colonies in turn. There 
was a famous temple of the Phoenician Heracles at Gades, for ex-
ample, erected by the Phoenicians long before Carthage took 
over. Diodorus speaks of it!31 "In the city they built many 
works appropriate to t he nature of the region, and among them 
a costly temple of Heracles, and they instituted magnificent 
sacrifices which were conducted after the manner of the Phoeni-
cians." And Polybius" describing New Carthage,,132 mentions that 
on the largest of its hills "is built a temple of Aesculapius," 
while another eminence "is known as the hill of saturn." Both 
references recall the cult of Aesculapius and of Moloch in -the 
mother city. 
What was the a tti tude of subject nations to the head of the 
empire? Those cities which she had founded and which shared her 
civilization and culture remained loyal" like Motya and New Car-
thage; among peoples whom Carthage had subjugated" however" 
there seems to have existed a chronic state of disaffection and 
rebellion. 
The hatred of the Libyans manifested in the Mercenary Revolt 
after the first struggle with Rome has been mentioned. This at-
titude among the Africans was of long standing. Their hatred 
was old when in 396 B.C. Bemi1co further exasperated them by 
106 
deserting the troops they supplied him in Sioily. Diodorus de-
clares:133 "When, Indeed, that disaster was made known through-
out Libya, those who had assisted the Carthaginians in war, 
though they had long hated the burden of their domination, now 
beoause of the betrayal of the troops at Syraouse burned with a 
JIluoh greater hatred against them." About 379 B.C. this hatred 
among the Afrioans had broken out into a revolt whioh threatened 
to overwhelm Carthage while she was we~k from plague. The Sardi-
nians, seizing the opportunity, followed their example, as Dio-
dorus reoords:134 
It happened a little later that the plague fell upon Carthage 
whioh, inoreasing more and more, oarried off many of the Cartha-
ginians and they almost lost the empire. For the Libyans, being 
disaffeoted, revolted, while the Sardinians, considering this a 
good opportunity, oonspired against Carthage and threw off her 
yoke. 
As early as 310 B.C. Agathocles counted upon this rebellious 
disposition when he dared the invasion of Africa. Diodorus 
writes:135 "He hoped ••• that their allies, groaning under Car-
thaginian demands for so long, would seize the opportunity to 
revolt." It is evident, then, that the hatred of Carthage burn-
ing among her subject neighbors was literally centuries old. 
This hatred is explained partially, as has been said, by the 
heavy tribute demanded from the Libyans, and by the manner in 
which they were betrayed while fighting for Carthage in Sicily. 
Diodorus adds a third reason:136 · 
At the conclusion of the Libyan war, the Carthaginians aven-
ged themselves upon the nation of the Mioatani Numidians, in-
Cluding women and children, by crucifying all who fell into 
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their hands. Wherefore their descendants, remembering the cruel-
ty worked upon their fathers, remained the most bitter enemies 
of Carthage. 
In Sicily much the same hostile attitude prevailed among the 
subject states of Carthage. When Dionysius planned his first at-
tempt to free Sicily from the Carthaginian rule, in 397 B.C., he 
found the citizens of Syracuse ready to join him, for, as Diodo-
rUS explains,137 "they desired the war no less than he, primari-
ly because they hated the Carthaginians." The other Sicilians 
supported the revolt, "for although they dreaded the domination 
of Dionysius, still they willingly joined in the war against 
Carthage, incited by the cruelty of the Carthaginians. And for 
the same reason, when Dionysius openly took up arms, those who 
dwelt in the Greek cities under the dominion of Carthage mani-
fested their hatred of the Phoenicians. 1t138 Finally, all the 
subsequent history of the island until it came into Roman hands 
is a repetition of this attempt to be free of Carthaginian domi-
nation. 
The Sicilians had many reasons for hating Carthage. The Car-
thaginian conquests had been attended with terrible barbarities; 
they massacred the people, stripped the Cities, imposed tribute 
upon their children. More fundamental still, the Greeks cherish-
ed an inborn love of freedom and a contempt for the Carthaginian 
"barbarianlt • They could not live content under Carthaginian rule 
because, as A. J. Church remarks,139 "Carthaginian habits and 
ways of life seem to have been particularily offensive to the 
taste of the Greeks." We shall understand their attitude more 
clearly when we understand the religion of the Carthaginians. 
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7 Ibid.: 
a.pxo~hl1J<; oe 'tTj<; n!J.epa) e'tepou~ 6.X!J.frt~ exa.'A.el 'te'tpaxlqXt-
ito"'t ot lotov'te~ lepav Ano'A.Aoovo~ od ~o 'te aya~a xa'taxpuoov ~v xa~ o~a a6't~ xpuo~'A.a'tov ana X''A.f~v 'ta'A.a.v't~v o'taa~oG xepl-
exe l'tO ••• 
8 Appian VIII~128: 'tP'~v 01 o6o~v 6.xa 'tTj~ 6.yopa<; 6.voo~v e<; a6't~v, OrXial xuxvat 
xat e~oopo~o, nav'taxoaev ~oav ••• 
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17 XIII,90: . 
'~iAxa~ ~a lepa xat ~a~ olxta~ aUATIaa~, xat ~1AO~r~W~ ~peu­
v~C1a~, ~oaa<hTIv W~~Ae,o.v auvf)epol0ev, -~oT)v etxa<; ~o~'v eOXT)-
xeyaL ~OA'V oixou~evT)v U~~ avopoov efxoal ~uplaOwv, a~ope~ov 
o~ a~a ~~~ x~roew<; yeyev~~~v~v, xAoua,~a~~v O~ oxeoav ~wv ~6~e 
'EAAT)VtOwV ~6Aewv yerev~evT)v. xo.t ~au~a ~oov ~v a6~~ ~lAO­
xaAT)aeV~Wv el~ xo.V~Olav xo.~aaxeuaa~a~wv xoAu~eAelo.v. xo.t ydp 
~ ~ N " I»' , • ypa~a, ~o.~~I\,~eel<; T)upee~ao.v el<; o.xpov ex~e~oVT}~eval, xo.l 1I:o.V-
~or~v av~p,av~wv ~'Ao~exvw~ oeo~~,oup~~evwv u1I:epaywv aple~O,. 
~a ~~v.ouv 1I:OAU~eAea;a~a ~oov e~ywv a1l:ea~e'Aev e[~ KapXTJOova 
(~y or<; xo.t ~~v ~Aap,Oo<; auve~T) xo~,ae~va, ~aupov). 
18 XIII 96: 
of 5! KapXT)oOV10I ~e~a ~~v aAw01V ~~~ ~oAew~ ~a ~~v avae~­
~a~a xo.t ~o~, avoplav~a<; xaf ~aAAa ~a 1I:OAU~eAea~a~a ~e~~veyxo.v 
er, KapX~Oova. 
19 XIII,108: 
~wv 0' iepwv oa,o, W~ xo.1JJ~ 01t~ ~ou 1I:Up~' ~ooxet 6'e~eapeo." 
~a, YAU~a, xar ~a 1I:ePl~O~epw, e[pyo.a~eva 1I:ePlexO~eV. 
20 Ibid.: 
~xov~wv o~ ~wv re~V ex~~, ~~l 1I:OAeW, 'A1I:OAAWVO~ avop,av'ta 
xo.Axouv a~oopo. ~~yo.v, aUA~aav~e, au~av a1l:ea~e'Aev ef, ~~v Tupo.v. 
21 Mora1ia,200b: 
eupwv e~ 't~v 1I:OA'V7avoplav~wv 'EAAT)V1XWV xat avaeT)~a~wv 
a1l:o !'X1Ata~ ~ea~~v ouao.v ••• 
22 VIII,133: 
~, 6~ .z1xt7~tav ~ep,e1l:e~~evJ ~aa. KapXT)oOV10l a<pwv avo.efl~o.~a 
xOlv4 1I:OAe~OUv~e, eAo.~ov, eA8ov'ta, e1l:1y,yv~axe,v xat xo~i~eaea.,. 
23 XVII 3 15: .evOl~~ O'aV ~G6T)AO' ~ 6uva~I<; a.u~oov ex ~oJ ua~a~ou 1I:OA~~OU, 
ev,~ xa.~eAUeT)aaV u1l:a ~Xl~(WVO' 'tou At~'A'a.VOU, xo.f ~ nOAI, QPOT)V ~~o.vlaaT). ~~e yap up~av~o ~oAe~erV ~ou~ov ~~v 1I:OAe~OV, 
1I:OAe" ~!v e!xov 'tplaxoato.<; €V 't~ A'~U~, avep~1I:wv o'ev ~~ 
1I:OAei ~uplaoo., e~oo~~ov~o.. 1I:OA'OpXou~evot o~ xo.t avayxo.aeev-
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25 VIII 82: 
,,1, ... , "~, I, H H Xa.t AOYOV a.U'tOlC;; 5t50v'tec;; w) T} ~ev It:OAtC;; eO''tlV a.~VOlt:AOC;; epT}-
~OC;;, ou Vo.Uv, ou Xa.'tUlt:EA'tT}V, OU ~eAoc;;. 00 ~l~O) EXOUO'o., oox 
cL.v5pa.C;; oixelouc;; rxa.vooc;; a.'J{o~a.xeO'eo.t 'J{ev'te ~upto.5wv €va.yxoC;; 
5te~ea.p~EvWV, ••• 
113 
!v eCp~v~ ~~AOXpOYt~ ~ea~paoplx6~wv yey~~~~wY a~eoYiay. ~ o! 
Xwpa ~ ~~y ~v a~~eAO~O~O~, ~ O! eAal0~6po~, xat ~~v 4AAWY ~~y 
xap~r~WV OeYOQWY aVa~AeW~. e~t ea~tpa O! ~ep~ ~~ ~eoiov eve-
~ov~o ~o~v ayeA"1 xat ~Of~yal, xat ~a ~A~arOY lA~ ~Op,aOwy r~~WV tye~e. XaeOAOO O! ~"V~ota ~l' ~V !V ~Or~ ~6nOl~ e~Oa,­
~OYta, ~~V tnt~ayea~a~Wv KapX~Oovtwv atelA~~6~ooy ~a~ x~~ael~, 
xat ~oi~ ~AOU~O" ~e~'AoxaA~O~OOv ~p~~ a~6Aaualv. o,6nep ot 
ZtXeA,~al ~~ ~e ~~, x~pa, xaAAO' xat ~~v e~Oal~ovtav ~~v tv 
a6~ti eao~a~ov~e, ••• 
29 :xx 17: ~a, ~~aaa, O! ~oAe" ~Aefoo, ~wv OLaxoatwv xexelpw~evo, ••• 
36 XXXVIII 7: 
ev xavo~A(~, xop~optOa aaAa~~tav ex'xenopx~eyo,. 
37 XXXVIII 8: ~ O! ~aAt; e~exope6e~o ~e~a ~eyaA~' a~ta, ev ~ti nop~opio, 
xat ~ti ~avoxAt~ ~ao~v, ~a~e ~o~, ~y ~ar, ~p~~ora" ~opavvou, 
~OAU ~, ~poao~etAelv. 
38 VIII,66: 
xop~upav noO~p~ xep'xei~evo, xat ~eA,a xat ~pe~~a a~~ 
xpoaou ••• 
40 XVI 2.25: ~e~a~~ O! ~~, .~~, xat TUpoU e,vwo~~ alYlaAO' 
~epwy ~nv uaAi~,v 4~~ov· ev~auea ~!v ouv ~aal ~~ 
xO~laae,aav er, Z,Owva ol ~~v xwveTav Oexeaeal_ 
ea~lv ~ 
xeiaea.l, 
42 Po1i;ics VII,2,6: 
ev !v[~ y4p xat VO~o, ~'ve, etal ~apo~uvov~e, ~po, ~~v 
ape~~v ~au~~v. xa.eanep ev Kapx~06v, ~a.at ~ov ex ~~v xptxwv 
46 Po1lbius, I 72: a~alpou~eVal ~Av xoo~ov eCoE~epov 6xpo~aoto~w~ et~ ~o~~ 
bvwv l ao~ou ~ • 
47 VII,165: 
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••• ~~~ye ~~' a6~~v ~av xpovov ~ou~ov ~OlVtxwV xat A'~uWV 
xat 'I~~QWV xat A'~WV xat 'EAtGUXWV xat ~ap60vtwv xat Kue-
vtoov ~pl~ov~a ~up,a6a~ xat a~p-a~Dyav a6~oov '~tAxav ~av Av-
vwvo~, KapXD60vtwv ~ov.,a. ~acnAea. 
49 XIII 54: 
eTxe 6l'~0~~ o6~~av~a~ 'Avvt(?ac;, w~ lJ.lv "'E~opo~ 6.veypalJle, 
~e~oov l-LuQla6a, eixoal, f~~er, 6l ~e~paxlaXrA'OU~· 0 6l Tr~alo, 
~DOlV, ou XOA~ xAetou~ ~oov 6exa ~upla6wv. 
51 Ido" XV,15; xpoopw~evo, 6 ~~~Qovw, ~a ~eyeeo~ ~ou XOA€~OU, ~oov ~e XOAl-




58 I 67: ~~ 5~ ~EYLO~OV ~EPOC; ao~wv ~V Ai~uec; ••• n'Aeioc; ov~ec; ~wv 5l0-
\lup t CJ)V. 
60 Id." XV,II: 
o 5-rrAvvr~ac; '1;<1 ~~v eTJpta np~ miollC; 't"'; 5uva.~eCJ)t;, oV't"a n'Aet(a) 
~wV,by50Dx0v't"a, ~e'l;a 5~ ~a5~a 'l;0~~ ~La~o~Opo~C; ene~lT)oe, nept 
\lUPlOUC; oV'I;ac; xaL 5",.Xl'Ar·OUC; ~av 6:.pLe~OV. O"~Ol 5 f)oav AlYO-
O~rVOl, Ke'A't"ot, Ba'Alapeic;, MaupouoLOL. 't"ou~CJ)v 5~ XG'I;O~'V xapev-
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epaAe ~o~, ~tXWprou, Ar~ua, xat Kapx~oovCou~, e~t o~ ~aa, ~o~, 
&~ aI~aAta, ~ov~a, ~ee'au~ou~ ~AerOV ~ a~aolov a~oa~~aa, ~wv 
~po~e~ay~~vwv. ~a o~ xepa~a Ola ~Wy f~~ewy Da~aAraa~o, eet, e~f 
~~v ~a AalaV ~ou, au~~axou, No~aoa" e~t o~ ~3 oe~laV ~ou, ~wY 
Kapx~OOYCOOV f~~erc. 
61 VI~52: 
••• ~a o~ ~ept ~a, ~e~lXa, xpeta, ~OAU o~ ~l 'pw~aro, ~pa, ~a 
~fA~lOV aaxouol Kapx~oovrwv. of ~~v yap ~~v OA~Y ~ept ~ou~o 
~010UY~&' a~ouoTIY, Kapx~o6v,o, o~ ~wv ~~y ~e~LXWY e[, ~eAO' bAl-
ywpOUal, ~WY o'f~x'xwv ~paxerav ~,ya ~o,ouv~a, ~pOYOLav. a1~lov 
ol ~Ou~wv ea~rv o~, ~evlxar, xat ~,aeo~6po" xpwv~a, ouva~ea" 
'pw~aro, ot eyxwpto" xat XoA'~Lxar,. 
62 VIII,82: 
63 ~.~VIII,93; vd. supra Ch. II, note 41. 
64 Id.,VIII~108: 
..• ~WV o'{Aapxwv of ~!v auv ~or, au~wv ~6~o~6A~aay, xat eye-
~, , ~ ~, " vov~o ~~v~e, e, OlaxoalOU~ xaL OlaXlAlOU, l~~ea,. 
67 I 35: 
••• Kapx~oovtou~~o~ nAeta~~v eaxov vau~lxDv ouva~lv ••• 
68 VI 52: 
••• ~~ ~!v ~po, ~a, xa~a eaAa~~av, o~ep eix6" a~etvov aa-
~OOOl xat ~apaaxeua~ov~a, KapXDoov,O' OLa ~O xat ~a~plo, a6~or, 
Iv~apxe,v ex ~aAa,ou ~DV e~~eLp,aV ~a6~~v xat eaAa~~o6pyerv ~a­
Alo~a ~av~wv avepw~wv ••• 
69 XVI):,~ 19: , 7 117 ~~~r b ~pa~OageV~' KOlVOV ~tv elyal ~Or~ ~ap~apOl) ~aa,v 
~eo, ~~V SeV~AaataV •••• KapX~6ovtoo, 6t Ka~a~Oy~OUY, el ~" ~OOV 
~eVWy e'~ Zap6~ ~apa~AeUaeleV ~ ent Z~~Aa,. 
72 Timo1eon XXV: 
'EV ~oij~~ oi KapX~66y,o, Ka~a~Aeooa,v et, ~O A1Au~alov ayov~e, 
tn~d ~upla6a, a~pa~ou Kat ~Pl~P&') 61aKoata, Kat ~AOra xtAla 
xo~t~OY~~ ~~xav4, xat ~e9p,~~a xal ar~ov a~oyov xat ~~y 'aAA~V 
1Lapaaxe:u~y ••• 
76 I 61: 
af ~~y y~ v~e:) ye~oua~l 6u~XPTIa~w, 6l€XelV~O ~po, ~ov xtv-
Buvov, ~a 6l nA~pw~a~a ~eAew, ~v ~yaax~a xat npo, Kalpov e~~e­
~A~~€Va, ~d 6' lXl~a~1Xa veoauAAoya xat np~6ne,pa naa~~ Ka-
xonaget~, Kat nav~o, 6elvou • 
•• • ~axew, €Aet ~e~aay, xat xev~Tp<.Ov~a ~~v a6~oov vau, Ka~e6uaav 
e~6o~Dxov~a 6' eaAwaav au~av6pOl. 
82 Polyb.,XV,18: 
~a ~axp~ ~AOra ~apa6ouyat xay~a ~A~V 6tKa ~Pl~PWV, ••• 
84 X;;.V 41: 
WG av ~POG ~o~G buva~w~cr~ou~ ~wv xa~a ~~v 'Eupw~~v ~{~Awv 
oLaywv{~EcreaL. 
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lV,~LXE~~~, ~"Kapx~~6vL2L ~XdeXo~aL, ~at ~v Kapx~b6vL Kdv~a 
naL KOLEL~W xaL KW~EL~W oau xat ~~ nOAL~U e~Ea~LV. 
93 1,72; cf. Ch. II, nota 16. 
97 VI 2: 
boxouaL bl ~OL xat ~O'VLXE~, ~~ '1~~ECav lx noAAOU ea~LVa 
lrr' ~~nopC~ bLarrAlov~E~, olx~aaC ~Lva ~~~ 'I~~pCa~, ••• 
99 III 2 13: 
T ' , ' I u, I Is.. _~ I U OU~OL yap ~OLVL~LV OU~W~ EyEVOV~O a~oupa UKOXELPLOL, wa~E 
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~aj nAE{OU b ~WV l~ ~~ Toupo~~uv{~ n6AEwv XUL ~WV nA~crCov ~6nwv 
~n tXECVWV V~V O~XE~creU~. 
101 VI,5: 
nuuo~lvou o~ ~ou nOAl~ou, ••• ~6VOb ~v txl cr~pu~w, XUL ~ov XDOEcr~~V ~Acropo~~uv EXWV ot cruv6v~a, OL~AeEV txt r&6ELP.U r XUL ~ov nope~~v lb,~I~~p{uv xEpacrub lAE~A&~EL ~a ~I~~pwv o~oev dOL-xo~v~wv, u~op~~v •••• 
121 
108 III 2 10: rrOA~~L~~'Oe, ~wv nepl Kapx~06va Neav dpyupelwv ~v~aee{', 
~eYLa~a ~&V elva! ~~aL, oLeXeLV 0& ~~, ~6AeW' oaov eLXOaL a~a­
blouG, nEp'LELA~~~a X~XAOV ~e~paxoa{wv a~ao'wv! ono~ ~e~~apa, 
~upLaoa, dvepw~v ~eVeLV ~wv lp1a~o~evwv, dva~lpov~aG ~6~e ~~ 
o~~ ~wv tPw~a'wv xae' lxaa~~v ~~lpav oLa~~p{aG xal ~Ev~aXLa­
XLAta, opax~aG. . 
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123 V,12: 
~e~a be ~a~~~v ~~v v~cr6v ~cr~Lv ~~epa ~~v ~ev ~poo~yop(av 
exouga ra~~o~, ne~ay'a be xat ~L~ecrLv e~xa(poL~ xexocr~~~ev~, 
¢OLVLXWV anoLxo~. 
123 
,. " 1toi\I..V exo'Ucra , , 
e~nopoq;, 
125 XVII,l,19: 
••• Kapx~box(06~ be xa~a1tov~oUV, et ~L~ ~wv ~evwv eC~ ~apbw 
rrapa1t~e~creLev ~ ~n!.. ~~~~a~. 
126 V", 2 ;.", , ~" 
••• ene!.. xa!.. xpa~Lcr~~ ~wv v~crwv ~cr~L ••• 
124 
132 X 10: 
.1 " T e 'So. "A \ .. t So. ~, 0 
••• e~ ou xa Lupu~aL vewG ox~~nLou • ••• 0 uv ~pL~OG npo -
7 K' ayopeue~aL ~povou. 
133 XIV 77: ~DG yap ou~~opaG oLax~~Uxee£o~G xa~a ~~v AL~~~V ot o~~~a~oL, 
xaL naA.aL ~ev ~Loo6v~eG ~o ~&po~ ~fjG ~wv Kapx~oov£wv ~ye~ovLaG, 
~~e oe oLa ~~v ~wv o~pa~Lw~wv EV Zupaxo~oaLG npooooCav XOA.~ 
~aA.A.ov i~lxauoav ~O xa~' a~~wv ~too~. 
13: ~'{, 24 t \ ..,.. .., IT So. , 
~e~a ue ~au~a ~OL~LX~~ vooou ~OLG xa~OLXOUOL ~~v .ap¥~uova 
YEvo~lv~" xat ~fj, vooou noA.A.~v In'~aoLv lxo~o~G" nOA.A.OL ~WV 
Kapx~oovLWV oLe~6ap~oav, xat ~~v ~1e~ovCav tXLvoUvEuoav &no~af..etv 
or ~e yap AC~ueG xa~a~povnoav~eG au~wv, dnlo~~oavt ot oe ~~v 
~ap06va xa~oLxo6v~eG, vo~{oav~eG lxetv xaLpov %a~a ~wv Kaex~oo­
vlwv, dnlo~~oav dn' a~~wv, xat ou~~pov~oov~eG dnleev~o ~OL~ 
Kapx~bovloLG. 
135 xx,3: 
~f..nL~e ~ou~ be %a~a ~ryv AL~~ryv ou~~&xouGt ~aeuva~lvouG ~otG rrpoo~ay~aoL lx nOA.NWV xpovwv, A~teoeaL xaLpov ~~G dnoo~&oew~. 
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.. I .\ L II I .L i I .. ~~G ELG ~ov, na~cpaG w~o~~~o~ ava~L~vr,crxU~EvoL, xa~Emw~a~oL ~OL~ 
Kapx~bov'OL~ 1toAl~LOL xaeEcr~~xELcrav. 
II. References to Latin and English Authors 
lI,420ff.: 
Miratur molem Aeneas, magalia quondam, 
miratur portas strepitumque et strata viarum. 
Instant ardentes Tyrii, pars ducere muros, 
molirique arcem et manibus subvolvere saxa, 
pars optare locum tecto et concludere sulco. 
Hic portus alii effodiunt; hic alta theatris 
fundament a locant alii, immanisque columnas 
rupibus excidunt, scaenis decora alta futuris. 
441: 
Lucus in urbe fuit media, laetissimus umbra. 
446: 
Hic templum Iunoni ingens Sidonia Dido 
condebat, donis opulentum et numine divae, 
aerea cui gradibus surgebant limina, nexaeque 
aere trabes, fori bus cardo stridebat aenis. 
453 : 
Namque sub ingenti lustrat dum singula templo 
reginam opperiens, dam, quae fortuna sit urbi, 
artificumque manus inter se operumque laborem 
miratur, videt Iliacas ex ordine pugnas, 
bellaque iam fama totum volgata per orbem ..• 
5 Cf. Smith, 434. 
10 Cf. T. H. Bindley in the introduction to his edition of 
Tertullian's Apologeticus Adversus Gentes pro Christianis, Ox-
ford, Clarendon Press, 1889, xi: 1tDUring t'F.i'e"perlod 01' its in-
dependence Carthage had possessed on the suwnit of Byrsa a 
temple dedicated to Asclepius; but the Roman colony when re-
building the town and acropolis preferred to replace the popula 
cult of this deit b that of the ancient .•• roddess Tanlt ... " 
11 IX,5,4. 
12 Odes, II,18,4. 
13 VII,182. 
14 Nat. Hist.,VII1,28. 
15 Ibid.,12. 
30 Aeneid, 1,421. 
31 Be11u~ Jugurthinum, XVIII,8: 
Ceterum adhuc aedificia Numidarum agrestium, quae mapa1ia 
illi vocant, ob1onga incurbis 1ateribus tecta quasi navium 
carinae sunt. 
33 Epodes,XII,21. 
34 Nat. Bist., IX,60: 
Tyrrpraecipuus hie Asiae; in Vreninge, Africae, et Gaetu10 
littore oceani .•• 
35 Odes, II,16,35. 




VI,12,7: Q. quoque Ennius Carthaginiensium "tunicatam uuventutemlt non 
videtur sine probro dixisse. 
44 L1. 975-6: 
Sed quae i11aec avis est, quae hue cum tunicis advenit? Num-
nam in ba1neis circumductust pa1lio? 
1008: 
Tu qui zonam non habes, ••• 
45 2£. cit., 1. 981: 
~uia incedunt cum anu1atis auribus. 
56 XXII,6. 
77 XXVIII,45: 
Triginta navium carinae, viginti quinqueremes, decem quadri-
remes, cum essent positae, ipse ita institit operi, ut die 
quadragesimo quinto, quam ex sy1vis detracta materia erat, 
naves instructae armataeque in aquam deductae sint. 
127 
78 XXIX,26: 
Nam, praeter quadraginta longas naves, quadringentis ferme 
onerariis exercitum transvexit. 
79 XXIX,27: 
Prosperam navigationem sine terrore ac tumultu fuisse, per-
multis Graecis Latinisque auctoribus credidi. 
80 XXX,lO: 
Carthaginienses, qui, si maturassent, omnia permixta turba 
trepidantium primo impetu oppressissent, perculsi terrestribus 
cladibus, atque inde ne in mari quidem, ubi ipsi plus poterant, 
satis fidentes, die segni navigatione absumpto, sub occasum 
solis in portum (Rusucurona Afri vocant) classe appulere. 
81 Ibid. 
91 Cf. Rostovtzeff, A Social and Economic History of the 
Hellenistic World, Oxford, 1941,~8ff., 1251, 1462. -- ---
94 XXXIV,62: 
Emporia vocant eam regionem. Ora est minoris Syrtis et agri 
uberis; una civitas eius Leptis; ea singula in dies talenta 
vectigal Carthaginiensibus dedit. 
95 XXXIII,47: 
Hannibal postquam, vectigalia quanta terrestria maritimaque 
essent, ••• 
128 XVIII,7. 
130 Cf. Smith, 36. 
139 .2£. cit., 46. 
CHAPTER IV 
MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL CULTURE 
I. Introduction 
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When Bosworth Smith says that "the most important factor in 
the history of a people,- especially if it be a Semetic people-
is its religion,,,l he states a truth which Polybius implicitly 
accepted when, comparing Rome and Carthage, he wrote: 2 "But the 
quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly su-
perior is, in my opinion, the nature of their religious convic-
tions." Religion is at once the characteristic of a people, the 
guage of' their culture, and, often, the ultimate explanation of 
their differences with other people. Religion determines their 
outlook and eventually their action; it follows the rise and 
fall of government and of other elements of culture, being found 
at its purest and best when they have reached their peak; and 
the answer it gives to the fundamental questions of life will 
account for otherwise inexplicable enmities with other nations, 
since these questions form the ultimate basis of agreement or 
dissension among men. Knowing the religion of Carthage, then, we 
shall hold the key to ,her culture, her development, and her re-
lations with the other nations of the ancient world. 
Fortunately, the sources provide sufficient information to 
enable us to trace in broad outline the development of this im-
portant phase of Carthaginian culture, although the facts thin 
12 
out as we approach the time of the Punic Wars. It will be use-
ful, however, to watch the development of moral culture through 
the early history of Carthage, inasmuch as this will manifest 
her moral background, determine her moral condition at the peri",( 
od of the wars with Rome. 
II. The Gods of Carthage 
The gods of Carthage were the gods of their Phoenician ances-
tors, and the Carthaginians through most of their history main-
tained close relations with Tyre in matters of religion. It is 
a bewildering task, however, to attempt to determine the exact 
hierarchy of the divinities in the original Phoenician system. 
The matter is further complicated by the fact that Greek and 
Roman writers, in speaking of the Carthaginian deities, apply to 
them the names of corresponding gods and goddesses in their own 
system rather than the proper Phoenician titles. Quintus Curtius 
Rufus, for example, refers to Moloch under the title of Saturn,3 
while Plutarch calls r~m Cronos. 4 We will be content, then, to 
mention the most important divinities worshipped at Carthage, 
giving to each that emphasis which the sources themselves seem 
to justify, without attempting to disentangle the complex system 
of which they were a part. 5 
The chief deity worshipped at Carthage, or at least the one 
most closely associated with Carthaginian religion in the minds 
of the ancients, was Baal or Moloch, called by the Romans saturn 
and by the Greeks Cronos. He waw identified with the sun and wit 
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fire, as his worship will indicate, and must have been regarded 
as a malignant power by the Carthaginians themselves, for he 
was propitiated by the cruel rites of which Justinus speaks in 
beginning his account of the Carthaginians: 6 
Cum inter caetera mala etiam peste laborarent, cruenta sac-
rorum religione, et scelere pro remedio usi sunt; quippe 
homines ut victimas immolabant; et impuberes (quae aetas etiam 
hostium mis~ricordiam provocat) aris admovebant, pacem deorum 
sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum vita dii rogari maxime 
solent. 
This element above all others impressed the Romans and 
Greeks and, to their minds, characterized Carthaginian religion, 
perhaps even Carthage herself, as is manifest in frequent refer-
ences like that of Dionysius of Halicarnasus: 7 "It is said also 
that the ancients sacrificed human victims to Saturn, as was 
done at Carthage while that city stood." It deserves, therefore, 
a separate section of its own. Scholars agree that Baal-Moloch 
had a more noble aspect as god of the life-giving sun, yet when-
ever he appears in the history of Carthage it is to preside over 
some national excitement,- a grave crisis or wild exaltation-
and to be propitiated with sacrifices of the kind mentioned 
above. 
Baal-Moloch, the sun god, had his feminine counterpart in the 
goddess of the moon,- "the Phoenicians' goddess; Astarte the 
people of Sidon call her." 8 She was the "heavenly Aphrodite" 
to whom Herodotus refers, in the manner of the Qreeks, when he 
speaks of the temple founded in her honor by the Phoenicians on 
Cythera: 9 "And the temple on Cythera was founded by Phoenicians 
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from the same land of Syria." She was Venus Caelestis, or simply 
Caelestis, to Latin writers like St. Augustine, who asks: 10 
!lVI/hat had now become of Caelestis, whose empire was once so 
great in Carthage?" She, too, ha~ a beneficent aspect, being 
goddess of the night and the giver of rain,-"virgo Caelestis, 
pluviarum pollicitatrix," as Tertullian calls her;ll yet it was 
rather under the aspect of the "heavenly Aphrodite", goddess of 
love, that she was worshipped, and her cult, at Carthage, as in 
other parts of the Phoenician empire, consecrated immorality. 
Identified with her in later times, at least as a subordinate 
goddess, was Dido or Elissa, the traditional foundress of Carth-
age, of whose worship Justinus writes: 12 "Quam diu Carthago 
invicta fuit, pro dea culta est.1t 
The Byrsa at Carthage, and the highest hill of New Carthage, 
were topped with temples dedicated to Aesculapius (Asclepius), 
as has been noted. From this it appears that he was recognized 
as the particular patron of Carthage and her colonies. He was 
not known to the Carthaginians, of course, as Asclepius, which 
was a Greek identification, but as Eshmun; he is said to have 
been the most famous of a family of deities called the Cabeiri, 
the sons of the Phoenician god Pataicus (identified with the 
Greek hephaestus and Egyptian Ptah) who were "the makers of the 
world, the founders of civilization, and the inventors of ships 
and medicine." 13 They were represented as dwarfs. Pataicus, 
the father, was cUltivated at old and New Carthage too; his 
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image was used as a figurehead for ships; Herodotus mentions 
among other details 14 that "the image of Hephaestus (at 
Memphis) is most like to the Phoenician Pataici, which the 
Phoenicians carryon the prows of their triremes •.• it is in 
the likeness of a dwarf." Then speaking of the images of the 
Cabeiri, he says:15 "These also are like the images of Hephaest-
us, and are said to be his sons." That Pataicus was cultivated 
at New Carthage may be inferred from the fact that one of the 
city's hills was dedicated to him, along with one to Cronos 
(Moloch) and- characteristic notel- another to the discoverer 
of the nearby silver mines. Polybius remarks: 16 
The three other smaller eminences are to the north of the 
city, the most easterly being called the hill of Hephaestus, 
the next one the hill of Aletes, who is said to have received 
divine honors for his discovery of the silver mines, while the 
third is known as the hill of Cronos. 
Melcarth, or Baal Tsur, the "Baal of Tyre", was rendered a 
special homage by the Carthaginians as the patron of the parent 
city, Tyre, and the protecting genius of the Phoenician colonies 
~e is the "Phoenician Heracles" to the Greeks, and his temple at 
Tyre has been briefly described by Herodotus: 17 "I took ship to 
Tyre in Phoenice, where I heard that there was a very holy 
temple of Heracles. There I saw it, richly equipped with many 
other offerings, besides that in it were two pillars, one of 
refined gold, one of emerald, a great pillar that shone in the 
night time." 
Later Herodotus visited another temple of the same god at 
133 
Thasos:18 "Then I went to Thasos, too, where I found a temple 
of Heracles, built by the Phoenicians.," 
Finally, at the other end of tbe Mediterranean, on the island 
of Gades, the Phoenicians, as Diodorus says, 19 .t buil t many work::: 
appropriate to the nat-lIre of the region, and among them a costl"J 
temple of Heracles, and they instituted magnificent sacrifices 
which were conducted after the manner of the Phoenicians." 
Silius ltalicus describes the custom and priestly ritual con-
nected w·i th this shrine :20 
Further, those who are permitted and privileged to have 
access to the inner shrine forbid the appr>oach of women, and are 
careful to keep bristly seine away from the threshold. The dress 
worn before the altars is the same for all; linen covers their 
limbs, and their foreheads are adorned with a head band of 
Pelusian flax. It is their custom to offer incense with robes 
ungirt; and, following their fathers' rule, they adorn the gar-
ment of sacrifice with a broad stripe. Their feet are bare and 
their heads shaven, and their bed admits no partner; the fires 
on the hearth stones keep the altars alight perpetually. But no 
statues or familiar images of the gods filled the place with 
solemnity and sacred awe. 
The absence of any image of the god, and purity of ritual 
seems characteristic of the cult of Me1carth. There is only one 
bit of evidence to the contrary; that is the reference of 
Pliny 21 to "Hercules, to whom the Phoenicians each year sacri-
ficed human victims.1f The cult of Me1carth also kept Carthage 
in close relationship with Tyre, for it was customary to send a 
tenth of the spoils taken annually to his temple in the parent 
city. The earliest direct reference to religious practice in 
the history of Carthage is the mention of this custom by Just-
inus 22 when he speaks of Carto10's meeting with his father, the 
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general Malchus (550 B.C.) on his return from Tyre, "whither he 
had been sent by the Carthaginians bearing the tithe of Heracles 
from the spoils taken by his father in Sicily." 
The Sicilian expeditions of 410-397 BC brought Greek gods to 
Carthage. The adoption was occasioned by the utter disregard for 
these very gods, manifested by the Carthaginian generals in 
desecrating and plundering the Sicilian temples. The Greeks were 
astounded by the insensibility of the Carthaginians in pillaging 
unscrupulously those places which were, as a rule, respected 
even by an enemy. Diodorus comments on their action after the 
capture of Silenus thus: 23 "These barbarians surpass all others 
in their savagery; where others will spare those who flee to 
the sanctuaries, out of respect for the gods, the Carthaginians, 
unlike their enemies, plunder the very temples themselves." 
Again, after the fall of Himera, Diodorus relates 24 that the 
Carthaginians "stripped the private homes of everything of value, 
while Hannibal despoiled the temples and burnt them." Other 
passages, too, have already' been quoted from the same author in 
connection with the description of Carthage, telling of the 
exspoliation of the Sicilian temples and the transfer of their 
treasures to Africa in the expeditions of 410 and 406 BG. Final-
ly, during the siege of Spracuse in 397, just before the begin-
ning of the plague which brought the third expedition to dis-
aster, Ha~ilco "seized the suburb of Achradina and plundered the 
shrines of Demeter and Persephone," as Diodorus recounts. 25 
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Shortly afterward he abandoned his troops and fled to Carthage 
in defeat; this desertion, as we have seen, aroused the Libyans 
to revolt, and Carthage herself was threatened with ruin. Dio-
dorus relates the reaction that followed within the city:26 
The gods were now obviously hostile to the Carthaginians, so 
that at first they were terror stricken and begged the deity to 
cease being angry; but soon religious panic seized the entire 
city, as each person anticipated in imagination its subjugation. 
They passed a decree therefore, resolving to propitiate by every 
possible means the gods whom they had insulted, and although 
they had never worshipped Persephone or Demeter before, now they 
appointed the most prominent citizens as priests of their cult. 
Then, after setting up statues of the goddesses with great 
solemnity, they instituted sacrifices according to the customs 
of the Greeks. Selecting the most cultivated Greeks in their 
midst, they assigned them to the permanent service of the god-
desses. 
Thus, about 396 BO, the patron goddesses of Sicily came to be 
established at Carthage. The revolt that threatened the city 
soon subsided and this circumstance, probably attributed to the 
influence of the new deities, must have given an even greater 
impetus to their cult. Moreover, it has been suggested that the 
golden statue of Apollo, housed in its elaborate shrine near 
the Carthaginian forum, was brought from Sicily during these 
expeditions; whether Apollo was adopted as a foreign god and 
worshipped at Carthage, and Tyre, according to Greek ritual, or 
whether he was simply identified with one of the aspects of the 
sun god, Baal, is not certain. At any rate, there is no doubt 
that the Greek gods now received honors at Carthage that they 
had never been paid before. 
Did their cult become so popular as to serj.ously rival that 
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f the traditional gods, - Baal-Moloch, Astarte, Melcarth? There 
is no positive evidence for such a change. Yet, from the negative 
aspect, we lmow that the strict worship of Melcarth and Moloch 
had to be renewed at the end of the century when the Carthagin-
ians were threatened by Agathocles and turned to these gods for 
protection. It is evident, however, that their cult had certainly 
never been abandoned. Diodorus records the ftreform" of Melcarth 
worship at Carthage when Agathocles defeated her army and threat-
ened her existence about 309 BC: 27 
The Carthaginians, therefore, believed that this calamity had 
been inflicted upon them by the gods, and adopted every means of 
divine supplication. They thought that Heracles, the patron of 
their colonies, was particularYly angry with them, and sent a 
great sum of money and a considerable number of very valuable 
votive offerings to Tyre. Since they were originally a Tyrian 
colony tb.ey had been accustomed in former times to send a tithe 
of their gains there to the god; later however, when they amassed 
great wealth, and their revenues increased tremendously, they 
sent very little, losing respect for the god. Moved to repentance 
by this calamity, therefore, they became mindful once more of all 
the gods of Tyre. 
From the text it is evident then that the homage paid to Mel-
Garth had fallen into neglect and had to be revived at this time. 
We shall see later that the same was true of the c~lt of Moloch. 
There is some basis, therefore, for suggesting that the Greek 
gods imported from Sicily became the popular objects of Carthag-
inian worship at least during the latter half of the fourth 
century. 
With the invasion of Agathocles and the return to Moloch and 
Melcarth, however, carthaginian religion settled back into its 
original mold, and no evidence of further change 1s noted. vie 
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may conclude then, that the religion of Carthage for the half 
century before, and all through the Punic Wars, was characterist-
ically Phownician, centered about the Moloch-Melcarth-Astal'te 
triad. There is evidence to support this conclusion, though it 
is scattered and unsatisfactory. 
Melcarth continued to receive his customary homage from the 
carthaginians. 8ilius Italicus depicts Hannibal as worshipping 
him at Gades: 28 "Thereafter he worshipped at the altars of the 
god who bears the club, and loaded them with offerings lately 
snatched by the conqueror from the fire and smale of the citadel 
of Saguntum." And Polybius mentions the fact that one of the 
Carthaginian ships used to convey the customary tribute to Mel-
earth at Tyre put in at the mouth of the Tiber about 264BC and 
was hired to take Demetrius back to Syria: 29 "Finding a Carthag-
inian ship that had carried sacred offerings anchored at the 
~outh of the Tiber, he hired it. Such ships were specially se-
lected at Carthage for the conveyance of the traditional offering 
of first fruits to their gods that the Carthaginians send to 
~yre." Thus the relation to Tyre and the offerings to Melcarth 
~ust have continued up to the destruction of the city. 
Silius represents Hannibal as taking his famed oath against 
the Romans at the altar of Dido, who, as we have said, was prob-
~bly identified with Astarte (Tanit) and worshipped in one of the 
~emples on the Byrsa. Besides testifying to the continued vener-
~tion of this goddess at the time of the Punic wars, this passage 
13 
is a typical Roman impression of Carthaginian religious rites in 
,;eneral :30 
In the center of Carthage stood a temple, sacred to tte 
spirit of Elissa, the foundress, and regarded with hereditary 
awe by the people. Round it stood yew trees and pines with their 
melancholy shade, which hid it and kept away the light of 
t,eaven •••• statues of mournful marble stood there,- Belus, the 
founder of the race, and all the line descended from Belus •••• 
There Dido herself was seated, at last united forever to 
Sychaeus; and at her feet lay the Trojan sword. A hundred altars 
stood here in order, sacred to the gods of heaven and the lord 
of Erebus. Here the priestess with streaming hair and Stygian 
garb calls up Acheron and the divinity of Henna's goddess. The 
earth rumbles in the gloom and breaks forth into awesome hiss-
ings; and fire blazes unkindled upon the a,l tars. The dead also 
are called up by magic spells and flit through empty space; and 
the marble face of Elissa sweats. To this shrine Hannibal was 
brought by his father's command; and when he had entered, Hamil-
car examined the boy's face and bearing. No terrors for him had 
the Massylian priestess, raving in her fren~y, or the horrid 
rites of the temple, the blood bespattered doors, and the flames 
that mounted at the sound of incantation. 
Is the impression of cruel rites and gloomy mystery merely 
the product of prejudice and poetic imagination? This mie::;ht be 
conceded if we did not know the appalling reali.ty of Moloch 
worship, whose chief feature was human sacrifice, propitiation 
of the god b~ burning human victims in his honor; and the 
victims in which he especially delighted were well-born children. 
III. Human Sacrifice 
The Phoenician ancestors of Carthage had practiced this cruel 
rite and passed it on with the rest of their religious system to 
their colonies. The Carthaginians had made it so important a 
part of their ritual that at an early date it became notorious 
among other nations. About 490 B.C. Darius tried to use his 
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influence to stop the practice, as Justinus records :3lltEnvoys 
came to Carthage from ~arius, king of the Persians, bearing a 
communication which forbade the Carthaginians to immolate human 
victims." Apparently the step was ineffective, for Plutarch tells 
us32that about ten years later "Gelon, the despot of Syracuse , 
after vanquishing the Carthaginians off Himera, forced them when 
he made peace with them to include in the treaty an agreement to 
stop sacrificing their children to Cronos." Yet the rite seems 
to have been continue~, at least in times of stress. During the 
siege of Agrigentum in the Sicilian expedition of 406 B.C., the 
plague carried off many of the Carthaginian troops, including 
Hannibal, the general. His successor, Hamilco, regarded this as 
a punishment because the Carthaginians had violated the tombs 
outside the city, and accordingly sought to placate the gods with 
sacrifice, as Diodorus relates:33 
When Hamilcar saw that the common soldiers were stricken with 
religious fear, he put an end, first of all, to the violation of 
the tombs. Then he sought to propitiate the gods according to 
Carthaginian custom, sacrificing a chiln to Cronos and drowning 
a number of victims in Poseidon's honor.' 
There was a partial neglect of the worship of Moloch in the 
years preceding the invasion of Agathocles, as Diodorus will 
show, but this very neglect brings out the full horror of the 
rites, for it consisted in a decline, not in the number, but in 
the quality of the victims. The nature of the "revival" of 
Moloch worship in 309 B.C. emphasises all the more the heartless-
ness and perversion of the worshippers. Diodorus describes the 
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revival, and the details of the ritual thus:34 
They believed that Cronos was aroused against them too, be-
cause in former times they had sacrificed the sons of the aris-
tocracy to that god, but later they bought children secretly, 
and after raising them, sent them as victims for sacrifice. But 
an investigation was held and some of the victims found to be 
supposititious. With these in mind, they beheld the enemy encamp 
ed at their gates and were filled with religious fear that the 
worship of their ancestoral gods had been neglected. They hast-
ened to rectify the carelessness by choosing out two hundred of 
the noblest children and offering them in public sacrifice. No 
less than three hundred others, yielding to reproach, offered 
themselves of their own accord. There were at Carthage brazen 
statues of Cronos fashioned with outstretched arms inclined at 
an angle so that the children placed in them rolled down and 
fell into the flaming hollow within. 
Some details of this inhuman rite as practiced privately are 
added by Plutarch:35 
With full knowledge and understanding they themselves offered 
up their own children, and those who had no children wuld buy 
little ones from poor people and cut their throats as if they 
were so many lambs or young birds; meanwhile the mother stood 
by without a tear or a moan; but should she utter a single moan 
or let fall a single tear, she had to forfeit the money, and her 
child was sacrificed nevertheless; and the whole area before the 
statue was filled with a loud noise of flutes and drums so that 
the cries of wailing should not reach the ears of the people. 
Tertullian laments the heartlessness of the practice thus: 36 
Cum propriis filiis Saturnus non pepercit, extraneis utique 
non parcendo perseverabat, quos quidem ipsi parentes sui affere-
bant et libentes respondebant et infantibus blandiebantur, ne 
lacrimantes immolarentur. 
The ancients in these passages speak eloquently enough of the 
horrible reality of Moloch worship. That they fully appreciated 
its revolting nature is already evident from what has been said. 
Plutarch's comment is: 37lfWould it not have been far better for 
the Carthaginians to have taken Critias or Diagoras to draw up 
their law code at the very beginning and so not to believe in 
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any divine power or god, rather than to offer such sacrifices as 
they used to offer to Cronos?" 
The Carthaginians maintained this practice through the entire 
course of their history with the possible exception of a single 
period; it was neglected, as we have seen,- perhaps even dis-
continued for a time in the years before the invasion of Agatho-
cles, the same time which saw the introduction of Greek gods and 
the decline of IJlelcarth worship. There is probably a causal re-
lation between these factors,- the introduction of Greek gods 
and the decline of the Moloch-Melcarth cults. The Carthaginians 
were always, for better or worse, a religious people; they were 
Semetic, their names,- Hannibal, Hasdruba1.- had religious sig-
nificance, they gloried in images, temples, and shrines, they 
were strongly influen~ed by religious fear. If they neglected 
their own gods, it was only because they had turned to those of 
the Greeks. But then Agathocles appeared suddenly in Africa, de-
feated the Carthaginian troops, encamped close to the city. The 
Carthaginians must have felt that the Greek gods had failed them, 
or at least that something violent had to be done to pacify the 
old gods whom they had neglected. Melcarth was loaded with offer-
ings, and the sacrifice to Moloch renewed with a vengeance. 
Shortly afterwards they gained a victory over Agathocles. Their 
exaltation took the same form as their despair. Diodorus relates 
that38"The Carthaginians after the victory were sacrificing the 
noblest of their captives at night as thanks offerings to the 
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gods, enveloping the victims with a great fire." Thus the prac-
tice of human sacrifice was renewed at this time never to be 
abandoned until the destruction of the city. Quintus Cuntius, 
speaking of the worship in general, says :39" Sacrum quoque, quod 
quidem diis minime cordi esse crediderim, mu1tis secu1is inter-
missum repetendi auctores quidam erant, ut ingenuus puer Saturno 
lmmolaretur, quod sacraligium verius, quam sacrum, Carthaginien-
ses a conditoribus traditum usque ad excidium urbis suae fecisse 
dicuntur." 
Though there is little direct evidence of human sacrifice 
among the Carthaginians at the time of the Punic Wars, state-
ments like that of Curtius above leave no doubt that it still 
prevailed. Silius Italicus alone presents a specific instance 
as taking place at this time and, though the incident itself 
may be fictitious, the practice in general was probably as he 
describes it:40 
The nation which Dido founded when she landed in Libya were 
accustomed to appease the gods by human sacrifices and to offer 
up their young children, - horri ble to t ell- upon fiery altars. 
Each year the lot was cast and the tragedy was repeated, re-
calling the sacrifices offered to Diana in the kingdom of Thoas. 
And now Hanno, the ancient enemy of Hannibal, demander' the 
general's son, as the customary victim to suffer this doom 
according to the lot. 
The practice of human sacrifice was, in fact, so integral a 
part of the Carthaginian religion, its necessity so deeply root-
ed in the tradition of the people, that it actually survived the 
destruction of the city and after the founding of Roman Carthage, 
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was taken up again, persisting far into the Christian Era. Ter-
tullian, in his day, c ould write :41uInfantes penes Africam Sa-
turno immolabantur palam usque ad proconsulatum Tiberii ••.•. Sed 
et nunc in occulto perseverat hoc sacrum facinus." 
With the full horror of this dominant feature of Carthagin-
ian religion in mind, it is not difficult to understand how 
Polybius could 'say without prejudice :42"But the quality in which 
the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is, in my 
opinion, the nature of their religious convictions. ft 
IV. Spirit And National Virtue 
Applying the universal standards of prudence, justice, tem-
perance, and fortitude to the people of Carthage,- judging them 
not by single instances but by established traits and by gener-
al statements of the ancients,- what can be said of their moral 
character, of their national virtue? 
First, in regard to prudence, it is evident that the Carthag-
inians could never have planned their government so efficient-
ly, nor have raised themselves to the head of a vast commercial 
empire, maintaining sovereign sway over the western Mediterran-
ean for centuries, without a great fund of native shrewdness and 
ingenuity. They were known for their subtlety and feared for 
their ability to outwit an opponent by stratagem. Cicero, more-
over, remarks: 43lfNec tantum Carthago habuisset Op1L.-n sexcentos 
fere annos sine consiliis et disciplina." Yet, prudent as they 
were in the very practical matters of government, commerce, and 
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empire, the Carthaginians were limited in their perception of 
higher spiritual values, au has been pointed out before; they 
were a religious people, it is true, yet their religion appar-
ently never arose beyond the level of fear and propitiation. 
They were prudent as far as they saw, but their vision never 
pierced much beyond the material. 
The sources have much to say against the Carthaginian sense 
of justice. No other people in the ancient world acquired such 
wide notoriety for faithlessness to agreements. "Punica fides 1t 
was a synonym for infidelity. It is certainly no more than fact 
that Carthage broke international law in plundering temples and 
tombs, that she oppDessed her subject peoples with unjust taxa-
tion, that she betrayed her mercenaries and mistreated her gen-
erals. On this last point Diodorus is most specific, condemning 
it as a maker of tyrants:44 
The chief cause of this is the cruelty of the Carthaginians 
in dealing out punishment. They raise their most capable men to 
posts of high command in time of war, forcing them, as a rule, . 
to bear the whole responsibility. But when peace returns they 
trump up charges against these very men, and haling them before 
unjust tribunals for fear of their power, overwhelm them with 
punishments. This is why some of their leaders, out of fear of 
judgment, desert their posts, w hile others turn to tyranny. 
The Carthaginians must have maintained a certain minimum of 
justice in the ordinary conduct of state affairs, otherwise the 
government could not have functioned so long without violent 
revolt, as Cicero has pointed out. But certainly the evidence 1s 
all against the possibility of a high esteem, or a high degree 
of 1ustice Amcm.Q' them. 
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The rapidity with which the ~arthaginians alternated in times 
of stress between deep despair and frenzied exaltation bespeaks 
a lack of restraint, of temperance, in their character. This 
change from one extreme to the other has been seen on the occa-
sion of Agathocles' invasion, when, after defeat, their fear 
took a violent form, while after a subsequent victory the same 
violence was manifest in their rejoicing. The trait is well 
illustrated by the wild extravagances with which the Carthagin-
ians reacted to the Roman ultimatum before the Third Punic WaD, 
vividly portrayed by Appian: 45 
Then followed a scene of blind, raving madness, like the 
strange acts which the Maenads are said to perform when under 
the influence of Bacchus. Some fell upon those senators who had 
advised giving the hostages and tore them in pieces ••••• Others 
treated in a similar way those who had favored giving up the 
arms. Some stoned the ambassadors for bringing the bad news, and 
others dragged them through the city. Still others, meeting cer-
tain Italians, who were caught among them in this sudden and un-
expected mischance, maltreated them in various ways, ••••• The 
city was full of wailing and wrath, of fear and threatenings. 
People roamed the streets invoking whatever was most dear to 
them and took refuge in the temp~ s as in asylums. They upbraid-
ed their gods for not even being able to defend themselves. Some 
went into the arsenals and wept when they found them empty. 
Others ran to the dockyards and bewailed the ships that had been 
surrenderee to perfidious men ••••• Most of all was their anger 
kindled by the mothers of the hostages who, like Furies in a 
tragedy, accosted those whom they met with shrieks, and reproach-
ed them with giving away their children against their protest, 
or mocked at them, saying that the gods were now taking vengeance 
on them for the lost children. The few who remained sane closed 
the gates, and brought stones up0n the walls to be used in place 
of catapults. 
There was, moreover, among the Carthaginians a marked ten-
iency toward luxuriousness, evident in their clothing and decor-
ation, the sumptuousness of their estates, and in the national 
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institution of public banquets, analogous to the sysitia of 
Sparta, as Aristotle remarks:46n Po1nts in which the Carthaginian 
constitution resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables 
of its Comradships corresponding to the Phiditia, etc ••••• " Un-
like the stern purpose of the Spartan messes, which were insti-
tuted to promote military spirit, the public dinners of the 
Carthaginians were organised by the "Comradships" evidently for 
social purposes, and later took on the aspect of unofficial pol-
itical gatherings or caucuses, as can be inferred from Livy, who 
speaks of Hannibal's attempt to arouse the Carthaginians to war, 
after his exile:47"Et primo in circulis conviviisque celebrata 
sermonilbu.s res est; deinde in senatu quidem ••••• " What must the 
table service have been at these banquets in the capital when 
the drinking cups of Carthaginian officers in the field were 
precious enough to satisfy a mutinous army of mercenaries in the 
Sicilian expedition of 406 B.C.1 Diodorus records49that Hamilcar 
the general, "persuaded the soldiers to be patient for a few 
days more and presented them with the drinking cups of the na-
tive Carthaginians as a pledge of his faith." 
But the greatest intemperance of the Carthaginians, what may 
be called their predominant passion, was avarice, which has been 
illustrated several times already, attested by the sources from 
Aristotle to Polybius. It is enough to recall here the remark of 
Polybius:49"At Carthage nothing which results in profit is re-
garded as disgraceful." 
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Though it was apparently true that, as Polybius asserts,50 
II the Carthaginians ••. depend for the maintenance of thei r freedom 
on the courage of a mercenary force," and "Italians in general 
naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily strength and 
personal courage," still the conclusion must be qualified by 
two considerations: (in regard to the fortitude of the Cartha-
ginians) (1) At one period of their history they give evidence 
of a general increase in patriotism and courage. (2) At times 
of desperate crisis they were capable of an astonishing reckless 
daring. 
The period during which public spirit may be said to have 
reached its height among the Carthaginians extends roughly from 
383 B. C., when the citizens themselves were, for the first time 
enlisted as common soldiers in any considerable number, to about 
308, when an entire citizen army turned out against Agathocles. 
The details have been given in discussing the armies of Carthage 
( vd. supra IE). There it has been noted that 10,OOOnative 
Carthaginians took part in the expedition of 339 against Timol-
eon, and that in the first clash with Agathocles in Africa, the 
Sacred Cohort made a brave stand in the face of defeat and the 
loss of their leader. There is, then, more solid evidence of 
courage and public spirit during this period than at any other 
up to the time of the Third Punic War. Moreover, Aristotle, a 
contemporary of this period, notes5lthat "among some peoples 
there were even certain laws stimulating military valor; for 
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instance at Carthage, we are told, warriors receive the decora-
tion of armlets of the same number as the campaigns on which 
they have served." This proves that the increase in valor was 
not simply haphazard, but deliberately promoted by the govern-
ment; it is the only evidence we have of a positive attempt on 
the part of the Carthaginians to foster any of the national 
virtues. 
It may be noted that Carthage at this period,- the greater 
part of the fourth century- is remarkable in several respects. 
This is the Carthage which Aristotle knew, whose constitution 
won his esteem, whose promotion of valor he notes. The Carthag-
inians at this time manifest a nobler spirit, fight their own 
battles, and even merit a word of praise from Diodorus for their 
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conduct after the battle of Cronium in 383 B.C.: "The Carthag-
inians bore their success like gentlemen, sending envoys to in-
vite Dionysius to come to terms." This period precisely saw the 
imported gods of the Greeks rise in popular favor, and the old 
practices of human sacrifice and Melcarth worship slip into de-
cline. Material prosperity, too, paralleled the rise in other 
forms of culture; the city had been beautified with Sicilian art 
at the end of the preceding century; during the long periods of 
peace from 367 B.C. to 344, and again, after Timoleon, from 337 
to the invasion of Agathocles in 308, commerce thrived and the 
Carthaginian power in Sicilty expanded; the evident results of 
this prosperity can be seen in the richness of the countryside 
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as Agathocles found it (vd. supra I C). All these considerations 
point to this as the peak period of Carthaginian civilization 
and culture. 
The changes which took place after the invasion of Agathocles, 
- the return of the old religious practices, renewed dependence 
on mercenaries, the gradual break down of constitutional balance 
in the direction of oligarchy, etc.- have been discussed in their 
proper sections. vVhat is important for our purpose is the reali-
zationthat the decline had begun almost half a century before 
the first Punic War, so that it was not with Carthage at her 
purest and best that Rome fought~ ~ut with a corrupting civili-
zation and culture. by the time of the Second Punic War the 
change was evident enough to draw from Polybius the remark: 53 
At the time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Car-
thaginian constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was 
better ••••• For by as much as the power and prosperity had been 
earlier than that of Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun 
to decline; while Rome was exactly at her prime, as far, at 
least, as her system of government was concerned. 
If then, Carthage at her height only approximates the relig-
ion and the courageous spirit of Rome, the breach between the 
two in this respect must have been all the wider at the time of 
the Punic Wars. 
Instances l~ve already been given of the desperate kind of 
courage displayed by the Carthaginians in time of unusual stress, 
- that which inspired them, for example, to hold out so long 
against overwhelming odds in the Third Punic War. Yet this cour-
age was not so much a fixed habit as a frenzied reaction, which, 
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for its very desperation, was all the more dangerous. 
From these considerations, then, we may conclude that the Car-
thaginians were never, in the last extreme, cowards; yet during 
a single period only did their courage rise to. anything like the 
stability of genuine fortitude. 
Finally, Plutarch alone among the ancient authorities attemptE 
a general characterization of the Carthaginians as a people. His 
comment on their spirit is the only passage we have which aims 
at telling, not what they did, but what they ~. He describes 
them thus: 54 
Quite different is the character of the Carthaginian people; 
it is bitter, sullen, subservient to their magistrates, harsh to 
their subjects, most abject when afraid, most savage when enrag-
ed, stubborn in adhering to its decisions, disagreeable and hard 
in its attitude toward playfulness and urbanity. Never would 
these people, if a Clean had asked them to postpone the meeting 
of the assembly on the ground that he had made sacrifice and had 
guests to entertain, have adjourned the meeting amid laughter 
and the clapping of hands; nor would they, when a quail escaped 
from Alcebiades' cloak while he was speaking, have joined eager-
ly in hunting it down and then have given it back to him; no, 
they would have put them both to death for their insolence and 
their flippancy, seeing that they banished Hanno on the charge 
of aspiring to be tyrant, because he used a lion on his campaign 
to carry his luggage. 
This characterization, though perhaps flavored by Greek bias, 
is in general accord with the impression left by Carthaginian 
religious practices. It is evident too that a people of little 
restraint or regard for virtue, of few ideals above the material, 
could hardly have enjoyed any great urbanity or freedom of sp"irit. 
The moral culture of the Carthaginians may be summarized thus: 
I) Their religion, during most of their history, was that of 
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their Phoenician ancestors" centering about the Moloch-Melcarth-
Astarte triad and characterized by one authority thus: liThe char-
acter of Phoenician religion and of the people who held it was 
at once impure and cruel. n55 
II) Their outstanding religious practice, at least in the 
minds of the Romans and Greeks, was the sacrifice of their child-
ren to Moloch" a rite which continued to the destruction of the 
city" and beyond. 
III) In point of virtue, the Carthaginians appear neither just 
nor temperate" though they were certainly prudent in temporal 
matters and capable of reckless daring under stress. 'l'heir spiri t· 
on Plutarch's authority, was sullen" cruel" unresponsive to 
amenity. 
v. Intellectual Culture 
Only the most meager traces of an intellectual culture sur-
vive, and these may be briefly recounted. The earliest recorded 
fact of intellectual significance is a decree of the Carthagin-
ian senate quoted by Justinus, 56lt facto senatus consulto, 'ne quis 
postea Carthaginiensis, aut litteris Graecis aut sermomi studereto 
ne aut loqui cum hoste, aut scribere sine interprete posset. rlf 
The measure was occasioned by the discovery that a certain Sun-
iatus, "potentissimus ea tempestate Poenorum,," had communicated 
with Dionysius in Greek, attempting to betray the general Hanno 
and the Sicilian expedition of 383 B.C •• The effect of the de-
cree must have been to cut Carthage off from the influence of 
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Greek intellectual culture. Whatever there was of literature at 
Carthage after that time would be thoroughly Punic. 
That there was an interest in literature among the Carthagin-
ians is proven by the fact that they possesseQ collections of 
books, which were distributed to the native African chieftains 
by order of the Roman senate when the city was destroyed. The 
nature, extent, and value of these collections are unknown. One 
work alone was deliberately preserved by the Romans,- Mago's 
treatise on agriculture in twenty eight books. The esteem which 
this work won from the Romans is attested by Pliny,57who men-
tions among other foreign authorities on agriculture "the Car-
thaginian Mago, whom our senata admired so much that when Car-
thage was taken and her libraries bestowed upon the African 
chieftains, they decreed that his twenty eight books alone shoulc 
be translated into Latin, despite the fact that M. Cato had al-
ready expounded the principles of the same subject." Varro testi· 
fies to the popularity of the treatise, which had merited the 
supreme recognition of being translated into Greek; after list-
ing the most eminent writers on agriculture, he affirms:58 
All these are surpassed in reputation by Mago of Carthage, 
who gathered into twenty eight books, written in the Punic ton-
gue, the subjects they had dealt with separately. These Cassius 
Dionysius of Utica translated into Greek and published in twenty 
books, dedicated to the praetor Sextilius. 
And Columella adds the final word of praise,59"paying greatest 
reverence to the Carthaginian Mago as the father of husbandry." 
In this type of literature, then, preeminence is ceded to a Car-
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thaginian author. 
Sallust made use of some Carthaginian historical works, pre-
60 
served probably by the Africans to whom they had been given: 
What men inhabited Africa originally, and who came later or 
how the races mingled, I shall tell as briefly as possible. Al-
though my account varies from the prevailing tradition, I give 
it as it was translated to me from the Punic books said to have 
been written by king Hiempsal. 
Finally, the only Carthaginian work extant is the travel 
acco1mt of Hanno, known as his Periplus, mentioned by Pliny61 
with another of the same natwe: "Also when the power of Carthag 
flourished Hanno sailed round from Cadiz to the extremity of 
Arabia, and published a memoir of his voyage, as did Hamilco 
when dispatched at the same date to explore the outer coasts of 
Europe." 
Agriculture, history, travel,- it is the type of literature 
we would expect from a people occupied with practical matters. 
Whether the Carthaginians ever produced much of aesthetic or 
speculative value we cannot tell; their background and nature 
makes it seem unlikely. 
Finally, there is evidence that philosophy was culti vated,'at 
Carthage, at least in the final period of her history. Clitoma-
chus, who became head of the Academy in 129 B.C., was a native 
of Carthage, where he had instructed others in philosophy before 
coming to Athens to study under Carneades. We know of him chief-
ly from Diogenes Laertius, who leaves the following account: 62 
Clitomachus was a Carthaginian, his real name being Hasdrubal, 
and he taught Philosophy at Carthage in his native tongue. He had 
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reached his fortieth year when he went to Athens and became a 
pupil of Carneades. And Carneades recognizing his industry, 
caused him to be educated and took part in training him. And to 
such lengths did his diligence go that he composed more than 
four hundred treatises. He succeeded Carneaaes in the headship 
of the school, and by his writings did much to elucidate his 
opinions. He was eminently well acquainted with the three sects, 
- the Academy, the Peripatetics, and the stoics. 
From the fact that he found pupils at Carthage it is evident 
that the Carthaginians could not have been entirely indifferent 
to philosophical pursuits, though, again, there is no way of 
determining the extent of their interest. 
This brief data, then, c~mprises the bulk of our knowledge of 
Carthaginian intellectual life. It would be rash to conclude 
that this phase of their culture was therefore inconsiderable; 
we would be j~dging them as Samuel Johnson did the Athenians 
when he declared that they were barbarous because they had few 
books. Yet, on the other hand, if the Carthaginians had produced 
anything comparable to the intellectual monuments of Greece and 
Rome, it is not likely that such productions would have perished 
utterly. Masterpieces, especially of literature, have a way of 
surviving. 
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Notes to Chapter IV 
I. References to Greek Authors 
2 VI 56: ~eylcr~~v bl ~o~ boxet b~a~opav lXeLv ~O tPw~alwv xOAl~Eu~a 
xPOG ~l~~LOV iv ~fj nEpt 8EWV bLa~~tEL. 
4 Moralia, 171 C: 
7 I,38,2: 
~lyoucrL bE xaL ~a~ 8~crla~ inL~e~Etv ~ro Kp6v~ ~oUG na~aLoUG, 
wcrnEp iv Kapx~b6vL ~tw~ ~ nOAL~ bLl~ELVE\ •••• 
8 Achilles Tatius, I,l: 
••• ~fj ~wv WOLvlxwv 8E~· 'Acr~&p~~v a~~~v ot ZLbwVLOL xaAoucrLv 
15 Ibid.: 
lcr~L be xat ~'1i5~a OIl-OLa ~otcrL ~OU 'H~a'cr~o~· "t"o,s~o1l bE cr~l(lb 
~atba~ AlyoucrL ELvaL. 
16 X,lO: 
xaAEt~aL bE ~wv ~PLWV b ~Ev xpo~ &va~OAab VEUwV 'H~alcr~ou, 
~o,s~ro b' b cruVEX~~ 'AA~~OU - bOXEL b' O~~Ob E~PE"t"~~ YEv6~EVOb 
"t"wv apy~p~'wv ~E~~AAwV lcro8lwv ~E~EuxlvaL ~L~V - 0 bE ~pl~oG 
npocrayopEuE~aL Kpovou. 
17 II 44: 
••• tnAEucra xat i~ Tupov ~~~ ~OLV'X~G, nuVeav6~EvoG a~~6eL 
ElvaL tpov tHpaxAlo~ ~YLOV, xa ELbov nXoucr'~b xa~EcrxEuaa~lvov 
5AAOLa{ ~E nOAAotaL &vae~~aaL" xat iv a~~ro ~aav cr~~AaL buo, ~ ~Ev xpucrou dnl~eou, ij bE crll-apaybo'D Aleou ~all-nOV'TOb ~aG vux'TaG 
lyaBoG. 
18 Ibid.: 
d~L~V b~ xat lG 8aaov, lv ~fj E~pOV tpov tHpax~EoG t~o 
¢OLVCXWV tbpu~lvov, ••• 
19 V,20; cf. Ch. III, note 131. 
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23 XIII,57: 
~oaou~o yap We6~~~L bLl~EpOV ot ~a~~apoL,~wV ~AAwV, W~~E ~wv 
AOLwWV EVExa ~ou ~~b~v daEpEtv ElG ~o baL~ovLoV, bLaa~~ov~wv ~OUG ElG ~a tEen xa~apEuy~aG, Kapx~b6vLOL ~o~vav~Cov d~laxov~o 
~wv ~OAE~{WV, O~G ~OUG ~wv 8EWV vaouG auA~aELav. 
25 XIV,63: 
••• xa~EAa~E~o be xat ~o ~~G 'AxpabLvfjG npoaa~ELOv, xat ~OUG 
VEWG ~fjG ~E 6~~~~poG xat Kop~G lauA~aEv. 
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33 XIII,86: 
tA~C",uaG be eewpWV ~a n",~e~ be~crLba~~ovouvTa, npwTov ~ev 
lxa~aa~o xaea~pwv ~a ~V~~eta. Me~a be ~a~~a txlTe~e ~o~G eeO~G 
~~~a ~~_Xea~p~ov ~eOG, ~~ ~Ev,Kp6v~ natba cr~ay~~aa~, ~0 be rrocre~ 
uwV~ x~~ oG ~eP£~WV xa~anov~~craG. 
15 
e' T ... K' ';e ~eLV OLa ~~ .pOV~ e UOV; 
42 V1#56; cf. supra, note 2. 
4~ Politics, 11,8,2: 
eXeL bt napanATjO'l.a ~fj J\axwvLxfj n:oAI.~eL<t ~a J.l.~v O'\)O'O'L'tLU ~wv 
~~aLpLwv ~Otb ~L~L~LOLG, ••• 
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49 VI f;6: 
,'-t' , , , ~ ~ " " '1 nap OL~ ~€v yap o~u~v aLOXpov ~wv av~xov~wv npo~ XepOOb' •• 
53 VI,51; cf. Ch. II, note 22. 
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1 Ope cit., 38. 
4 De Rebus Gestis Alexandri Magni, IV,3,22. 
5 For a full discussion of Phoenician religion of. A.H. 
Sayce, The Ancient Empires of the East, London, Mac-
millan,-rIT83, 414 ft. 
6 XVIII, II. 
10 In Psalmos, XGVIII,14: 
Regnum Coelestis quale erat Garthagini J Ubi nunc est 
regnum coelestis? 
11 Apologeticus, XXIII; cf. Ch. III, note 10. 
12 XVIII,6. 
13 Sayee, 417; cf. also the note on Herodotus 111,37 in 
the translation of A.D. Godley (Loeb), London, Heinemann, 
1928, 4 vol. 
20 Punica,III,20-3l: 
Tum~ quis fas et honos adyti penetralia nosse, 
femineos prohibent gressus ac limine curant. 
saetigeros arcere sues; nec dlscolor ulli 
ante aras cultusj' velantur corpora lino, 
et Pelusiaco praefulget stamine vertex. 
distinctis mos tura dare atque e lege parentum 
sacrificam lato vestem distinguere clavo. 
pes nudus tonsaeque comae castumque cubile; 
irrestincta focis servant altaria flammae. 
sed nulla effigies simulacrave nota deorum 
maiestate locum et sacro implevere timore. 
21 Naturalis Historia, XXXVI,4: 
Hercules, ad quem-Poeni omnibus annis humana sacrifica-
verunt victima ..• 
22 XVIII,7: 
..• a Tyro, quO decimas Herculi ferre ex praeda Sicili-
ensi, qQam pater eius ceperat, .•• 
28 111,14-16:-
Exin clavigeri veneratus numinis aras 
captivis onerat donis, quae nuper ab arce 
victor fumantis rapuit aemusta Sagunti. 
30 1,81-103: 
Urbe i'uit media sacrum genetrlcis El1ssae 
manibus et patrie Tyriis formidine cultum. 
quod taxi circum et piceae squalentibus umbris 
abdiderant caelique arcebant Iumine, templum. 
. • • . •• stant'.marmore maesto 
effigies, Belusque parens omnisque nepotum 
a Bel0 series •..••• 
ipsa sedet tandem aeternum conluncta Sycheo; 
ante pedes ensis Phrygius iacet; ordine centum 
stant arae caelique deis Erebique potenti. 
hie, crine effuso, atque Hennaeae numina divae 
atque Acheronta vocat Stygia cum veste sacerdos. 
immugit teIIus rumpitque horrenda per umbros 
sibiIa; inaccensi flagrant altaribus ignes. 
tum magieo volitant cantu per inania manes 
exciti, vultusque in marmore sudat Elissae. 
Hannibal haec patrio iusau ad penetralia fertur; 
ingresaique habitus atque ora explorat Hamilcar. 
non ille euhantis Massylae palluit iras, 
non diros templi ri tua::aspersaque tabo 
Iimina et audito surgentes carmine flammas. 
31 XIX,l: 
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... legati a Dario, Persarum rege, Garthaginem venerunt, 
afferentes edictum, quo Poeni humanas hostias immolare ••• 
prohibebantur .•• 
36 Op. cit., IX. 
39 IV,3,22. 
40 IV,765-771: 
Moa fuit in populis, quos condidit advena Dido, 
poacere caede deos veniam ae flagrantibua aria, 
infandum dictu J parvoa imponere na toa. 
urna reducebat miserandos annua casus, 
sacra Thoanteae ritusque imitata Dianae. 
cui fato sortique deum de more petebat 
Hannibalis prolem discors antiquitus Hannon. 
41 Loc. cit.: Modern archeological findings have dispel-
led all doubt of the reality of human sacrifice at Carthage 
as described by the ancients. For an illustrated aC,count 
cf. B.K. De Prorok, "Ancient Carthage in the Light of Mod-
ern Excavation,; It, ~ational Geographic Magazine, XLV (April, 
1924), 391-423. 
43 De ~e Publica, II, 48. 
47 XXXIV,6l. 
55 Sayce, 417. 
56 XX,5,13. 
57 Nat. Hist., XVIII,5: 
•.• cui 'quidern tEn tum honorem senatus noster habuit Car-
thagine capta, ut cum regulis Africae bibliothecas donaret, 
unius eius duo de tr,iginta volumina censeret in Latinam lin-
guam transferenda, cum iam M. Cato praecepta condidisset. 
58 De Re Rustica,I,lO: 
HocnoMlitate Mago Carthaginiensis praeteriit, Poenica 
lingua qui res dispersas comprendit libris XXIIX, quos 
Cassius Dionyslus Uticensis vertit libris XX ac Graeca lin-
gua Sextilio praetori misit. 
59 De Re Rustica, 1,1,13: , 
••. verum tamen ut Carthaginiensem Magonem rusticationis 
parentem maxime veneremur ••• 
60 Bellum Jugurthin~, XVII,7: 
Sed quo mortales initio Africam habuerint, quique postea 
accesserint, aut quo modo inter se permixti sint, quamquam 
ab ea fama quae plerosque optinet divorsum est, tamen uti 
ex libris Punicis, qui regis Hiempsalis dicebantur,' inter-
pretatum nobis est •.• quam paucissimis dicam. 
61 Nat. Hist.,II,67: 
Et Hanno:-carthaginia potentia florente, circumvectus a 
Gadibus ad finem Arabiae, navigationem eam prodidit scripto; 
sieut ad extera Europae noseenda missus eodem tempore 
Hamilco. 
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CONCLUSION 
Out of the mass of details recorded by the ancients the 
dominant factor of CarthaKinian civilization and culture appear 
clear and vivid. The study of the elements of civilization 
has revealed the Carthaginian law was well formulated but 
poorly enforced; the wisdom of the constitution of Carthage 
was vitiated by outstanding defects in the national character -
venality, cruelty, expediency, factiousness. The strength of 
that character, on the other hand, lay mainly in the keen 
practical wisdom of the Carthaginians and their surprising 
capacity for reckless daring and fierce resistance in the face 
of a crisis. Their civil character, then, was shrewd and 
powerful, but defective in the higher qualities of magnanimity, 
humaneness, unity of spirit, and fidelity to principle. 
The study of Carthaginian culture illustrates, explains, 
and enforces this general characterization. In keeping with her 
nature as a merchant state, the material element was the most 
highly developed in the culture of Carthage. The city itself 
was impressive in its buildings, strongly fortified, with 
cleverly constructed harbors and rich adornments, the work 
largely of foreign craftsmen and artists. The agricultural 
system of the surrounding countryside was a model for the 
ancient world, and resources within the city were abundant 
enough to last through many a long siege. The inhabitants were 
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shaBply divided into four classes, with the wealthy merchants 
in their luxurious robes and jewelry occupying an exclusive 
position at the top. The large armies of Carthage were for the 
most part a motley aggregation of mercenaries, though in times 
of stress the citizens proved themselves capable of high 
courage. But the strongest arm of the empire city was her 
navy, which was magnificently equipped, but finally lost 
because of neglect and false economy. 'lath this she controlled 
the entire Western Mediterranean, drawing from her colonies 
and subjects along its shores vast revenues through trade, 
taxation, and natural resources. Carthage established this 
empire through conquest and a shrewd system of colonization, 
held it by force of arms and economic sanctions, a common 
coinage and a co~mon religion, kept it exclusive for her own 
gain. But this selfish purpose, pursued throu3h overburdening 
taxation and cruel exploitation, won her the hatred of her 
subjects, provoked rebellion, and ultimately contributed to 
her complete destruction. 
The Carthag1ntans aroused the animosity of others than her 
subject nations, moreover, by certain elements in her moral 
culture. The gods of carthage were Eastern deities - Moloch, 
Astarte, Melcarth, Eshmun - though there is evidence that she 
adopted some of the Greek 30dS at one period of her history. 
Her native gods were worshipped with dark and secret rites, 
among them the repugnant practice of human sacrifice. Judged 
by the standard of the cardinal virtues, the Carthaginians 
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were prudent in a limited, practical way, but failed badly 
in justice; in fact, ItPunica fides" became universally known 
as the antithesis of justice and honor. The Carthaginians were 
subject to wild extremes of fear and exaltation, luxurious, 
and above all, avaricious. They were never cowards in the face 
of danger, but only during one period - roughly from 380 to 
310 B.C., and incidentally the Same period that saw the intro-
duction of Greek gods - did they rise to anything like a 
genuine spirit ot patriotism and fortitude. This, perhaps the 
peak period of Carthaginian culture, had come to an end by the 
time of the Punic Wars, and Home fought a nation that had 
slipped back into its inveterate vices, characterized by a 
public spirit which Plutarch describes as sullen and harsh, 
at one time abject in fear, at another savage in anger, 
stubborn, disagreeable and hard. 
There is little to be said of intellectual culture at 
Carthage. Mention is made of large libraries, but only a few 
meager traces remain, - a travelogue, the title of a treatise 
on agriculture, a word about histories - which seem to indicate 
a practical literature. And yet, toward the end of her 
existence, there is evidence of an interest in philosophy at 
Carthage, for Clitomachus came from there after having taught 
for some years. It is not likely, however, from what we know 
of their other qualities, that the Carthaginians were much 
concerned with speculation, or that they ever produced a great 
literature, since little more than a title has survived the 
the test of time. 
This, then, is the civilization and culture of Carthage as 
portrayed by the writers of Greece and Rome. The picture is a 
single, consistent whole, and offers in general a solid 
historical basis for Chesterton's sue:gest1on that the Punic 
V'lars were a clash of opposing cultures. To demonstrate this 
in detail would require a careful comparison of Carthaginian 
civilization and culture with that of Rome at the time of the 
Punic Wars - a separate study in itself. The end of this 
investigation is attained if Chesterton's impression of 
Carthage is shown to be verified by the testimony of the 
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